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ABSTRACT 
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MERT ŞENCAN 
 
POLITICAL SCIENCE M.A. THESIS, JULY 2019 
 
Thesis Supervisor: Assoc. Prof. Özge Kemahlıoğlu 
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Scholars of populism literature mostly view crisis as one of the key causal independent 
factors for the emergence of populism. Instead of viewing crisis as an available initiator 
element, this study takes into account its perceptual dimension, views crisis indeed as 
failures, and accepts that they can only become crisis when they are perceived as crisis. This 
study aims to focus on Benjamin Moffitt’s claim that the ability of populism to remain power 
depends on its perpetuation failures as crisis. As taking Ernesto Laclau’s conception of 
populism as a base, to check whether this claim may seem to be true for Turkish case, a mixed 
method exploratory research has been run by combining case studies of recent economic 
failure periods with content analysis of president Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s discourses. While 
focusing on periods of failures, Erdoğan’s discourses have been categorized according to 
their potential ability to rise crisis perception of the people of Turkey. Whether Erdoğan’s 
crisis emphasizing populist rhetoric is greater than his crisis denying populist rhetoric has 
been checked per each case, while changes in sense of crisis of the people and support of the 
electorate to AKP have been presented. In that way, not an explanatory but an exploratory 
study has been run to find out whether Erdoğan may fit the “populist” profile that Moffitt 
uses for Hugo Chávez. However, under conditions like small number of cases and constraints 
of discursive data, findings point out Erdoğan may not fit such “populist” profile.  
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ÖZET 
 
 
POPÜLİZM, BOZULMALAR VE KRİZ ALGISI 
 
 
 
MERT ŞENCAN 
 
SİYASET BİLİMİ YÜKSEK LİSANS TEZİ, TEMMUZ 2019 
 
Tez Danışmanı: Doç. Dr. Özge Kemahlıoğlu 
 
 
Anahtar Kelimeler: popülizm, bozulmalar, kriz, kriz algısı 
 
 
Popülizm literatürü uzmanları, krizi çoğunlukla popülizmin ortaya çıkışındaki nedensel 
bağımsız kilit unsurlardan biri olarak görürler. Bu çalışma, krizi hali hazırda bulunan 
tetikleyici bir öğe olarak görmek yerine, onun algısal boyutunu dikkate almakta, krizi aslında 
bozulmalar olarak görmekte ve bozulmaların yalnızca kriz olarak algılandıklarında kriz 
olabileceklerini kabul etmektedir. Bu çalışma Benjamin Moffitt’in popülizmin iktidarda 
kalma becerisinin bozulmaları kriz olarak ebedileştirme becerisine dayandığı iddiasına 
odaklanmaktadır. Ernesto Laclau’nun popülizm anlayışını baz alarak, Türkiye vakası için bu 
iddianın doğru olup olamayabileceğini kontrol etmek için, yakın dönem ekonomik bozulma 
dönemleri örnek olay incelemeleri ile Cumhurbaşkanı Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’ın 
söylemlerinin içerik analizini birleştirilerek karma yöntem ile keşifsel bir araştırma 
yürütülmüştür. Bozulma dönemlerine odaklanılırken, Erdoğan’ın söylemleri Türkiye 
halkının kriz algısını arttırabilme potansiyel becerilerine göre kategorize edilmiştir. Halktaki 
kriz algısındaki ve AKP’ye olan seçmen desteğindeki değişimler sunulurken, Erdoğan’ın kriz 
derinleştirici popülist retoriğinin kriz reddedici popülist retoriğinden daha yüksek olup 
olmadığı her örnek olay için kontrol edilmiştir. Bu yolla, Erdoğan’ın, Moffitt’in Hugo 
Chávez için kullandığı “popülist” profile uyup uymayabileceğini bulmak için nedensel değil 
fakat keşifsel bir çalışma yürütülmüştür. Fakat, bozulma dönemleri sayısının azlığı ve 
söylemsel veri kısıtları gibi şartlar altında, bulgular Erdoğan’ın bu “popülist” profile 
uymayabileceğine işaret ediyor.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
Populism is often viewed as a contested (Mudde 2017, 27; Bonikowski & Gidron 2013, 1; 
Panizza 2005, 1), vague (Mudde 2017, 34), elusive (Taggart 2002, 66), and recurrent (Laclau 
1977, 143) concept. It is said to be ambiguous (Urbinati 2018, 6), pernicious (Müller 2016, 
11), toxic (Ferguson 2016, 20), chameleonic (Taggart 2002, 70), contagious (Pappas 2016, 
35), pragmatic (Mény & Surel 2002; 17, 19), contextual (Canovan 1999, 4), confrontational 
(Bonikowski & Gidron 2013, 3), reactionary (Freeden 2017, 9), direct (Betz 2002, 199), 
performative (Moffitt & Tormey 2014; 388, 394), moralistic (Müller 2016, 20), normative 
(Hawkins, Read, & Pauwels 2017; 279), inclusionary (Mudde & Kaltwasser 2012; 167), 
exclusionary (Moffitt 2015, 202), left-wing (Rodrik 2018, 13), right-wing (Mudde 2004, 
549), and etc. phenomenon. 
Populist politics was often seen as equivalent with a vulpine electoral tactic in semi-
democratic regimes of the Global South, specifically in Latin American politics. However, 
following the end of the Cold War, a global decline in ideological politics showed itself as a 
populist uprising in various disparate geographies. As traditional ideological content is being 
replaced by stylized performances and contemporary politics have become more and more 
stylized, as politicians have becoming like celebrities while protests and various sorts of 
mobilizations gain a stylized character (Moffitt & Tormey 2014; 388, 394). While populist 
politics has been increasingly taking over mainstream politics, it is widely been viewed as 
perilous due to its potential of leading the moralization of politics complemented by a strong 
polarization tendency which leaves a very little space for a peaceful political struggle of 
populism with its competitors. Such struggle is considered as a zero-sum game in which one 
collective identity gradually eliminates the other (Kaltwasser 2012, 199). With regards to its 
hazardous association with representative democracy, scholars frequently use the term 
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populism with metaphors such as shadow (Canovan 1999; 3,10,16; Müller 2016, 11), specter 
(Arditi 2007; 50, 51, 53; Kazin 2017; xi), pathology (Taggart 2002, 62), parasite (Fieschi 
2004, 236), or an “awkward drunken guest" (Arditi 2007, 78). 
This work is not a study focusing on the debate like “populism versus democracy.” Populism 
has become a trending topic among social scientists due to a recent synchronized emergence 
of populist actors, movements, and parties all around the globe. Such simultaneous 
emergence of populist figures has turned into populist wave while “reversing the previous 
acquisitions” of infant democracies, expanded specifically after the end of the Cold War. An 
extensive scrutiny of democratic and non-democratic foundations of populism is beyond the 
scope of this study. I’ll briefly mention such concerns pointing out a decline in democratic 
politics by different scholars under the heading of “why does populism matter.” 
Although there is no consensus on the definition of populism in political science literature, 
scholars widely agree on who populists are (Moffitt 2015, 198). Precisely, many scholars 
agree that leaders such as Donald Trump, Nigel Farage, Marine Le Pen, Geert Wilders, 
Viktor Orbán, Silvio Berlusconi, Alexis Tsipras, Tayyip Erdoğan, Rodrigo Duterte, Juan 
Perón, Hugo Chávez, Alberto Fujimori, Carlos Menem, Fernando Collor de Mello, and etc. 
have been leaders that have owed their political success to populism. However, scholars of 
political science have not achieved to agree on what populism indeed refers to so far. Past 
and present instances of populism vary from one geographical region or a period of time to 
another and this contextuality of the phenomenon in turn makes generalizations of it 
extremely difficult (Urbinati 2018, 4). This is a huge problem, especially when one wants to 
conduct a scientific research in populism. In order to handle this problem, I want to focus on 
three main approaches to populism in the literature, elaborating their pros and cons 
analytically, and attempt to build a minimal definition of which domain is a political one. 
Such a justified minimal definition enables measurement of populism and assist one to 
conduct an empirical study while minimizing the risk of having conceptual stretching 
problems. 
What makes this study different is that I intend to focus on the relationship between populism 
and a sense of crisis. It is claimed that populism can sustain itself while depending on the 
perpetuation of the latter. Scholars of populism literature often view crisis, whether it has a 
3 
 
social, political or economic base, as a key initiatory element for the emergence of populism. 
Almost all works take crisis as a preceding causal element, functioning as an independent 
initiator to provide propitious ground for the rise of populism. In particular, these studies 
attempt to explain the emergence of populism by presupposing it as an oppositional political 
actor or movement, challenging the existing establishment which has been undergoing a 
crisis. However, just few of them mention the perceptual dimension of crisis (Taggart 2002, 
2004; Moffitt 2015; Moffitt & Tormey 2014). And one of them emphasizes that the durability 
of populism depends on its ability to perpetuate crisis (Moffitt 2015) without distinguishing 
populism in power and populism in the opposition. 
This study focuses on populism in power, in Turkey and aims to check Moffitt’s (2015) claim 
supposing that populism, as an outcome of failures, results in a sense of crisis over citizens, 
contributing to its ability to remain power. My intention is to apply this claim to Turkey and 
see whether Erdoğan may be using a similar strategy or not. However, this study is not a 
comprehensive explanatory work. Rather, I intend to explore and check whether Erdoğan, 
during his speeches, attempt to emphasize or deny framing failures in order make a sense of 
crisis among the people or not. If there seems to be an association as Moffitt (2015) argues 
in his claims for Chávez, I intend to check whether such association works for Erdoğan’s 
case or not. 
The first chapter includes an introduction part, a combination of various views of scholars on 
why populism matters, a brief history of populism and structural explanations aiming to 
understand its underlying reasons. In Chapter 2, I’ll present an extensive literature review, 
and I’ll attempt to build a minimal definition in order to make this phenomenon measurable. 
Literature review will provide a detailed descriptive information on three main traditions in 
populism studies, each will follow their own critique sections, in which I intend to create an 
inferential leverage for the conceptualization part and enable a better comprehension of 
populism. After the introduction of theoretical framework mostly based on Laclau’s theory 
of populism, I will create a minimal definition for empirical research. In Chapter 3, once I’ve 
briefly mentioned on how different scholars measure populism in the literature, then I’ll 
explain my research design briefly. This will follow the introduction of my variables and 
cases. In the remaining part of Chapter 3, discourse selections and the criteria I’ve used for 
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it will be explained in detail. Then I will discuss the excerpts and how I’ve made my 
measurements. This will be followed by the introduction of categorical variables and package 
of failures part which I’ve thought to be useful to help me during my research. In Chapter 4, 
I will introduce my cases, and an analysis part will follow. This chapter will come to an end 
with concluding remarks.  
 
 
1.1. Why Does Populism Matter? 
 
 
Either corrective for representative democracy or a threat to it, populism is a crucial 
phenomenon (Van Kessel 2014, 115). Many scholars no longer see populism as a marginal 
reaction, indeed, it is said to have turned into mainstream politics (Mudde 2004; 542, 562; 
Stanley 2008, 96; Mudde 2013, 2; Moffitt 2015, 210; Kaltwasser et al. 2017, 16) and what 
we are witnessing might possibly be a "populist Zeitgeist" (Mudde 2004, 551).  
In concordance with its observable impact on mainstream politics, academic work on 
populism has been expanding (Kaltwasser et al. 2017, 16). Some scholars argue that 
populism will be a regular theme in future politics although today's instances may be 
temporary due to the episodic nature of the phenomenon (Mudde 2004, 563), while some 
others assert that the fate of the democracy depends on it (Kazin 2017, xii). By taking 
populism as a major catalyst for the emergence of competitive authoritarianism, some 
scholars argue even the election of a populist may potentially end up with an institutional 
crisis and thereby distortions within democratic framework (Levitsky & Loxton 2013, 112). 
As Mudde (2013) claims, the real threat to democracy is that the extreme right-wing ideology 
has been gaining respect in the guise of democratic legitimacy (2). A populist contamination 
– that all political parties apply populist themes in their political discourse has turned out to 
be evident (9). In short, populism is contagious and other parties may ineluctably end up with 
shaping their political agenda according to the rising popularity of populists (Taggart 2002, 
76), and thereby it poses a threat against liberal institutional framework and strengthen 
illiberal politics (Pappas 2016, 35). Populist influence on mainstream parties may result in 
their plummeting legitimacy, effectiveness, and sustainability (Bonikowski & Gidron 2013, 
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27). Thus, the real power of populist politics comes from its potential ability to change the 
rules of the game in representative politics. While mobilizing within representative politics, 
populism may pose a serious threat to it (Taggart 2002, 78). Populism is frequently 
emphasized as a destabilizing element of democratic politics (Moffitt & Tormey 2014, 382) 
and thought to be equivalent with non-democratic attitudes.  
Populism undermines political institutions, lowers the quality of knowledge of the electorate 
about the political system and it motivates reactions based on fear and resentment rather 
informing electorates for policy debates and building a possible social consensus 
(Bonikowski 2016, 22). It may jeopardize democracy’s functioning via a distrust towards 
institutional procedures and conflicts with institutional framework, as attempts to undermine 
separation of powers and the rule of law (Arditi 2007, 52). As Moffitt & Tormey (2014) point 
out populist leaders apply discursive references to the elite or political establishment as 
sources of crisis, corruption, political malfunctioning of the system and introduce the people 
as their cheated and oppressed victims. Hence, populists may apply a denying discourse of 
experts' expertise, adapt an attitude against technocracy and bureaucracy (391). By 
undercutting the confidence in institutions, leading polarization, and political stalemates, it 
raises tension and rivalries within the society which further enhances inequalities 
(Bonikowski 2016, 23). Furthermore, huge mass support may be more determinative than 
institutional constraints and therefore can evolve into an ability to change not only 
institutional but also democratic regime structure. Concisely, institutional constraints may be 
insignificant when a populist movement with a massive support comes to power and pursue 
a change in constitutional framework (Hawkins, Read, & Pauwels 2017, 275). That’s why 
many scholars consider populism as a toxic phenomenon for democratic politics and a 
malicious threat against party systems (Bonikowski & Gidron 2013; 17, 18). As Taggart 
(2004) remarks, if underestimated and disdained, the impact of populism on political settings 
may be overwhelming, as in the case of Italy in the early 1990s. The distrust in political 
system may lead a complete transformation of the party system in the country and a complete 
change in constitutional settings (283).  
To Bonikowski & Gidron (2013), if still ignored, populist politics, especially within an 
unconsolidated democracy, may even be responsible for reversions from democracy (22). 
6 
 
Levitsky and Loxton’s (2013) contend that if populists become successful in benefiting from 
the discontent with the status-quo and weak party systems, in their attacks on institutions of 
horizontal accountability, then fragile democracies are likely to slide into competitive 
authoritarianism (107, 108, 112). Even if we merely focus on European context, 
deconsolidation as a consequence and a complementary phenomenon of populist surge, may 
not only pose a threat to unconsolidated and infant democracies of Eastern and Central 
European post-communist states such as Poland or Hungary. That means, populism may even 
thrive in established democracies (Bonikowski & Gidron 2013, 24). As Foa and Mounk 
(2017) remarks, there is a growing disaffection toward democracy in Western liberal 
democracies and now it’s the time to question the assumption that asserts once a democracy 
is consolidated, then it will last forever (8, 9).  Although democracies do not disappear 
overnight and deconsolidation does not necessarily end up with a breakdown, it is one of the 
most important signs of a democratic failure (Foa & Mounk 2016; 16, 17). 
Due to this perilous potential against representative democracy, populism is mostly viewed 
and studied as a serious negative phenomenon. Nevertheless, contrary to such negative 
perception and an extensive usage with pejorative epithets, some scholars claim that 
populism may have some positive repercussions. Beside its aforementioned detrimental 
potentials, populism can serve as a warning to the power elite that the system has begun to 
malfunction (Mény & Surel 2002, 15), and gives a chance to experts to pinpoint the 
weaknesses of the system (Taggart 2002, 78). With manifestations of the discontent of 
masses (Mény & Surel 2002, 21), it may provide a legitimate voice for excluded groups 
(Bonikowski & Gidron 2013, 19), therefore can be corrective for democracy when politics 
become too distant and unresponsive to people's demands (Müller 2016; 8, 61). In short, 
populism can be read as a reactive force against deterioration of representation (Mény & 
Surel 2002, 13), and the rise of populist movements can give us clues about shortcomings 
and inherent deficiencies of representative politics (Taggart 2004, 286). After all, the gains 
of populism in the world history cannot be ignored when one looks into 19th century U.S. 
populists' contributions to the development of social democracy concept, via advocation of 
democratic reforms and demands of a regulatory state structure (Müller 2016, 90).  
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1.2. A Brief History of Populism 
 
 
Although the concept of populism was developed by social sciences in the post-war era (Di 
Tella 1997, 188), populism is indeed a historical phenomenon that has reoccurred since 1890s 
(Canovan 1999, 12), that even American politics has witnessed a party labeled itself as 
“populist” in late 19th century (Müller 2016, 85). As Urbinati (2018) points out, first instances 
of populism appeared in the late 19th century. In Tsarist Russia, Narodnichestvo had an 
intellectual ideal suggesting an agrarian type of communitarian society which consists of 
"uncontaminated peasants" whereas the People's Party in the U.S. was an ethical political 
movement aiming to protect individual producers against industrialization and corporate 
capitalism and challenge power elites by referring the constitution (4, 5). In time, populism 
sprang into Latin America and turned into a movement which has different mainstays such 
as nationalism, charismatic leadership, and mass support of "the people," thereby evolved 
into authoritarian regimes run by Perón in Argentina and Vargas in Brazil during 1940s and 
1950s (Jagers & Walgrave 2007, 322). By applying state power in order to downgrade 
liberalism, stunt political opposition, protect conventional ethical norms, and empower 
middle class masses both politically and economically, Latin American populism thrived in 
the age of socioeconomic modernization (Urbinati 2018, 5). On the other hand, on European 
continent, populism emerged as a right-wing reactionary politics (Taggart 2002, 70). During 
Post-War period, populism thrived in a guise of far-right politics during 1970s, as a reaction 
to traditional politics, emphasizing its neglectful dimension, and proposes new laws and 
policies on immigration, taxation and crime, while depending on nationalism (Jagers & 
Walgrave 2007, 322). During 1980s and 1990s, the term "populism" was used to mark 
politicians who conducted irresponsible statist economic policies (Aslanidis 2016, 95; Di 
Tella 1997, 188). Also called as economic populism, fiscal irresponsibility which appeared 
as rulers’ extravagant distribution of economic benefits to the people for the sake of raising 
their mass support, focused on short-term gains of popularity results with deep crisis in the 
long run that masses would be worse off inevitably (Weyland 2017, 51). However, as Latin 
American 'neoliberal' populists (Carlos Menem, Alberto Fujimori, Fernando Collor de 
Mello) took over the political scene, extravagant statist economic policy decisions no longer 
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viewed as a criterion to pinpoint populism (Aslanidis 2016, 95; Weyland 2001, 8; Weyland 
2017, 51). In short, populist experiences have adopted rural form (in 19th century U.S.), 
revolutionary form (in Tsarist Russia), urban mass movement form (as Peronism in 
Argentina) and extreme right-wing forms (in contemporary Europe) (Taggart 2002, 70). 
Furthermore, populism was identified with economic policy choices for a short period of 
time in 1980s and 1990s, and polemically associated with the rise of fascism and national 
socialism in Europe during 1930s. 
As scholars do not agree upon what populism is, they therefore demonstrate disagreements 
on its history as well. To Müller (2016) fascism experience of Germany and Italy in 1930s 
had populist characteristics - they were not just fascist, racist, violent movements but also 
populist movements gathered around a radical leader profile (93). On the contrary, to 
Ferguson (2016), the tone of interwar fascism involved a serious level of militarism, 
eventually fascists prepared for the war, wore uniforms, and went to war (13). However, he 
contends that populists tend to trigger trade wars, not real ones (21). While Barr (2009) 
contends that the U.S. agrarian movement seen at the end of 19th century was not populist 
because it had a bottom-up characteristic, with participatory linkages (38, 39). In contrast, 
Vittori (2017) argues that leaderless movements are a priori viewed as non-populists, which 
indeed may not be the case (51). Disagreements among scholars on “populist” instances are 
indeed numerous. Before presenting their assessment criteria, I’d like to mention on 
structural causalities, subjected to some grand theories, enabled many scholars to develop 
functionalist explanations according to critical junctures of political history. Development, 
complemented by traumatic transformative changes that human beings have gone through, 
have always been inspirational for scholars to create their own theories which seek to 
interpret episodic populist surges. 
 
 
1.3. On Structural Theories 
 
 
Political scientists mostly don't examine populism within a historical unity (Bonikowski & 
Gidron 2013, 3). Aforementioned episodic emergences of populism through the history have 
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pushed scholars to develop structural explanations for populist surge since alleged particular 
causes are too distinct and numerous to provide a unified explanation for its escalation. For 
instance, populism is associated with harsh economic conditions (Canovan 1999, 12), a 
severe financial crisis (Ferguson 2016, 16), globalization shocks (Rodrik 2018, 2), a feeling 
of deprivation of power (Mény & Surel 2002, 11), the ability "to appeal to, and mobilize 
popular ressentiments” (Betz 2002, 211), the decline of ideological politics (Moffitt & 
Tormey 2014, 387; Mudde 2004, 555), distrust to elites and institutions (Taggart 2002, 69), 
technocracy (Müller, 2016, 96), immigration and multiculturalism (Betz 2002, 211), a 
resentment against crime (Mudde 2013, 11), the rise of artificial intelligence (Inglehart & 
Norris 2017; 18, 19, 22, 23), etc. Instead of focusing on particularity of these all alleged 
causes, structural explanations seek to find underlying causes of populism by looking at the 
big picture and attempt to develop theories of material and non-material causalities. My 
intention is to mention some of these theories as briefly as possible, since I suppose these are 
valuable assertions which may help one to comprehend populism better, and thereby helpful 
to develop a conceptualization 
Among some mostly asserted structural theories, Di Tella’s relative deprivation thesis 
emphasizes the asynchronism of disparate development levels of developing world versus 
developed world, and rising expectations of the people in developing world due to this 
mismatch (Laclau 1977, 151). To Di Tella (1997), once a certain social and economic level 
is achieved, satisfying demands of entrepreneurs and working-class people is essential and 
populism ineluctably rises due to this requirement (199). The core argument of this thesis as 
people living in developing countries, which are on the periphery of developed countries, 
witness the level of wealth in the developed world and want to have a high level of wealth as 
their counterparts living in the developed world enjoy (Hawkins, Read, and Pauwels 2017, 
272). In another theory, Betz (1994) emphasizes two big transformative changes: First, the 
end of the Cold War and a shift towards a unified world capitalist economy, and second the 
rise in globalization and fluid forms of capital, labor, information technology, services, etc. 
Betz argues, that these changes have brought tremendous impact on work force (27, 28), 
which in turn led a sense of powerlessness, resentment, and anxiety among the people, and 
prepared a suitable political environment for radical right-wing populists to exploit such 
emotions (38). Likewise, Inglehart & Norris (2016) resort to economic insecurity thesis in 
10 
 
order to explain populist escalation in Western democracies. This thesis is based on the 
overwhelming impact of substantial changes over the workforce and the society in the post-
industrial economies (1). It claims that due to catastrophic impacts of modernization, 
globalization, and neo-liberalism, such as atomized workforce, the erosion of unionized 
labor, sharp decline in manufacturing industry, neo-liberal austerity policies, rising income 
inequality, etc., the rise in economic anxiety and social deprivation have enhanced the 
sensitivity of low income and less secured parts of the society to xenophobic, nativist, anti-
establishment populist rhetoric (2, 10, 11, 12). With regards to non-material dimensions of 
transformative changes, Hawkins, Read, and Pauwels (2017) focus on Durkheimian mass 
society thesis which associates the rise of popular grievances with changes in social relations 
due to the atomization of the workforce after industrialization. According to this thesis, 
increasing mediatory salience of the state in social relations evoked the shift of power from 
individuals and their social formations to impersonal bureaucratic institutions (269). Norms 
and values that function like an integrative cement of the society, such as social 
consciousness, collective action, solidarity slowly drifted away from members of the society 
(269). A crisis of identity, appeared as a void which would be filled by populists, and 
instrumentalized as a motor power to trigger mass mobilization (269). In a similar vein, 
Inglehart & Norris (2016) also mention counter-silent revolution which emerged as a hostility 
to the spread of progressive and post materialist values originated from leftist student 
demonstrations of 1960s and 1970s and pervaded all over the globe (13). Such progressive 
values accompanied by an erosion in traditional and conventional values, a sense of loss 
especially among members of older generations and less educated individuals, thereby 
following their resentment due to a sense of losing privileges, consequently contributed the 
rise of populism (14). 
 
 
1.3.1. Critique of Structural Theories 
 
All of these theories are extremely valuable with regards to their ability to bring a macro 
vision to the reader, and thereby facilitate critical commentaries not only for populism but 
also for many other social phenomena. However, they have some serious shortcomings.  
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First of all, structural efforts often do not even tend to define populism. Rather, they are more 
likely to speculate on it axiomatically (Laclau 1977, 154). They are unable to build a unified 
logic of populism, that can be applied to any part of the world (Hawkins, Read, and Pauwels 
2017, 274). More clearly, these theories may be unable to provide an overarching explanation 
for populism due to their inherent spatial limitations. For instance, Di Tella’s relative 
deprivation thesis can be applied to explain populism in Latin American while it cannot be 
used to commentate on populism in Western developed democracies. This theory implies 
that once a society gets more developed, then it must gain an immunity against populism 
(Laclau 1977; 153, 154). But when we look at populism in today’s Western developed world, 
we see that’s not the case. As Kaltwasser (2012) populist parties and movements also appear 
in Norway and Switzerland (188). Moreover, as Laclau (1977) contends, viewing populism 
as an outcome of asynchronism of different development levels of nations is problematic per 
se. The reason is fascism is Italy during 1920s was associated with Italy's agrarian 
underdevelopment status and therefore surmised that no industrialized country would 
experience it. The ones who developed such theses obviously couldn't anticipate the zenith 
of fascism would take place in highly industrialized Germany (153). 
Secondly, these theories may lack explanatory power with regards to not only a spatial 
dimension but also a temporal one. For instance, as Hawkins, Read, and Pauwels (2017) 
argue, Betz’s thesis might explain structural transformation that globalization has created in 
the medium term, especially for western consolidated democracies (271). However, scholars 
emphasize its weak explanatory power for the long-term existence of populism in Latin 
America (271). Any explanation based on historical shifts (for example, from export-oriented 
economies to import substitution industrialization, or from nationalism to neoliberalism) is 
reductionist and doomed to fail to provide a satisfactory explanation for populism (de la Torre 
2000, 139). If populism were equivalent with import substitution industrialization in Latin 
America, then no one would talk about populism today for Latin American context, since 
this type of development had largely been abandoned (Knight 1998, 238). Moreover, as 
Laclau (1977) argues, any relation with populism and import substitution industrialization 
has to be proved, especially for the period between 1930 and 1960 in Latin America (177). 
In concordance with such a doubtful remark, de la Torre (2000) asserts that claimed 
correlation between import substitution industrialization and populism may not be as high as 
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expected. In Brazil, import substitution began to be implemented before 1930s and populism 
emerged during 1940s and in Peru and Ecuador, populism emerged before import 
substitution industrialization took place (5).  
Thirdly, despite their valuable effort, these functionalist approaches may also be misleading 
in terms of viewing world political and economic history as a subject of social experiment. 
What I mean is, taking modernization or globalization as mere independent variables in a 
ceteris paribus logic is not possible. Huge transformative changes have had too many 
repercussions, which ultimately have been in interaction with one another. For instance, as 
Inglehart & Norris (2016) admit, drawing a clear-cut distinction between economic 
inequality and cultural backlash theories is extremely difficult. There may be a series of 
interaction processes between economic and cultural settings and those two may interact and 
mutually feed each other. As globalization enhances the level of economic insecurity, then it 
may trigger a cultural backlash among conservatives who are more inclined to protect 
traditional norms and values (3). In short, changes might erupt after critical junctures like the 
end of WWII or Cold War, but history and so does the social life have a continuity. Therefore, 
phenomena such as industrialization, modernization, urbanization, and globalization cannot 
be considered as totally distinct.  
Fourthly, and most importantly, as Weyland (2001) argues, structural explanations of 
modernization or dependency theories overlooked the impact of politics by an overstating 
focus on social and economic transformations (5). They discredit the autonomy of politics 
while shifting the domain of the phenomenon from political to economical (8). Equating 
populism with economic preferences and defining it over economic decisions will inevitably 
end up with misconceptions. These misconceptions contribute stretching the scope of this 
notorious concept further. Populists may have got involved with flamboyant redistribution 
policies ending up with fiscal irresponsibility however, such policies don’t seem to be under 
the monopoly of populists since many other governments also apply such tactics, particularly 
when elections are about to take place (Knight 1998; 242, 243). Moreover, as Weyland 
(2001) points out, fiscal irresponsibility, a.k.a. economic populism, cannot be attributed only 
to populist leaders, it is indeed an outcome of consequential decisions of parliaments or 
governments and underlying reasons may vary from case to case (11). Instead of focusing on 
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commonly agreed upon policy preferences, as Betz (2002) asserts, contextual specificity is 
important in populism and populist movements should be checked case by case, rather than 
resorting overarching explanations (213). Because populism has a contextual sensitivity, it 
suffers from conceptual ambiguity (Rooduijn and Pauwels 2011, 1272). 
 
 
1.4. Implications 
 
 
Before concluding this chapter, I contend that the relationship between populism and big 
social transformative changes, which constitute building blocks for structural theories 
mentioned above, points out a simple, but at the same time a complicated relationship. On 
the one hand, the relationship is simple because all these structural factors indicate a core 
causal factor - a crisis as a common denominator, whether it’s social, political, or economic. 
In particular, populist escalation has mostly been associated with systematic economic crises, 
globalization shocks or recessions (Ferguson 2016, 16; Kazin 2017, xiii; Laclau 1977; 175, 
176; Rodrik 2018, 2; Weyland 1999, 397), social traumas (Hawkins, Read, and Pauwels 
2017, 269; Inglehart & Norris 2016; 13, 14) or a crisis of representation (Müller 2016; 78, 
79; Taggart 2002; 69, 72; Stavrakakis 2017, 549; Urbinati 2018, 3; Van Kessel 2014; 99, 
100). On the other hand, it is complicated or maybe viewed as loose because these social 
transformative changes subjected to structural theories, have neither attempted to impede 
expressions of popular demands nor developed mechanisms hindering populist escalation. 
As Taggart (2002) remarks, modernization may have created conditions for populism, but at 
the same time, it resulted with an institutional area that populists can utter their grievances 
and direct their frustration to (73). But what does that mean and why is this remark 
noteworthy?  
It is noteworthy because if these big transformative changes have constituted underlying 
reasons that in turn triggered populism as claimed, and if they haven’t built mechanism to 
hamper it, then different populists must continuously and almost mechanically rise to and 
fall from the political scene around the globe. There would be a complete populist saturation 
over what is political, only populists and their populist substitutes, not any other forms. As 
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I’ve mentioned above, the social history has a continuity which inherently embodies the 
change that no one can stand against. No political entity can fight against globalization, the 
spread of information, artificial intelligence, flows of capital and people, as none could have 
resisted industrialization, capitalization, modernization, and urbanization due to the 
pervasiveness of such phenomena and power competition between nations. Whenever 
countries attempt to resist the change, they end up with a limited ruling capability, they lose 
international and domestic power, and ultimately fail. However, the change is continuous 
and often comes with a group of new losers, that means the people have faced and will face 
with constant crisis. If we are in a constant crisis era, and if crisis automatically leads 
populism, then how can we explain long time uninterrupted presence of populists at their 
office (Chávez, Duterte, Erdoğan, Orbán, etc.) without any challenges from their potential 
substitutes, oppositional populist counterparts? Is it all about weak oppositional challenges 
or skewing the even playing field of democratic politics? The answer of this question is 
beyond the scope of this study since it requires an extensive empirical research. But populists 
in general, are expected to rise and fall due to a commonly agreed upon idea that the longer 
a populist politician remains in power, the less likely he/she will apply to populist discourse 
(Bonikowski 2016, 15). As Knight (1998) remarks, populism as an outcome of crisis and 
confrontation, has a “limited shelf-life”. In the long run, it inherently loses its momentum 
and fail, or loses its populist character and gain a completely different one - gets 
institutionalized and thereby mutated as in the case of Peronism (231). In a similar vein, 
Weyland (2001) argues that neoliberal populists (Menem and Fujimori), although less 
institutionalized than Peronism, ultimately failed since neoliberal prescriptions were painful 
for the people, and that’s why they attempted to boost fiscal expenditure before electoral 
campaigns in order to benefit it from politically (17). Thus, if conditions continue to be harsh 
for the people and if the change comes with crisis despite its episodic severity, brings a group 
of new and snowballing losers, how can one answer the question mentioned above by 
applying an inferential logic? 
An inferential answer is in accord with points mentioned above with regards to populism’s 
limited shelf-life, and implicitly given by Taggart’s (2002, 2004). He contends that “self-
limiting quality” is one of populism’s core feature and it refers to the assumption which 
presupposes that populist mobilization only occurs against a sense of crisis, and naturally, 
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populists cannot sustain such sort of mobilization in the long run since once they have 
achieved power, they inevitably tend to adopt new forms of politics and get institutionalized 
(69, 78; 276). To Knight (1998), contrary to frequent remarks on the association between 
populism and crisis, such association would be problematic since crisis itself a vague term, 
under-theorized (227). In a similar vein, Moffitt (2015) argues that what political science 
literature views as a crisis indeed is a failure, which can manifest itself over objective 
indicators (197). On the contrary, crisis is not a neutral objective phenomenon, it has no clear 
but boundaries. Instead, what determines its scope is what we think, feel, and express about 
it (190, 194, 195, 197). Hence, a crisis is indebted to its occurrence to the degree that it is 
perceived as crisis (Moffitt 2015, 197; Moffitt & Tormey 2014, 391) and such perception is 
achieved by “spectacularization” of a failure by performative populist style (Moffitt 2015, 
197). Examples can be given as Hugo Chávez’s emphasis on imperialist conspiracies and 
Geert Wilders' Islamophobian remarks arguing that the Dutch society is under a perpetual 
attack due to rising Islamization (Moffitt & Tormey 2014, 392). To Moffitt (2015), such 
populist performances do not eliminate the fact that crises are temporal phenomena – running 
a constant performance of crisis is not easy (207). If populism is a reactionary phenomenon 
to a sense of severe crisis as Taggart (2002, 69) argues, then its existence and sustainability 
depends on maintaining a propaganda that deepens and perpetuate crisis (Moffitt 2015, 209). 
To Moffitt (2015), Chávez was able to run his "performance of crisis" in a linear and gradual 
manner and that’s why he remained in power and had been able to rule his country (207). In 
other words, populists who skillfully perpetuate a performance of crisis and achieve to extend 
it to a longer period of time have longer political lifetime than the ones who are unable to do 
so (208).  
But one can wonder how a populist can perpetuate a sense crisis despite his/her position as 
the head of the government. In a possible populist escalation scenario, we expect that a 
populist challenges established elites during a crisis, when the power bloc of those elites is 
highly fragile. Once the populist has achieved power and begun to rule, then he/she inevitably 
will face with new losers of the change (not only refers to the change as I’ve used through 
this part which refers to an inevitable inconvenience that a structural transformation brings 
over the people, but also, as I’ll explain later, refers to an inevitable exclusion at least for 
some part of the society, due to the inherent exclusionary nature of populism), thereby face 
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with a dissatisfaction which he/she is expected to instrumentalize as a mean of mobilization 
against the previous power bloc. Moreover, as populism continues to rule, it may deviate into 
a more institutionalized and routinized path in order to obtain a durability, thereby ultimately 
loses its mobilizational power, as mentioned above (Knight 1998; 231, 232; Taggart 2002; 
69, 78; Taggart 2004, 276). Once populism has reached that level, then it becomes 
responsible for the failures that masses mostly would pay the price. But as Moffitt’s (2015) 
remark for the case of Chávez mentioned above, the trick seems to be convincing citizens 
that they are the target of an existential threat. What the people can do is to get mobilized 
against this threat and support their leader.  
I will continue to explain this mobilization and its relationship in terms of instrumentalizing 
of a sense of crisis in the conceptualization part since it requires further theoretical 
clarification. Before that, I want to go into the next chapter, and continue to mention on three 
main traditions in populism. 
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2. THEORETICAL PART 
 
 
 
2.1. Ideational Approach 
 
 
Ideational tradition has grown as the most popular approach in populism studies with regards 
to quantity of contributors and publications. Prominent scholars of this tradition are Cas 
Mudde and Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser (2013), Catherine Fieschi (2004), and Ben Stanley 
(2008). This view of populism has roots in Michael Freeden’s thin centred ideology concept. 
In his influential work, Freeden (1998) defines a thin-centred ideology as an ideology that 
“arbitrarily severs itself from wider ideational contexts, by the deliberate removal and 
replacement of concepts" (750). Freeden argues that a thin-centred ideology is unable to offer 
complex range of explanations due to nonexistence of chained ideas between the abstract 
conceptual core and concrete and practical conceptual periphery. It is this limited ideational 
structure that makes it thin-centred (750). In short, while a full ideology is capable to provide 
wide range of answers to political issues of societies create, a thin-centred ideology is not. 
Cas Mudde (2004), who is the pioneer of ideational approach, defines populism as "an 
ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and 
antagonistic groups, ‘the pure people’ versus ‘the corrupt elite’, and which argues that politics 
should be an expression of the volonté générale (general will) of the people" (543). This 
definition asserts that populism have two polar opposites: elitism and pluralism (543). In 
another work, Mudde & Kaltwasser (2013) point out that elitism refers to the belief that 
people are banal and not trustworthy but elites, on the other hand, are superior in terms of 
culture, intellect, and morality. Pluralism refers to a reference to the heterogenous structure 
of the society with various power centers, and society is not pure confrontation of 
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homogenous “the people” versus “the elite.” Due to pluralistic form the society, no one can 
talk about a phenomenon like “the general will.” Pluralism, in this respect, means tolerating 
and encouraging ethnic, cultural, religious minorities to pursue their own way of living (152).  
Mudde views populism as a thin-centred ideology, which means, it has limited scope and 
ambition than thick ideologies, such as socialism or liberalism. This thin-centered 
characteristic of populism disables an ability to offer or formulate broad menu of solutions 
to major issues (Mudde 2017, 30). However, according to this conceptualization of populism, 
it can integrate itself with other thin or thick sorts of ideologies such as; communism, 
socialism, nationalism or ecologism (Mudde 2004, 544). Likewise, Fieschi (2004) contends 
that populism has a parasitic, symbiotic and fulfilling relationship with mainstream 
ideologies (236), and it can only function and perform when it finds a host ideology, it cannot 
stand on itself (238). In concordance with such views, Stanley (2008) views populism as a 
complementary ideology and a receptive partner for full scaled ideologies. To Stanley, 
populism is compelled to remain as conceptually thin due to a great range of its own versions 
(107). One other crucial point of Stanley’s work is his emphasis on interpretations. Stanley 
contends that ideas are individual interpretations of the world, and ideologies are interpretive 
frameworks constituted by a set of ideas as concepts (Stanley 2008, 98). 
Scholars of ideational approach also accentuate the emotional dimension of populism. In 
order to undergird their remarks, they apply Taggart’s concept of heartland which refers to a 
splendid image of the historical times of a nation when there was not such inconveniences 
and defects of today's politics such as globalization, immigration, heavy tax burdens and etc. 
(Taggart 2002, 68). To Taggart, heartland as a romanticized grandeur and unifying concept, 
brings the people together and constitute the population of it (Taggart 2002; 67, 68). Mudde 
applies to Taggart's heartland concept as an equivalence of initiator of a populist surge. He 
claims that heartland becomes active under unusual circumstances such as a mixture of 
political resentment, a serious threat against usual way of living, or presence of an attractive 
populist leader (Mudde 2004, 547). Similarly, Fieschi uses the term “empty heart” as an 
equivalence of Taggart’s heartland and argues that this concept indeed refers to the thin-
centredness of populism (Fieschi 2004, 238). To Fieschi, a sine qua non feature of populism 
is its appeal to the people. Populism relies on positive valorization of the people vis a vis the 
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elite (Fieschi 2004, 237). In short, populism significantly relies on sentiments, it refers to the 
realm of the sentiment instead of rationality (Fieschi 2004, 238). 
For the last two decades, ideational approach has mustered up wide support from various 
scholars. Numerous works on populism has viewed it as a thin or loose ideology and 
conducted their analyses according to ideational definitions. Frequently asserted advantages 
of ideational approach are its ability to provide measurability to empirical studies of 
populism, both of which can be qualitative or quantitative (Mudde 2017, 35), and can study 
populism both on the elite and on mass level (Mudde 2017, 39). 
 
 
2.1.1. Critique of Ideational Approach 
 
 
Although ideational approach is widely adopted in populism studies, it has begun to lose its 
initial popularity. As ideational debate has permeated to the literature, it has had serious 
backlash from scholars of other approaches. Besides, even Freeden (2017) is involved to this 
debate, by an article on Brexit and populism, questioned whether populism may be accepted 
as a thin-centred ideology or not. Before Freeden’s response on his thin-centred concept and 
its alleged relation with populism, I’d like to mention on some important reactions of various 
scholars to ideational tradition. 
First of all, Van Kessel (2014) emphasizes that viewing populism as a thin-ideology requires 
a fixed classification of parties or movements which are populist and non-populist, according 
to a defining ideological characteristic (102), and as Aslanidis (2016) remarks, an ideology 
has to have coherence (89). But as Taggart (2004) underscores, the fact that populism lack 
core values would ineluctably result in a great "chameleonic" and therefore, a context 
dependent nature. By the term "chameleonic," Taggart implies that populism is like a liquid 
that can take the shape of a whatever it is into (275). Likewise, while Canovan (1999) admits 
populists might have some principles, she remarks that due to context dependency and 
absence of core values, they do not show adherence to any particular ideology (4). According 
to Mény & Surel (2002) populism is highly pragmatic and not stable, such chameleonic 
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nature may inevitably result in switching their strategies according to changing events and 
rules of the game (17, 19). In short, due to the lack of a core program, one can hardly talk 
about a possible populist ideology (Van Kessel 2014, 102). 
Secondly, Mudde (2017) argues that ideological elements in populism cannot be overlooked. 
Even in organizational definitions of populism, especially for the ones used for Latin 
American cases, such elements are apparent (28). Contrary to this logic, Di Tella (1997) 
contends that having ideological elements or bonds cannot be considered as a determinant in 
populism. For instance, as in the case of Wałęsa in Poland, rightist or Catholic bonds of a 
political actor does not automatically make him a non-populist or does not reduce his populist 
quality (192). Besides, to Hawkins (2009), unlike any ideology, populism cannot provide 
clear policy preferences. It is unstable, innately does not have crystal-clear arguments, and 
has a subjective quality which is expressed by the rhetoric of the orator (1045). Furthermore, 
as Panizza (2005) remarks, populist narratives may employ various ideological themes and 
arguments, myths and symbols in order to enable the identification of the leader with the 
people (20). That’s why it may be very hard to find a common ideological ground that is 
shared by all populist movements and organizations (Bonikowski & Gidron 2013, 5). To 
Bonikowski (2016), populism can be seen in both right and left sphere of the political 
spectrum. While it appears with the patterns of islamophobia (17), ethno-nationalism and 
distrust in the political system in richer European countries as the right-wing populism. In 
poorer Southern Europe, it usually emerges as a reaction against neoliberal policies (20, 21). 
Moreover, even the very same political actor may apply populism in one campaign and may 
not use it in another one (Bonikowski’s examples are Eisenhower’s campaigns in 1952 and 
1956; Clinton’s in 1992 and 1996) (13). Hence, populism cannot be viewed as a coherent 
world view or ideology (23).  
Thirdly, as Moffitt & Tormey (2014) point out, Freeden contends that thin ideologies, despite 
their limited conceptual cores, continuously strive to expand their conceptual articulations 
and target to turn into more developed ideologies via enhancing their ideational intensities 
and visionary capabilities (383). However, scholars argue that populism seems to lack such 
efforts. What is more, to Moffit & Tormey (2014), political formations rarely present 
themselves as populist. There is not a unified body of global populism like Populist 
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International. There has been neither a philosopher nor a theoretical text shedding light on a 
full-developed and broad populism theory and endeavoring to broaden its ideational 
horizons. Although it embodies some ideational elements, the history of populism lacks a 
common originator of populist formations beside late 19th century of People's Party in USA 
and Narodnichestvo in Tsarist Russia (383, 384). In short, populism lacks vision and 
universality (Aslanidis 2016, 89; Betz 1994, 107). 
Fourthly, to Aslanidis (2016), when one offers a direct opposite of a concept, or an antithesis 
of a thesis, the two has to be equivalent with regards to conceptual hierarchy (91). To Mudde 
(2004), populism has two polar opposites: elitism and pluralism (543). Based on this 
definitional argument, Aslanidis (2016) contends that these two must also be thin-centered 
ideologies as well (91). He asserts that Pappas' (2016) analysis at this point makes more sense 
since he defines populism as "democratic illiberalism." To Aslanidis (2016), taking populism 
as ideology requires such sort of conceptualization. But the distinction between what is thin 
and what is thick is obviously highly interpretative (91). In sum, viewing populism as a thin-
centered ideology ineluctably leads conceptual stretching and thereby enhancing the 
confusion about populism (91, 92). 
Lastly, many years after his influential work that has been an inspiration for scholars of 
ideational approach, Freeden (2017) has written an article on populism and Brexit. In this 
work, Freeden himself contends that populism may not be considered as a thin-centred 
ideology. To Freeden, populism is different than other thin-centred ideologies such as 
nationalism, ecologism or feminism, due to its essence and morphology. In terms of its 
essence, populism is reflective, it lacks transformative capacity to drive a future change. And 
due to its morphology, it has a limited nature to embody elements of other ideologies and 
lack of capacity to turn itself into a full ideology. Freeden also remarks that thin-centred 
ideologies have a potential to become full ideologies when they embody features of other 
ideologies. However, populism does neither show such a potential nor a desire to do so. The 
populist core doesn't let any broader ideational inclusion (3). Besides, although precision is 
not a prerequisite for ideologies (2), the core of populism varies according to societies and 
circumstances, which makes an analysis of the core difficult (4). What is more, except its 
core ideas, populism highly lacks coherence within itself, while ideologies are expected to 
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have at least some level of coherence. Due to this inconsistent nature of populism, it cannot 
even be compared with other ideologies (6, 7). Moreover, Freeden also points out that what 
happens in the peripheral section of populism (an economic crisis, a judicial intervention, a 
severe increase in immigration, etc.) almost has an instant access to the core of populism. In 
full developed ideologies, except serious emergences like war or terrorism, that speed is far 
lower due to filters around the core, and the path that goes to the heart of a comprehensive 
ideology is wavy. That absence of ideological filters around the populist core engenders 
vulnerability of speedy transmissions of ideational and political emergencies and fabricated 
crisis, ensuing impulsive abrupt reactions from populists (6). 
In sum, I have enough reasons to claim that ideational approach to populism is not a proper 
way to run a populism research due to its flaws and misconceptions remarked by many 
different scholars mentioned above. Although ideational elements in today’s populists cannot 
be ignored, they seem just like a tip of the iceberg. Therefore, if one wants to fully 
comprehend populism phenomenon, he/she has to go deeper below. After all, as I have 
pointed out, ideational approach to populism couldn’t find a support even from Michael 
Freeden, the creator of thin-centred ideology concept. In short, I agree with Aslanidis’ (2018) 
point asserting that ideational approach to populism offers nothing more than a Manichaean 
outlook, which is also emphasized by discursive tradition (1244). 
 
 
2.2. Strategic Approach 
 
 
Frontrunners of this tradition are Kurt Weyland (1999, 2001, 2017), Robert Barr (2009), 
Kenneth M. Roberts (2006), and Nadia Urbinati (2018). This approach is inclined to view 
populism as a strategic movement of which ultimate goal is to achieve power (Urbinati 2018), 
and take policy preferences, party structures, and types of mobilization as units in their 
studies (Bonikowski & Gidron 2013, 10). In general, this approach is different than two other 
main approaches with regards to its emphasis on actions rather than rhetoric, party 
organization, a strong emphasis on the leader, and the direct relationship between the leader 
and followers. 
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As an identified name with this tradition, Weyland (2017) views populism as a political 
strategy in which a personalistic leader seeks ways to raise the influence of his/her supporters 
and exercises their power (55). Populists appear on political scene in order to win and 
maintain political power via mass mobilization, with emphasis on achieving will of the 
people. Personalistic leaders appeal to masses which are heterogeneous and loosely 
institutionalized, and heavily rely on unmediated contact (59). To Barr (2009), populism may 
be viewed as an attempt to re-institutionalize of politics, in terms of replacing horizontal 
accountability of institutional framework with vertical accountability of a single political 
actor via building vertical ties between the leader and his/her followers (45). However, in 
order to talk about populism, we need three necessary conditions: anti-establishment rhetoric, 
outsiders and vertical linkages between the ruler and the ruled. When separated and become 
uncombined, none of these features refers to populism on their own (44). In concordance 
with such conditions, Barr (2009) defines populism as "a mass movement led by an outsider 
or maverick seeking to gain or maintain power by using anti-establishment appeals and 
plebiscitarian linkages" (38). In this definition, plebiscitarian linkages refers to either 
momentary or episodic input of the people in public decision-making process. So, they 
authorize a political actor to decide on behalf of themselves (35, 36). Outsiders are not 
newcomers to political system. Instead, what determines an actor's condition of being an 
insider or outsider is his/her position vis a vis the party system (33). And mavericks are 
insiders but simply challenging the status-quo (44). Lastly, what Barr (2009) means by anti-
establishment appeals is all sorts of challenges to power elite, whether they are political or 
economic elites (31). According to Urbinati (2018), populism is mainly a strategic movement 
that relies on leadership, party structure, the manipulation of institutions and procedures in 
order to achieve power by gaining the consent of the majority (7). Roberts (2006) claims that 
the underlying reason of the hardship in defining populism stems from its organizational 
variation and disparate forms of mobilization, that’s why he views populism as a political 
mobilization of masses by personalistic leaders challenging established elites (127).  
To strategic approach, leadership is a core input in populism. Scholars of this tradition also 
often mention on charismatic leadership as a significant catalyst in populism. Charisma, 
which is often regarded as the leader's superhuman abilities to represent, lead, and protect the 
people (Weyland 2001, 13). Although not a core characteristic, it may indeed consolidate 
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quasi-direct relationship between the leader and masses (Weyland 2017, 50), reinforces the 
confidence to the leader's capability to perform, triggers mass mobilization like a crisis does 
(Barr 2009, 41). But political history has also witnessed non-charismatic populists, like 
Alberto Fujimori in Peru (Barr 2009, 41). Hence, Weyland (2017) claims that rather than 
charismatic leadership, populism requires personalistic leadership. With such a leader, 
populism seeks to challenge and dominate established political actors of the elite and 
organized parties (55), while ending up with an engagement in the chameleonic dimension 
of the phenomenon (67). Opportunism, flexibility to seek votes, and a lack of ideological 
commitment are defining features of personalistic leadership (63). 
Like political scientists of ideational approach, scholars of strategic tradition often underline 
advantageous aspects of their approach, especially by comparing it with other two main 
approaches. For instance, Weyland (2017) sheds light on the basic argument of strategic 
approach that distinguishes it from other two traditions: Strategic conceptualization of 
populism focuses on what populist do, not on what they say (50). The logic of populism as a 
strategy relies on the discrepancy of populist discourse and action (53). Leaders show their 
true intention when they make decisions, not by giving a speech or applying any other sorts 
of discourse (61). Thus, populists’ promises, and their policy performance usually do not 
overlap (64). Moreover, if we take populism as a loose ideology or a discourse, then we 
mistakenly consider all leftist politics should be populist. In fact, parties with tightly 
organized structures and ideologically committed to left wing ideology (for instance 
communist parties) cannot be counted as populist (62). Besides, these misconceptions are not 
limited to leftists. Fascist leaders, such as Hitler or Mussolini, cannot be considered as 
populists due to their commitment to dogmatic rigid ideological positions while populists are 
instead pragmatic, opportunistic, and put their vote maximization targets ahead of their 
related ideological backgrounds (50). Organizational factors and programmatic/ideological 
commitment distinguish real populists from the assumed ones – the ones that are mistakenly 
considered as populists by other traditions (62). What is more, by not adding a personalistic 
leader to populism analysis, one can also mistakenly cover bottom-up mass movements, 
which are indeed not populists. Merely depending on Manichaean discourse does not make 
a movement or leader populist (59), rather populism requires top-down leadership, pioneered 
by a personalistic leader (54).  
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2.2.1. Critique of Strategic Approach 
 
First, as I’ve mentioned above, Weyland’s (2017) focuses on the discrepancy of rhetoric and 
action, ideological commitments and tactical vote calculations, as means of a true 
identification of populism (53). According to this point of view, populism is a pernicious 
phenomenon, which inherently acts against the masses. It’s a trick, a con which may only 
end up with losses of masses. However, populism is also considered as not a purely demonic 
phenomenon, but it might also correspond an inclusionary form of politics, which in turn 
may also bring benefits for the people (De la Torre 2000, 141). It may enhance inclusiveness 
by raising political participation at the expense of political competition (Kaltwasser 2012; 
197, 200). Inclusionary distributive policies of Chávez and Morales are some examples 
(Mudde & Kaltwasser 2013, 159). In short, it can also refer a corrective phenomenon in 
democratic regimes because it provides a voice to the ones fraught with a sense of not being 
represented by existing elites (Kaltwasser 2012, 185). Moreover, this logic merely focuses 
on short run cost-benefit dimension of the issue. It does not say much about the possible long-
run consequences and is doomed to fail to explain the political presence of populists who 
have been running their countries for a long time period. Specifically, it is unable to provide 
a reasonable explanation for the long-term rule of leaders such as Erdoğan, Duterte, or Orbán, 
who are viewed as identified with their populist way of doing politics by various scholars 
and intellectuals. Furthermore, when Weyland (2001) associates the loyalty of followers with 
the leader’s ability to fulfill his/her promises, he also remarks that a decline in popularity of 
a populist may ineluctably lead a collapse in populist politics (13) Such emphasis on the 
discrepancy of what is said and what is done overlooks the impact of how such discourse is 
framed by mass media and how is it perceived by followers. More or less, popularity and 
loyalty depend on a degree of subjectivity. Weyland’s such claims obviously disregard 
populism’s sentimental dimension, which I’ve mentioned before while presenting ideational 
approach. Populism is highly interpretative, thus how the leader's performance is perceived 
and evaluated by masses is extremely important. That’s why the political career of a populist 
may not merely depend on success and failures of the fulfillment of his promises. As Barr 
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(2009) points out, personalism requires a faith in personalities, not in any sorts of ideologies 
or impersonal dimension of procedures such as laws, rules, etc. (40). A strategic approach 
depends on personalistic leadership therefore also depends on the faith in such leadership. 
So, what matters is much more about not losing the faith, which is not shaped merely by facts 
but also by perceptions, interpretations, norms, values, and beliefs. This is indeed in accord 
with Barr’s (2009) criticism on personalistic dimension of populism. He contends that the 
people may have various reasons to support a political actor. Hence, one cannot precisely 
claim that support to populism is an outcome of materialistic loyalties depending on benefits 
based on ties of clientelism and patronage, or non-material loyalties which are more due to 
leaders' messages or charisma (Barr 2009, 41). 
Second, as Mudde (2017) points out, assuming populism as a strategy may be highly 
problematic due to the fact that it relies on the idea that populists have strategy while other 
politicians do not (30). In addition, as Aslanidis (2016) remarks, identifying populism as an 
opportunistic political strategy which is merely based on taking electoral benefits or not is 
very hard indeed. To know what truly exists at a politician’s mind is not possible. What is 
more, politics is a bundle of tactics and strategies, strategy is embedded in it. Political actors 
are rational individuals, each of whom seeks to maximize his/her political benefit (96). 
Hence, when we view populism as a strategy, we take it as an equivalence of politics. Because 
politics as a whole includes all ideological movements as well, which inevitably confutes 
Weyland’s (2017) claims on the distinction of opportunist vs ideological politics I’ve 
mentioned above. Besides, as Urbinati (2018) herself mentions, electoral success is a part of 
democratic contest, and this fact obscures the distinction between populism and any other 
movement of representative politics (7). 
Third, prominent scholars of strategic approach views populism as some sort of a governance 
which operates under a semi-democratic setting. Urbinati (2018) evidently remarks that 
populism is a new sort of government, in which one part of the populace has overwhelming 
power over the rest of the society. It contests constitutional democracy with "direct 
representation" which refers to the direct relationship between the leader and the people (14). 
Similarly, Weyland (2017) argues that both Mussolini and Hitler resorted Manichean 
discourse, the essence of which was based on the distinction between pure people and their 
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enemies. However, while fascism or national socialism may quickly turn into a despotic 
authoritarian governance, populism remains in the gray zone, between democracy and 
competitive authoritarianism (Weyland 2017, 53). Urbinati (2018) asserts an affirmative 
argument: Populism is different than fascism in terms of not discarding free and competitive 
elections and accepting their legitimate role. (5). Therefore, unlike fascism, populism needs 
elections in order to prove its legitimacy (9, 10). I have several reasons to oppose these ideas. 
First of all, populism may end up with authoritarian forms of governments such as 
competitive authoritarianism (Levistky & Loxton 2013) or especially when relies on 
charismatic leadership, it may end up with a rise in authoritarian tendencies (Inglehart & 
Norris 2016, 7). But assuming populism as a form of regime or government may end up with 
conceptual stretching and lead us distorted results in our studies since it not only changes the 
unit of analysis but also our conception of populism. Besides, focusing too much on fascists 
might lead us to overlook the historical context. Political circumstances in 1930s were very 
different than the ones we have today. One cannot know for sure, but we need to think on 
this counterfactual: If fascists of 1930s lived today, would they transform their regimes into 
fascist ones? My answer is no, probably they would remain in the “gray zone” because, as 
Müller (2016) remarks in today's global politics, the cost of open authoritarianism is too high 
and an official abolishment of a "democratic regime" may end up with a huge loss in 
international prestige, as well as a possible loss in material benefits (49, 50). 
Fourth, Weyland (1999, 2001, 2017) often emphasizes loose organizational formations of 
populist movements in his works (384-389, 12-15, 58) and briefly argues that populists seek 
for support among unorganized masses (Weyland 1999, 386). In addition, Weyland (1999) 
contends that party weakness is a necessary condition of populism and claims that strong 
parties hinder the rise of populism. As an example, he mentions that Hungarian strong parties 
impeded a populist surge (385). He also emphasizes that parliamentary systems do not 
provide auspicious environment for populists to rise power (390). To these arguments, I can 
say that this point of view is highly dependent on Latin American context and almost totally 
relies on a conceptualization of populist instances from Latin American politics. In general, 
European parties are in strong and not loosely organized. But we know that populist 
escalations have recently gained a serious support from the electorate in several European 
countries. As Moffit & Tormey (2014) point out, Le Pen's National Front or Wilder's PVV 
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do not have loose organizational structures although they are widely viewed as populists by 
many scholars (386). More interestingly, contrary to the claims of loose organizational 
structures of Latin American populists, Kaltwasser (2012) remarks that completed works 
depending on empirical evidence showing that Peronism in Argentina was indeed very 
organized (193). Moreover, even other scholars of this approach do not agree on taking 
organizational formation as a defining characteristic for populism. To Barr (2009), an 
analysis of organization structures is not defining characteristic of populism since 
organization formation may vary from one populist movement to another but cannot be 
operationalized in order to distinguish populists from non-populists (42). Likewise, Roberts 
(2006) argues that due to the organizational variation of populism, organized vs unorganized 
dichotomy cannot be a defining characteristic (127, 128). For emphases on party systems and 
strong parties, I agree that a collapse of party systems may provide propitious conditions for 
populist surge (i.e. Italy in early 1990s). But the entire political history has shown us that 
populists may thrive in almost any governmental setting. Focusing on strong parties cannot 
provide a true explanation for Viktor Orbán’s achieving power in Hungary and his long-term 
presence in the office. Besides, too much focus on parliamentary vs presidential distinction 
may cause trouble in populism analysis since it overlooks populist emergences in 
parliamentary settings. For instance, one cannot explain how Orbán and Erdoğan achieved 
power in their initial electoral campaigns, in two different parliamentary settings. 
To sum up, strategic approach has a crucial logic within itself. It presents leader as a 
determinant. Despite the weaknesses and inconsistencies in general, Barr’s (2009) approach 
to populism seems more consistent. However, even this definition would have a low 
operationalizability in a possible comparative research on populism. Measurement would be 
problematic since there is not a clear single unit of analysis, thereby only allows qualitative 
works for the supply side analysis of populism. Therefore, I’ll move into the discursive 
approach to discover whether it is able to provide an operationalizable conceptualization that 
one can apply in quantitative empirical studies. But what is more important than 
operationalizability is that strategic approach fails to offer a sufficiently rigid and a single 
unified conception of populism, due to its inferential inconsistencies detailly mentioned 
above and conceptual disagreements among its own prominent contributors.  
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2.3. Discursive Approach 
 
 
The pioneer of discursive tradition is Ernesto Laclau (1977, 2005a, 2005b), while numerous 
other scholars have contributed (Aslanidis 2016; Bonikowski 2016; de la Torre 2000; 
Hawkins 2009, 2010; Kazin 2017; Panizza 2005). Definitions of discursive approach may 
seem disparate for instance; a logic (Laclau 2005a), an appeal (Canovan 1999)1, a mode of 
persuasion (Kazin 2017), a Manichaean rhetoric (de la Torre 2000), a political 
communication style (Jagers & Walgrave 2007), a discursive framing strategy (Bonikowski 
2016), a discursive frame (Aslanidis 2016), and etc. Nonetheless, they all have an important 
common denominator: Discourse as the unit of analysis; comprising words, expressions, 
speeches, and statements of various political actors.2 
This tradition basically views populism as an anti-status quo discourse that symbolically 
divides the political society into “the people” and its “other” (Panizza 2005, 3). For example, 
Aslanidis (2016) asserts that populism is better identified with discourse emphasizing the 
sovereignty of the people against the corrupt elite (96). Likewise, to de la Torre (2000), 
populism is a style of political mobilization based on a Manichaean rhetoric that constructs 
politics as a moral and ethical struggle between the people and the oligarchy (4). Similar 
definitions of which units are again discourses are built by many other scholars, even their 
traditional origins have been different. For instance, also known with his structural approach 
to populism, Di Tella (1997) defines populism as political expressions that initiate a mass of 
loosely organized people into action against the privileged, better of segments of the society 
(188). 
 
1. Although Canovan’s (1999) work puts too much emphasis on appeals to the people, she doesn’t view discourse 
as the only unit in populism. To her, ideological elements embedded in democracy such as sovereignty of the people, are 
also crucial (Canovan 2002, 33). 
2. I deliberately have not included scholars who view populism as a style for this paragraph since they often 
consider other units beside discourse. For instance, Knight (1998) is different than other scholars mentioned under this 
rubric with regards to his emphasizes on that populism cannot be limited to a simple rhetoric. Similarly, to Moffitt & Tormey 
(2014), populism as a style is different than a mere discourse, it refers to a bigger set of dramaturgical elements such as 
performance, audiences, actors, stages, screens, etc. (389, 390). 
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According to scholars of discursive approach, populism is not a coherent world view or 
ideology. Rather, it is a dynamic discursive framing strategy (Bonikowski 2016, 23). Framing 
is the practice of presenting an issue from a certain point of view in order to maximize its 
impact on people. Frames are not characteristics of individuals, movements, or political 
parties, but they are features of political discourse such as statements, speeches, press 
releases, briefings, or public debates (Bonikowski 2016, 14). Because ordinary citizens have 
incomplete information and understanding about who is responsible for worsening economic 
conditions, or who is really involved with scandals, populist politicians appear as narrators. 
Populists stimulate populist attitudes via rhetorical framing (Hawkins, Read, & Pauwels 
2017, 277) and populist discourse works as it touches to the “ressentiment” of masses and 
exploit it (Betz 2002, 198). Populist strategy indeed depends on discursive references to the 
sovereignty of the people - Populists pretend to care about concerns of the people, present 
themselves as they were not alienated from the folk, therefore strive to pose for as if they are 
better candidates to defend interests of the folk (Jagers & Walgrave 2007, 323). 
An analysis of populism based on discourse is almost a requirement if one cares about 
empirical consistency. Because the only common denominator of all populist movements is 
"a rhetorical style which relies heavily upon appeals to the people" (Quoted from Canovan, 
Vittori 2017, 51). Apart from this fact, I want to mention on some pros of viewing populism 
as a discourse, expressed by various scholars. As I’ve mentioned above, populism lacks 
adherence to any sorts of ideologies. It is indeed a flexible reaction in order to persuade the 
people (Kazin 2017, 3). To Hawkins (2009), unlike any ideology, populism cannot provide 
clear policy preferences. It lacks crystal-clear arguments and has a subjective quality which 
is expressed by the rhetoric of the orator (1045). In short, populism is contextual (Canovan 
1999, 4), unstable (Bonikowski 2016, 13), and chameleonic (Taggart 2004, 275). Thus, rather 
than ideological conceptualizations, one should focus on discourse as an expression of 
populism. Identifying populism as a discursive, speech-level phenomenon enables us to 
recognize its contextual dimension with regards to its not only temporal but also spatial 
differentiation (Bonikowski 2016; 14, 15). Discourse can be measured via attentive scrutiny 
of discursive elements exercised by political actors (Aslanidis 2016, 97). Populist discourse 
is not only measurable but also valid and reliable (Hawkins 2009, 1046). To Aslanidis (2016), 
taking populism as a discursive frame brings us two advantages: First, it enables a better 
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comprehension for its cognitive dimension. Second, it provides a methodological framework 
for empirical work (98). Moreover, most of the empirical work in populism indeed views 
populism as a discursive phenomenon (100). Discursive elements are implicit in populism's 
ideational approach that Cas Mudde has developed. In fact, scholars of ideational approach 
criticize discursive tradition, but they mostly rely on discourse as a unit of analysis in their 
studies (98)3. 
Before mentioning critique of discursive approach, I want to present a simplified overview 
of Laclau’s theory of populism. This simplified version of the theory will not only provide 
sufficiently satisfying answers for any possible opposing inquiries, but also provide a base 
for my minimal definition.  
 
 
2.3.1. On Laclauian Perspective 
 
In his highly theoretical work, Laclau (2005a) builds an abstract maximal theory of populism. 
He simply defines populism as a political logic, rather than a movement identified with a 
particular social base or an ideology (117). His approach to populism requires a shift of units 
of analysis from movements and ideologies to political discourse (Laclau 2005b, 33). 
According to this theory, in a political society, there are distinct particular demands of 
individuals constituting that society. When unfulfilled, these particular demands get 
accumulated. The more accumulation they undergo, the less the institutional system becomes 
able to absorb them as different demands. This follows with the establishment of an 
equivalential relation between such demands due to a solidarity between individuals whose 
particular demands are not responded (73). If demands remain isolated from each other, then 
they remain as democratic demands. But when demands get articulated in an equivalential 
way and constitute a plural social subjectivity (refers to the body of an equivalential chain in 
Laclau’s theory), they turn into popular demands (74). The perquisite of equivalence is the 
particularity of demands. If such particularities disappear, then there would be no common 
ground to build an equivalence. So, for the construction of “the people,” both difference and 
 
3. Scholars who have ideational background or adopt an ideational definition of populism but view discourse as 
the unit of analysis in their works will be mentioned under the section called “Critique of Discursive Approach” 
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equivalence of demands are essential (79). In other words, what equivalential chain 
eliminates is that the distinction of demands, not the demands themselves. Popular identity 
rises over persistent and disparate unfulfilled demands (Laclau 2005b, 46). 
To Laclau (2005a; 2005b), three conditions are necessary for a populist surge: First, an 
antagonism - based on a dichotomy of the social space that is distinguished each other with 
an internal frontier (for instance the people vs the power elite or bloc); second, the 
construction of “the people” via the construction of equivalential chain, which has inherent 
anti-pluralistic and anti-institutional characteristics, by articulation of unfulfilled demands; 
and third a stable system of signification once a certain level of mobilization has been 
achieved, the vague solidarity between equivalent demands turned into a unification of such 
demands (74; 38). Hence, the success of a populist surge depends on the strength of 
equivalential links between particular demands (Laclau 2005b, 37), the generation of a 
popular subjectivity which necessitates the construction of an internal frontier (Laclau 2005b, 
38) and the ability of one difference to achieve a totality via discursive identification, when 
exposed to exclusion (Laclau 2005a; 78, 82). For instance, on the hand, we have a well-
functioning welfare state, in which particular demands are responded without any 
modification to their particularity and therefore equivalential links and the internal frontier 
of antagonism never emerge. So due to its non-exclusionary functioning, such society does 
not provide the propitious environment for the construction of a totality, and thereby “the 
people” (78, 79). On the other hand, in a different political setting (Laclau’s example is 
Thatcher’s initiation of neoliberal policies in the U.K.) facing with a severe exclusion, an 
equivalence among differences may rise by self-identification of all links in a popular chain 
with a common denominator. In this process democratic particular demands turn into popular 
demands while the former may remain and expand in a hegemonic formation (82). What 
Laclau means by hegemony is the claim of one particular demand to represent the whole 
equivalential chain without losing its particularity and start to function as a signifier of the 
totality of the chain (Laclau 2005b, 39). At this point, “the hegemonic identity becomes 
something of the order of an empty signifier” (Laclau 2005a; 70, 71). What we must 
understand from the “emptiness” is the common denominator that is signified via a popular 
symbol. Any popular identity necessitates a condensation around some signifiers, such as 
words, speeches, images, etc., of which function is to signify the equivalential chain as a 
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totality (Laclau 2005a, 96). And what Laclau (2005b) calls as the empty signifier is the 
element that deliberately provides coherence to an equivalential chain by signifying it as a 
totality (44).  
I want to underscore three key dimensions of Laclau’s theory of populism. First, the emphasis 
on representation as explained by a popular subject’s claim to represent totality of 
equivalential chain. Second, the importance of discourse – such claim of representation 
indeed relies on discursive construction of “us and them”. And third, the leader – who 
initiates the functioning of signification process. In order to accentuate the role of 
representation and discourse, Laclau (2005b) clearly argues that in a political society, "the 
people" can only be constructed through relations of representation (48) and since "the 
people" is a constructed conception, populist discourse does not simply express a sort of 
popular identity, rather it builds popular identity over relations of representation (48, 49). 
Furthermore, Laclau (2005b) remarks that the common genus of a movement or an ideology 
is a discourse (47) and one cannot talk about populism when the discursive construction of 
the enemy is missing (39). In other words, the construction of hegemony in populism is 
achieved via discourse (Laclau 1977, 196).  
 
 
2.3.2. Critique of Discursive Approach 
 
Criticism to discursive approach indeed focus on few but important aspects. First and 
foremost, despite her emphasis on appeals, Canovan (1999) asserts that populism cannot be 
merely taken as a discourse (1999, 5). Due to the fact that every political speech claim to 
speak on behalf of the people, or for the people, distinguishing populist speeches from non-
populist ones is considered as impossible (Panizza 2005, 5). In a similar vein, Knight (1998) 
contends that appeals to "the people" cannot be merely attributed to populism and any regime 
can employ much or less populist elements (229). Supportively, Mudde (2017) claims that 
emotional discourse cannot be considered as populism since all political campaigners resort 
such rhetoric (35). In accord with that, Weyland (2017) argues that “us and them" demagogy 
may have been used by various leaders, including both populists and non-populists. Such 
rhetorical explanations convey analysis to a vaguely broader scope (53). My answer to such 
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remarks would be that as explained in Laclau’s theory (2005a, 2005b), populist discourse 
does not refer to a usual, ordinary or simple sort of discourse. Not all appeals that refer to 
"the people" can be assessed within the extent of populism (Laclau 1977, 165). It is indeed a 
very particular type of rhetoric, aiming to achieve a totality of the whole equivalential chain 
via attempting to build an artificial homogeneity for it, while presenting it as a hegemonic 
alternative vis-à-vis the power elite (the other). Such attempt is undertaken by one particular 
difference pretending to act like an empty signifier (an individual with an unfulfilled 
democratic demand, or to put simply, the leader/initiator of the populist movement). 
Therefore, appeals to the people, only under such circumstances can be assessed as populist. 
According to Laclau’s (2005a, 2005b) point of view, any politician attempting to gain such 
hegemonic power against a power bloc by merging his unfulfilled particular demand with 
other unfulfilled particular demands of individuals who are also excluded, gets engaged with 
populism. To discursive tradition, there is no binary distinction like populist vs non-populist 
(Bonikowski & Gidron 2013, 9). To Laclau (2005b), rather, one should inquire that to what 
extent a movement is populist (45). In other words, every movement is somehow more or 
less populist due to their appeals to the people against an enemy via a constructed social 
frontier (47). Populism may have degrees, just like democracy may (Aslanidis 2016, 93). As 
Kaltwasser (2012) says by referring to Robert Dahl's polyarchy, democracy is an ideal that 
can never be achieved fully (196). Aslanidis (2016) reasonably asks why democracy indices 
such as Polity IV and Freedom House is widely used and thereby viewed as legitimate data 
while indices of populism are largely viewed as illegitimate (93). More interestingly, as 
Aslanidis (2016) remarks scholars who adopted ideational approach and often strive to 
downplay discursive tradition are often complainant about “degreeism” issue, but they 
ultimately rely on discursive data (92, 93).  For instance, as measuring populist discourse for 
his quantitative text analysis of populism, Pauwels (2011) agrees that populism is a thin 
centred ideology but what makes this ideology measurable is its discursive expression (100). 
Likewise, Rooduijn and Pauwels (2011) employ Mudde's (2004) definition of populism as a 
thin-centred ideology and measure it by ultimately relying on election manifestos (Rooduijn 
and Pauwels 2011; 1273, 1274). Similarly, Vasilopoulou et al. (2013) argue that populism as 
an ideology is likely to manifest itself via narratives of political actors (389). For degreeism 
debate, Aslanidis (2018) reemphasizes in one of his other work – that populist discourse 
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inherently shows its intensity according to degrees (1242). In concordance with this assertion, 
not only Pauwels’ (2011) claims point out but also his findings verify that populism is not a 
Sartorian "either-or" concept, rather it inherently has a “matter of degree” (97, 98, 114). This 
means some parties, naturally, might be more or less populist (114). In a similar vein, results 
of Rooduijn and Pauwels' (2011) study point out that some parties are more and some other 
are less populist, thereby acknowledging that populism indeed has degrees (1277). 
Second, another frequently pronounced objection is an overlook of the action, but a mere 
concentration on the rhetoric. To Van Kessel (2014), populism can show itself as a loosely 
applied discourse (114). Weyland (2017) asserts that focusing on the discrepancy between 
discourse and action is absent in Hawkins' (2009) measurement procedure. Therefore, 
populism is falsely defined in such discursive works Weyland (2017, 53). More precisely, 
Weyland (2017) argues that if one applies Hawkins' (2009) holistic grading procedure to 
Hitler and Mussolini, then one may conclude that these leaders were populists, which was 
not the case to Weyland (Weyland 2017, 53). Hawkins’ response is more accurate for the 
discrepancy between discourse and the action: "Actions are ultimately “populist” because of 
the meaning that is ascribed to them by their participants, not because of any objective quality 
that inheres in them" (Hawkins 2009, 1047). This response reflects how much interpretations 
are important in populism and how actions are shaped by interpretative discourses, speeches, 
words, or statements. One can easily object to Weyland (2017) ideological assessment 
criterion in terms of distinguishing populists from fascists. More or less, every populist 
politics has ideational dimensions. Indeed, there are scholars who view fascism as having a 
populist nature. To Müller (2016), both Mussolini and Hitler were also populists (93). 
According to Laclau (1977), Nazism indeed emerged as a populist mass movement, which 
in time avoided revolutionary potential of popular interpellations, and deviated into a path 
that brings it to its true objectives (174). What makes a movement populist is its ability to 
express popular-democratic elements antagonistically against a power bloc (173). That is 
why movements that have distinct ideological background such as Maoism, Peronism, or 
fascism, may all refer to populist escalations (de la Torre 2000, 13). 
Third, scholars from strategic approach criticize discursive tradition due to its negligence 
institutional framework. Although Laclau (2005a, 2005b) mentions on equivalential chains 
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are get linked together in an anti-institutional way, as I’ve mentioned above, in general 
discursive approach takes discourse as unit of analysis, not the organization of the movement 
itself. Organizational features are not viewed as core characteristic of populism, even by 
some scholars of strategic approach, as I’ve mentioned before. However, Barr (2009) 
emphasizes the position of the leader with regard to the political establishment and argues 
that rhetoric is not enough to pinpoint this position. Outsiders can only be identified by 
looking their experience within the party system (33). Moreover, Barr (2009) contends that 
populism is highly dependent on plebiscitarian linkages, but stylist approaches do not take 
this into consideration (43). As once can expect, Barr (2009) views populism according to 
his own definition. However, in the critique of strategic approach, I’ve already mentioned 
that being an outsider is not seen a necessary condition by even other scholars of strategic 
tradition. When it comes plebiscitarian linkages, Barr (2009) describes them as extreme, 
purer and vertical forms of electoral linkages, authorizing political actors, instead of political 
parties, for the representation of the people (35, 36). They have top-down dimension, highly 
dependent on the leader, and they provide direct relation between the leader and the led, by 
transcending institutional settings (37). What I understand from Barr’s plebiscitarian linkages 
is that they exist due to first leader’s personalism tending to bypass institutional settings, and 
second electoral processes of democracies, so more or less, they are dependent on democratic 
framework. Moreover, Barr (2009) seems to create this new type of linkage due to high 
frequency of Latin American leaders tending to involve those kinds of relationship between 
the people. But the domain of populism is not limited to democracy, rather it depends on 
political representation. In a political society where representative politics is prevalent, 
populism has always a chance to thrive, regardless of democratic or non-democratic 
institutional structure.  
To sum up, among three main traditions, I’ve found discursive approach as the most 
propitious one which I can use to build my own minimal definition. Besides, with regards to 
operationalizability and measurement, this tradition seems to have fewer inner disagreements 
on populism and provides higher consistency. After all, the unit of analysis is clear, 
determined, and theoretically justified. Scholars who take discourse as a unit can conduct any 
sorts of studies: Qualitative, quantitative, or mix-method. Now I wish to mention what I’ve 
inferred from populism as a discourse so far, by presenting an implications section. Next, I 
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will introduce my own conceptualization, that is based on Laclauian perspective of populism. 
With a few modifications, I’ll attempt to build a minimal definition whose core features are 
clear and theoretically justified. 
 
 
2.4. Implications 
 
 
In accord with remarks of various scholars in populism literature, I contend that populist 
discourse has four crucial dimensions - moralistic, constructivist, formative, and 
exclusionary. These four do not have to be totally distinct from each other, instead often may 
appear complementary.  
With regards to moralistic dimension, populists, in their rhetoric, claim the validity of their 
majorities depends not only on numerics but mainly on ethics and morality (Urbinati 2018, 
9). According to populist logic, popular will is a symbolic representation of "real people" 
(Müller 2016, 27). That means only some of the people are “real” in a political society 
(Müller 2016, 21). Populist rhetoric is based on aggrandizing good and virtuous of simple, 
ordinary people while vilifying incompetent, unaccountable and corrupt elites (Mény & Surel 
2002, 12). It brings a severe political polarization and it relies on profound political loyalties 
(Knight 1998, 237). Such dualisms of “the people” vs “the elite” or “us” vs “them” are based 
on a conception of morality since they indeed attempt to build moral boundaries with clear 
cut lines by a quasi-religious approach (Bonikowski & Gidron 2013, 2; de la Torre 2000, 15; 
Mudde 2017, 29; Müller 2016, 25; Taggart 2002, 78). Neither 'pure people' nor 'corrupt elite' 
refers to formal categorizations, rather they are "moral constructs" (Mudde 2002, 216). 
Populists apply moral references in their discourses, and such moral dimension of populism 
disables political adversaries by not letting any "legitimate dissent" (Panizza 2005; 22, 23). 
That explains Müller’s (2016) emphasis on the power of populism – it indeed comes from 
populists’ empirically non-falsifiable hypothesis. While democratic politicians can try 
something and fail, populists make moral and symbolic claims which are not empirically 
falsifiable due to their nature. Because populists are invulnerable to empirical denial, they 
are discursively persistent in today’s politics (39, 102). 
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What I mean by constructivist dimension is that politicians who apply populist frequently, 
skillfully construct an identity for “the people,” an incarnation of such identity with 
themselves. Manichaean discourse is based on identification of the good as the unified will 
of the people and of the evil as a conspiring elite (Hawkins 2009, 1042). This "us and them" 
antagonism helps populism to build a group identity (Moffitt 2015, 201) by appealing value 
commitments of the people (Müller 2016, 92). To Hawkins (2009), by identifying the enemy, 
populism negatively constitutes the people. For instance, Chávez defines evil as imperialism 
and blames the opposition of being puppets of United States and other international perilous 
forces against Venezuelan people. The good is constructed as an overarching notion that 
symbolizes the ones who reject any compromises with the evil (1043, 1044). Populists 
dexterously resort constant "existential threats" during their appearances of addressing the 
nation via mass communication channels such as regular radio programs as in the case of 
Viktor Orbán, “Aló Presidente” channels as in the case of Hugo Chávez, or TV programs as 
in the case of Evo Morales (Müller 2016, 43). Expressions of bad manners may complement 
the performative political style of populists (Moffitt & Tormey 2014, 392). Populists’ 
proximity to the people leads an identification, an imaginary incarnation of “authentic 
people” with the leader (Urbinati 2018, 12). Such identification facilitates the people’s 
delegation of power to a political actor who allege to be incarnation of their redemption (de 
la Torre 2000, 19). Identification does not have to be one sided - accompanied with a sense 
of belongingness, it may emerge interactively between the people and the populist actor (de 
la Torre 2000, 19) and it may also result in a redefinition of the people, as in the case of 
George W. Bush's attempts to construct the identity of "us" and to redefine what is to be 
American (Panizza 2005; 6, 7).  
The formative dimension refers to the ability of populism to shape perception of the people. 
Cas Mudde (2004) seeks for an answer for why political stage is so much saturated with 
various populist movements. Mudde simply asks two questions: Is the distance between the 
people and the elite is wider than it was in the past? And is corruption a more serious problem 
in today's politics than before 1990s? His findings do not match what is expected, and do not 
provide an explanation for why we experience a populist Zeitgeist. Thus, he contends that 
what has changed is indeed perceptions, not facts (552, 553). Events, actions, facts are indeed 
facilitating instruments for populists. Such instruments enable intensive and easy means to 
39 
 
build group identity so long as they are instrumentalized by populist discursive framing. 
According to Panizza (2005), what triggers the construction of that identity is indeed 
discursive framework, not by material concreteness of events. Bush achieved to create a 
collective identity of “us vs terrorists:” "Either you are with us, or with the terrorists" (6). 
Bush’s claim that 9/11 was indeed against freedom provided a simple explanation for 
confused and traumatized American people (8). In short, perception plays a huge role in 
populist politics and what shapes perceptions of individuals is cognitive mobilization 
conducted by political statements, speeches, discourses of populist politicians. 
If one talks about populist strategy, then one needs to focus on the exclusion of the existing 
power bloc, or the status-quo, or the opposing equivalential chain at the other side of the 
internal frontier in Laclau’s (2005a, 2005b) theory. Then one may see that populist strategy 
inherently leaves no space for reconciliation or compromise while discursively initiating 
cognitive and when necessary, physical mobilization of masses. Inherent exclusionary logic 
of populism should not be confused with inclusionary forms of populism as Kaltwasser 
(2012; 197, 200) Mudde & Kaltwasser (2013, 159) point out. These scholars focus on policy 
outcomes of populist rule or mobilizations when they refer to inclusionary forms of populism. 
Inclusionary policies of Chávez and Morales are politically inclusionary actions, once these 
leaders have achieved power to increase their popularities, to fulfill prerequisites of their left-
wing ideologies, or pay back to “the people” for their electoral support. What I mean is, 
during the appearance of opposing equivalential chains, the antagonistic construction of “the 
people” and thereby the enemy, while identifying the former with the leader, requires an 
exclusionary attitude against the enemy. That means populism has an inherent exclusionary 
dimension. This exclusionary dimension of populism is explanatory about why Robert Barr 
(2009) views the condition of being an outsider or a maverick as a required condition for 
populism. As I’ve pointed out, populism is highly constructive, moralistic, and formative. 
Therefore, it relies on identities, senses, emotions, perceptions, beliefs, and loyalties. That 
means populism rises as a non-material phenomenon that highly depends on faith (Barr 2009; 
40, 41; Canovan 1999, 9). Faith is the key to understand the solidarity between individuals 
because other individuals with unfulfilled particular demands have to have a faith in the 
leader and perceive him/her as an “equal” with regards to their excluded status. That explains 
why not only political outsiders but also insiders challenging the status-quo (mavericks) 
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occasionally appear on political stage as fervent demagogues. As Barr (2009) contends, like 
outsiders, mavericks practice populist rhetoric and present themselves as the change against 
the status-quo (44) (This change is different than the change that huge social transformations 
ultimately bring. In accord with Laclauian conceptualization, it refers to the exclusion of the 
status-quo while it may be inclusive for followers of the leader). As Panizza (2005) remarks, 
excluded people want to be represented by someone like them but also have outstanding 
achievements that may inspire them: An ordinary individual but with a strong personality, 
with a similar disadvantaged background but ultimately able to achieve power due to his/her 
perseverance and hard work, despite all unfavorable circumstances he/she has gone through 
(21, 22). I contend that being an outsider, or a maverick, or charismatic leadership are not 
necessary requirements. These features do not necessarily evolve into populist escalation per 
se. The effort of Barr (2009) can be explained as an attempt to achieve an overarching 
inclusion of all populist instances via an either-or logic, especially focusing on the ones 
appeared in Latin American politics. Conditions of being an outsider or maverick are closely 
associated with all dimensions I’ve emphasized, in terms of serving as strong facilitators for 
a populist escalation via stimulating an identification of the people with the leader. Therefore, 
I argue that these conditions are catalysts, not prerequisites of populism. Instead, the 
precondition is that the leader has to be identified as an equivalence of all differences, by all 
differences positioned as the leader’s equivalences in the whole equivalential chain, and 
thereby has to be able to claim a hegemonic totality of the whole chain he belongs. 
 
 
2.5. Theoretical Framework 
 
 
In this part, by using Laclau’s (2005a, 2005b) theory as a base, I’ll strive to build a minimal 
definition in order to conduct an empirical study that leaves no space for confusion or 
conceptual stretching issues. But before that, I have to agree Weyland’s (2001) emphasis that 
the domain of populism is political. Historical instances of populist surge have proven that it 
cannot be limited to the scope of economic policy choices. And once one has agreed that 
populism is indeed political, then one may inevitably accept that populism is practiced in 
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order to achieve or perpetuate power, like any other forms of politics. As I’ve agreed upon 
the domain of populism and what it actually refers to, now I want to go back to the very 
beginning of populist escalation.  
Once the spark of populism prematurely appears due to failures or crises, a common 
resentment of the people that encourages a positioning against a power bloc is essential, not 
for all traditions agree upon its existence as a requirement, but for the necessity of that 
unfulfilled particular demands to form equivalential relations, if one takes Laclauian logic 
(2005a, 2005b) as a base. The resentment of differences – individuals with distinct particular 
demands – serves as a builder for an ambiguous internal division between frustrated 
differences and the power bloc. Such ambiguity can be overcome by a solidarity among all 
differences, resulting with a more explicit internal frontier of equivalences positioned against 
the power bloc. At this point, Ben Stanley (2008) reasonably asks this question during his 
attacks on Laclauian perspective: What enables the solidarity between dissatisfied, frustrated 
individuals? Is this an automatic process? (97, 98). Indeed, Laclau (2005a; 2005b) has 
provided this answer by contending that the construction of a popular subjectivity requires a 
discursively generated, universal representation of the whole chain, which in turn 
necessitates homogenizing the heterogeneous totality, and that is achieved by the leader (74; 
39, 40). As Laclau (2005a) clearly points out, one difference shows up and attempts to 
transcend oneself in order to achieve a hegemonic totality and gets in touch with others, 
whose demands are different but at the same time, with regards to the unfulfillment status of 
their demands are “equal” individuals (78, 82). Only in this way, the logic of equivalence 
overwhelms the logic of difference. At the end of this process, populism rises due to the 
expansion of the logic of equivalence at the expense of the logic of difference (Laclau 2005a; 
77, 78). In short, I contend that the presence of a leader is an essential core characteristic of 
populism.  
So far, I’ve mentioned populism as a discursive phenomenon, and that is inherently able to 
bend objective realities and manipulate it. At the end of the first chapter, I also mentioned on 
Moffitt’s (2015), Moffitt’s & Tormey’s (2014) and Taggart’s (2002, 2004) emphasis on what 
really stimulates populist escalation – a sense of crisis (Moffitt 2015; 195, 199; Moffitt & 
Tormey 2014; 391, 392; Taggart 2002, 69; Taggart 2004, 275). This may be true for both 
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populism in the opposition challenging an established power bloc and populism in the office, 
aiming to maintain the leaders’ perpetuation of power. To Moffit (2015), a systematic crisis 
is enhanced to a level of perceived crisis and after then, it can only be experienced via 
mediation and performance of populists. "Populist actors actively perform and perpetuate a 
sense of crisis, rather than simply reacting to external crisis" (195). In short, a sense of crisis 
underpinned and perpetuated by the leader. This view is more reasonable than assertions 
claiming that populism emerges due to crisis – which are, to Moffitt (2015), indeed objective 
phenomena and therefore should be named as failures. However, before adding perpetuation 
of a sense of crisis as a core feature of populism one key issue rises – the impossibility of 
reading minds of populists and the probability of that the mind of the electorate may be 
shaped by various elements, not merely by discursive performance of populists. So, I view 
Moffitt’s (2015) claim as a testable hypothesis in an empirical research. In addition, when 
one attempts to build an overarching minimal theory that encompasses all possible populists 
instances, one should not forget that shaping perception of the electorate (which I’ve named 
as formative dimension) cannot be limited the leader’s performative discourse, it may be run 
by the media by polishing the leader, or by the opposition via weak performance and constant 
denigration of the populist leader. Panizza (2005) points out that identification may also 
thrive over a negativity- a failure or a weakness of "the other" in turn reinforces the people's 
identification with the populist leader. The more their adversaries demonize populist leaders, 
the more it consolidates the people's identification with them (26). What is required in 
populism is that, after a leader appears due to solidarity, he/she might not simply conduct a 
populist performance merely based on taking advantage of a failure and perpetuating it as a 
crisis, but he/she must attempt to achieve a hegemonic totality of the equivalential chain. For 
instance, before Erdoğan came to power, he did not have a media power. But he was 
presented as an outsider, banned from politics before since he read a religious excerpt of Ziya 
Gökalp, and thereby was imprisoned. Before elections, he joined a TV program, faced with 
the opposition candidate Deniz Baykal, while remaining as a calm and a righteous, legitimate 
alternative for the power, and that was all his performance. The weakness of the opposition 
indeed strengthened the construction of shared identity among Erdoğan’s actual and potential 
followers. Thus, today’s high frequency of performative stylistic populists does not 
necessarily require that populism must be defined with such an inclination. A sense of crisis 
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in the mind of the electorate provides a fertile soil for a growing solidarity between 
equivalential links but does not necessarily come from the populist performance of the leader. 
Such perception may be found as given or already existed before the solidarity. Once the 
leader has appeared on political stage, he/she may only attempt to utilize an already existed 
sense of crisis for a claim of hegemonic totality of the whole equivalential chain. Hence, I 
consider perpetuation of a sense of crisis via populist performance as an important facilitator, 
a true catalyst, but not a core necessary feature. Instead, perpetuation of a sense of crisis via 
populist discursive performance can be tested, especially to better comprehend instances of 
populism in power. 
Once the leader appears, the initial ambiguity of the internal frontline disappears, antagonism 
of resentment evolves into antagonistic group identity, and polarization of two identities 
takes place: on the one hand the people and on the other hand its “other” - the power bloc. 
Once the society reaches this stage, both parties rise as moral alternatives to each other. 
Discourses, political speeches and statements would inevitably have a moral, an ethical 
dimension, in order to maximize new possible articulations for both equivalential chains, 
positioned against each other with a moral antagonism, while both demonizing “the other.” 
This moral positioning of both parties ineluctably turns into a Manichaean outlook for 
populism. The power bloc is a constructed entity, built by populist rhetoric. At this point, 
once more I have to remark that a claim for hegemonic totality is a requirement for populist 
politics. As Stavrakakis (2017) points out, discourse and hegemony are closely related (549). 
Moreover, depending on Laclauian perspective, Howarth (2014), while referring to Laclau, 
explains hegemony as a corresponding process that one difference claims to represent “an 
incommensurable totality”, without ceasing to remain as a particular difference (8). In a 
hegemonic formation, discursive practices link and modify heterogeneous elements (10).4 
Hegemonic discourse appears as a claim to achieve an impossible totality while Manichaean 
outlook requires actual or constructed, abstract or concrete enemies. So, the enemy as a 
construct, may correspond an actual entity or gain fictional character. That is explanatory for 
both populism in the opposition and populism in power. When in the opposition, the process 
 
4. Hegemony in such references and in Laclauian perspective in general refers to a concept different than its 
frequent usage in political science literature. Hegemony in political science often viewed as a term that is synonym with 
dominance or authority of one group against the other. On the webpage of American Heritage dictionary, it is defined as 
“The predominance of one state or social group over others.” (Accessed online on April the 24th, 2019). 
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of articulations of equivalential links accompanied by the leader’s claim of hegemonic 
totality of the whole chain, takes place in the periphery. But when in power, populists are at 
the center of power. Populism at the center cannot be understood without an intensive 
consideration of populism’s Manichaean outlook and a tendency to present itself as a 
peripherial alternative challenging the actual or perceived global power center. Dependency 
theories and Di Tella’s (1997) remarks point out a division of global center and periphery 
relations – while the Global North refers to the center, countries of the Global South refer 
peripherial countries. I argue that in the Global South, populism in power uses this factual 
position to challenge established power centers of the political globe, due to its attempts to 
achieve a hegemonic totality. However, these peripherial populist challenges may not only 
be conducted against actual power centers but also perceived ones – the ones that are claimed 
by populists, indeed imaginary and ambiguously constructed enemies. Tayyip Erdoğan often 
resorts populist discourse that emphasizes a “master mind” playing vicious schemes and 
conspiracies against Turkish citizens, which is unknown, undetermined by a concrete 
formulation. Such discourse is also adopted by leaders of global power centers of the Global 
North. For instance, Donald Trump frequently applies to populist rhetoric when he attempts 
to demonize an abstract phenomenon – globalization and its inherent outcomes that bring 
various inconveniences to American working-class people. When Trump attempts to do so, 
he positions the frustrated Americans at the periphery of the bigger global and political 
picture in which the ones who benefit from globalization as an opposing power bloc. But 
whenever, populist point out a phenomenon, they also point out actors around, taking 
advantage of or consciously benefiting from it. A phenomenon itself, as long as not a natural 
disaster like an earthquake is not likely to cause trouble for people.  
In short, populism emerges as a hegemonic discourse against abstract or concrete power 
centers. Such power centers may not only refer to actual powers such as U.S. or E.U. due to 
their overwhelming political and economic power and influence but also refer to agents of 
the change such as globalization, information, artificial intelligence, etc. which can be 
downgraded via certain policies, inevitably bring a group of winners and losers, but cannot 
be eliminated or cannot be resisted against. This is true for all populists, regardless of their 
ruling in the Global North or South. In short, the group identification shaped by Manichaean 
outlook may require manipulative populist discursive tactics based on the creation of actual 
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or imaginary enemies in order to consolidate group identity, to maintain its hegemonic 
ability. The strategy of populism refers to the whole populist process, beginning from the 
appearance of the leader triggering solidarity among all frustrated individuals, to the attempts 
of achievement or perpetuation of power. 
To sum up, populism as a discursive strategy, has four core requirements: a leader stimulating 
a solidarity among “the people,” the leader’s claim of a hegemonic totality of his 
equivalences to challenge a power bloc, an inevitable Manichaean antagonism of “the 
people” identified with the leader against the power bloc; and an objective to achieve or 
perpetuate power like every other political movement. 
In concordance with these features, I define populism as: 
A hegemonic discursive strategy, based on a Manichaean antagonism of “the people” versus 
a power bloc, employed by a leader on behalf of “the people,” and practiced in order to 
achieve or perpetuate power. 
Now, because I have a minimal definition of populism which makes its measurement 
possible, I may continue to the next chapter in which I thoroughly explain my research 
design. 
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3. RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
 
 
3.1. How is Populism Measured in the Literature? 
 
 
Viewing populism as a discursive phenomenon requires taking discourse as the unit of 
analysis. Empirical works of populism measure this phenomenon through classical content 
analysis as in works of Jagers & Walgrave (2007), Hawkins (2009; 2010), and Vasilopoulou 
et al. (2013); or through computational content analysis based on certain predetermined 
keywords as conducted by Reungoat (2010), Pauwels (2011); or through both as offered by 
Aslanidis (2018) and run by Rooduijn and Pauwels (2011). 
Among all works, Jagers and Walgrave's (2007) analysis can be considered as a breakthrough 
in populism studies with regards to its methodological innovations and insights, while being 
among very first instances of empirical populism studies (Aslanidis 2018, 1248; Pauwels 
2011, 102; Rooduijn and Pauwels 2011, 1273). In this study, by defining populism as a 
political communication style, Jagers and Walgrave (2007) pinpoint three core characteristics 
of populism phenomenon by mentioning historical examples: a reference to "the people" and 
a justifications of actions depending on "appealing to and identifying with the people;" anti-
elite sentiments; "the people" as a homogeneous monolithic body, with the exception of 
exclusion of marginal groups. Scholars build an operational definition that is merely based 
on the first characteristic and call it "thin concept of populism." To them, this refers to the 
minimal – necessary and sufficient – condition of populism. Scholar also develop a "thick 
concept of populism," which combines all three features (322, 323). Scholars apply content 
analysis political party broadcasts of Belgian parties on a TV channel. A compilation of 
randomly selected 20 broadcasts per party, each of which are 10 minutes long, between 1999 
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and 2001, constituted measurable populism data for scholars (325). Despite its earthshaking 
impact on populism studies, this work unfortunately has some serious issues such as 
including false positives since all references to the people are coded as populists (Aslanidis 
2018, 1248). In addition to issues of validity, this work also seems to suffer from issues of 
reliability (Rooduijn and Pauwels 2011, 1273) since it only focuses on one country and 
scholars do not even mention whether their technique works for other sources of data, rather 
than TV broadcasts. 
Inspired by Jagers and Walgrave (2007), in their work focusing on populism embedded in 
Greek politics, Vasilopoulou et al (2013) define populism as a blame-shifting mechanism 
grounded on an exclusionary discourse of us against them (392). By employing measurement 
technique of Jagers and Walgrave (2007), scholars use parliamentary speeches of the leaders 
of five political parties in Greek parliament (Vasilopoulou et al. 2013; 392, 393). Scholars 
build their own indexes, call them blame shifting index and exclusivity index, then focus on 
sentences rather than words, omitting phrases that do not include verbs such as exclamations 
or question marks (Vasilopoulou et al. 2013; 393, 394). 
Jagers and Walgrave’s (2007) work has also been inspirational for Reungoat (2010) who 
operationalizes scholars’ indexes with a few diversifying changes, while checking European 
election manifestos for populist tones. Reungoat (2010) measures populism by taking 
percentage of populist words over total number of words of particular segments of manifestos 
which are related with her own indexes (311). To Aslanidis (2018), this work over codes 
instances of people centrism and takes all claims of democracy as populists (1249). 
Hawkins (2009, 2010) uses a technique called holistic grading that requires determining core 
characteristics of populist textualized discourse and employing trained native scholars in 
different geographies. Taking the entire text as the unit of analysis, Hawkins’ (2009, 2010) 
trained coders measure populism according to a three-point scale (0,1, and 2 referring non-
populist, mixed, and populist respectively) and build a populism score according this 
measurement process. However, this technique is claimed to fail to provide enough reliability 
(Pauwels 2011, 102; Rooduijn and Pauwels 2011, 1273), and be problematic due to inclusion 
of false positives (Pauwels 2011, 102). 
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Alternatively, Pauwels (2011) runs computational text analysis rather than a labor-intensive 
manual coding (97). While rejecting minimal definitions due their possible drawbacks such 
as low operationalizability, Pauwels (2011) uses words that are expressed by “Vlaams 
Belang” to determine expressions of populism (103), thereby his dictionary-based method 
requires predetermined certain words which are used as unit of measurement. For instance, 
the more parties use words such as promise, arrogant, betray, disgrace, truth, then the higher 
their populism scores would be since populism relies on that the people are deceived by self-
interested corrupt elites (105). Same logic requires counting words such as direct and 
referendum as signs of being populist (105). Pauwels’ (2011) core argument justifying his 
measurement method is that a computerized quantitative text analysis does not treat texts as 
discourses that require interpretation (102). It not only enables numerically counting textual 
content but also analyzing it (98). But computer-based analysis is also criticized due to its 
vulnerability to inconveniences of human interpretative bias since choosing certain keywords 
ultimately depends on human led decision making (Aslanidis 2018, 1245; Moffitt & Tormey 
2014, 385). After all, there is no universal rule in building a dictionary of populist expressions 
and any attempt to build such a dictionary would be problematic due to its inherent overlook 
of context specificity of the phenomenon (Aslanidis 2018, 1247). On the other hand, one of 
Pauwels’ (2011) criticisms against classical content analysis method of Jagers and Walgrave 
(2007) is its mere focus on single case. However, Pauwels’ (2011) work reduces the domain 
of populist into a single party, Vlaams Belang, due to the fact that it is seen as notoriously 
populist by various scholars (103), despite the fact that few scholars have doubts about its 
populist character (106). Throughout his research, Pauwels (2011) count references to the 
people, and this logic requires that parties who more frequently use such references will be 
more populist than others (104) while his ideational approach to populism requires the 
assumption that the people and its opposite the elite are two homogenous entities. However, 
he admits that measuring populism depending on a word counting measurement does not 
eliminate the possibility of whether the people and its opposite – the elite – are given as 
homogenous bodies during the content (105). As he points out that impossibility, he remarks 
that his work inevitably lacks validity but argues that this is due to the tradeoff between a rise 
in reliability in quantitative content analysis with a decline in validity (105). 
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In accord with such remarks of Pauwels (2011), Aslanidis (2018) mentions that while 
computer-based analysis provides high reliability, which is inherently low in human coding 
techniques, they face with issues of validity due to their dictionary quality (1245). Therefore, 
he offers a hybrid method for future projects in order to overcome issues of validity and 
reliability (1250, 1251).  
Likewise, Rooduijn and Pauwels (2011) chooses a hybrid method. They employ Mudde's 
(2004) definition of populism as a thin-centered ideology, and measure populism according 
to its two core dimensions – people centrism, and anti-elitism – while relying on election 
manifestos as unit of analysis (Rooduijn and Pauwels 2011; 1273, 1274), and apply their 
analysis by trained coders who are provided a large body of words and phrases which may 
refer to appeals corresponding these two dimensions (Rooduijn and Pauwels 2011; 1274, 
1275). Because classical content analysis requires an expensive time-consuming process, 
Rooduijn and Pauwels (2011) also apply computerized content analysis of which 
measurement depends on a dictionary of possible populist indicators (1275). While in 
classical content analysis their unit of measurement is paragraphs, in computerized analysis 
scholars focus on words rather than paragraphs (1275). Employing a hybrid measurement 
method and applying both classical and computational measurement methods, Rooduijn and 
Pauwels (2011) admit that classical content analysis of populism provides more valid and 
probably more reliable results than a computational one (1279). 
While taking discourse as commonly agreed upon unit of analysis, scholars running 
quantitative research on populism mostly suffers from validity, many of them do not even 
have a robust justified definition and conceptualization. I argue that maximizing reliability 
when not having a valid solid ground does not refer any scientific merit in these studies. For 
example, Pauwels (2011) chooses high reliability and operationalizability at the expense of 
validity. His dictionary-based approach involves certain keywords such as “people, elite, 
ruling, undemocratic, politic, direct, betray, deceit, treason, arrogant, mafia, corrupt, caste, 
shame, shameless,” etc. as signs of populism. The one who applies using such words more 
frequently than others are calculated as more populist than them. Likewise, Jagers and 
Walgrave’s (2007) work is also problematic with regards to distinguishing populism as thin 
and thick concepts, while underscoring the former as a prerequisite. Scholars count all 
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appeals to the people as populists since they claim such references to the people constitute 
the thin concept.  
To Pauwels (2011) classical content analysis in general has four main issues: lack of 
reliability, labor intensive work which makes possible comparisons over time and space 
extremely difficult, probable subjectivity of the coder, and the absence of consensus on unit 
of analysis (102). Among scholars, validity is often understood and explained as a 
correspondence of validity between two things. For instance, Weber (1990) remarks, many 
content analyses are based on face validity, which refers to the extent that a category seems 
to measure what it aims to measure (18, 19). Similarly, King, Keohane, and Verba (1994) 
remarks that validity is measuring what we suppose that we are measuring (25). To Adcock 
and Collier (2001), a measure is valid when obtained scores of a measurement can be 
meaningfully interpreted with regards to a systematized concept (531). Error in measurement 
can be either systematic or random while the former refers to issues of validity whereas the 
latter refers to problems of reliability – which means repeated applications of a measurement 
process yield different outcomes (531), especially when conducted by different scholars 
(King, Keohane, and Verba 1994; 26). By shedding light on this distinction, Adcock and 
Collier (2001) argue that unreliable scores may be still valid on average, but scholars 
emphasize that abstaining a systematized error is their main concern (532).  
I admit that concerns of Pauwels (2011, 102) mentioned above on classical content analysis, 
would be inevitably present in this work too. However, I’ve already provided enough 
justification for my unit of analysis as discourse and I contend that my minimal definition 
will measure what it intends to measure, thereby fulfill validity requirement of a social 
research better than any computational or classical word/phrase-based populism analysis. To 
my view, populism requires a qualitative check on discourses and quantitative word count is 
not enough to pinpoint it via words that may potentially correspond to a type of Manichaean 
antagonism and a hegemonic claim of totality. Any attempt to ignore the qualitative 
dimension of populism research would inevitably underrate existing populist rhetoric and 
leads biased results. This is because any word/phrase count may not necessarily fulfill these 
two core requirements of populist rhetoric words/phrases that are used by the leader during 
exercising a Manichaean antagonism and a hegemonic totality claim do not have to refer 
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same particular statements. These two can be given separately in a group of sentences, or 
between paragraphs, especially when the speaker uses implicit mentions. They can even be 
understood when the complete speech is viewed holistically whenever required to do so. 
Thus, I argue that my understanding of populism with respect to the minimal definition I’ve 
generated in the previous chapter, would end up with a higher validity. Besides, I’ve provided 
parts of discourses (excerpts) that I’ve coded during my analysis. Some of these excerpts are 
given as coding instances. By presenting excerpt examples under each case, I intend to 
overcome concerns of validity and coder subjectivity.  
 
 
3.2. On Research Design and Methodology 
 
 
Throughout this research, pinpointing populist discourse and measurement of it will depend 
on the definition that I’ve generated at the end of chapter two. According to that definition, 
four core characteristics – a leader, a discursive claim of hegemonic totality, a discursively 
exercised Manichaean exclusionary antagonism, and an objective to achieve or perpetuate 
power are required in order to talk about populism. Because I scrutinize Erdoğan’s 
discourses, I don’t need to focus on the first and the last one since Erdoğan has been the 
leader of the ruling party in Turkey since 2002, and he has been a politician, thereby has 
already been in the domain of politics. Besides, a rational politician running for the office 
does not only try to achieve power but also strives for perpetuation of his rule once he has 
got the office. When we look at Turkish case, by almost the half of the population who has 
been voting for the opposition, Erdoğan is also considered as a leader seeking ways to 
perpetuate his power and not losing the office especially after the failures that Turkey has 
witnessed since 2013. It is known that this portion of Turkish electorate view Erdoğan’s 
rhetorical antagonism as attempts further deepening the existing partisan polarization within 
the society. This is also related with the fact that political actors of opposition parties mostly 
have pointed out Erdoğan as the core responsible of such failures, whenever they appeal 
towards their actual or potential supporters. On the one hand, supporters of opposition parties 
have continuously been critical about AKP’s years of alliance with Gülenist Movement that 
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came to an end with the initial conflict that took place on December the 17-25th and peaked 
on July the 15th, the failed coup attempt. On the other hand, compromises given to Kurds 
during Kurdish peace process had also been criticized by the majority of the opposition and 
their supporters, especially during peace negotiations with Kurdish Movement. 
In short, during my analysis, while taking unit of analysis as discourse, I have checked the 
remaining two conditions: a claim of hegemonic totality, and a Manichaean exclusionary 
antagonism exercised by Erdoğan via discourse either implicitly or explicitly5. I consider 
discourses that fulfill these two necessary conditions as populist discourses. Whenever an 
excerpt of discourses I’ve checked falls short to provide both conditions, I consider it as non-
populist excerpt6. But because I’ve also taken implicit totality claims and antagonistic 
references into account, the division of populist vs non-populist excerpts depends merely on 
antagonistic rhetoric. This is because the issue here is that excerpts that I’ve assessed 
throughout this study includes either implicit or explicit hegemonic totality claim. This is 
about my review of appeals that might actually or potentially have an impact over the 
equivalential relation between Erdoğan and the people of Turkey in economic sense on the 
national level. The logic depends on what Erdoğan explicitly says in some of his appeals that 
“We are on the same ship.” Erdoğan’s appeals about Turkish economy or economic 
conditions of the people either implicitly or explicitly strengthen or weaken the equivalential 
relation between him and the people. Therefore, throughout this work, populist vs non-
populist division is determined according to antagonistic rhetoric.  
In order to explain the focus of my research, I have to mention on Moffitt’s (2015) work on 
populism and crisis that has been an inspiration for me to conduct this study. In his article, 
Moffitt (2015) argues that “populists” who skillfully perpetuate a performance of crisis and 
achieved to extend it to a longer period of time have longer political lifetime than the ones 
who couldn't achieved to do so (208). Moffitt’s (2015) core argument here is that politicians 
 
5. For implicit mentions I’ve sought for a certain word, phrase, a group of words that may refer to a sign for an 
antagonism or a hegemonic totality claim. For instance, if Erdoğan uses “these, they” as pronouns for antagonistically 
aforementioned political actors or groups in his related speech, then I’ve perceived such appeals as containing implicit 
antagonism. But whenever he uses a reference to the economy, or the people in an economic sense, I’ve viewed it as an 
equivalence of an implicit hegemonic totality claim since economy interests all of us. This detail is important since this 
work does not focus on pure political appeals which do not necessarily include such implicit totality claims. 
6. In the following pages of this chapter, I’ll mention detailly on what excerpts refer to. 
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who are infamously applies populism more frequently than others perpetuate failures7 and 
turn them into crisis, achieve a sustainable populist performative politics to remain in power. 
He points out Hugo Chávez’s success of achieving such perpetuation, and thereby had been 
able to rule for a long period of time (207). Based on this claim I’ve intended to run an 
exploratory mix-method research throughout this work. My objective is to take Moffitt’s 
(2015) claim and check whether president Erdoğan uses the same strategy to perpetuate his 
power in Turkey, as Chávez has been claimed to sustain successfully in Venezuela. But 
different than Moffitt’s (2015) approach to populism, which relies on that it is a performative 
style, I view populism as a discursive phenomenon. Besides, what I mean by crisis is 
economic crisis, not mere political ones8. 
This research is not an explanatory one looking for causal relationships since sense of crisis 
of the people living in Turkey may have too many underlying independent variables. Instead, 
I’ve decided to focus on Moffitt’s (2015) valuable claim and intended to run an explorative 
case study research which aims to pinpoint whether there is an associational pattern between 
Erdoğan’s perpetuation of failures as crisis via populist appeals and crisis perception of the 
people living in Turkey. If such a pattern exists, I’ve further checked whether it helps 
Erdoğan to remain in power, with regards to the electoral support to his party. In accord with 
this objective, monthly data of crisis perception of the people living in Turkey and electoral 
support to AKP are acquired from research company called Konda. In the former, people are 
asked whether they expect an economic crisis in the following months. The percentage of 
affirmative answer is taken into account as sense of crisis percentage of the people. In the 
latter, people are asked which party they would vote if there were an election today. The 
percentage of the ones who answered that they would for AKP is viewed as electoral support 
to Erdoğan and taken into account accordingly. More information of these two variables can 
be found under “Variables” title.  
 
7. I’ve used the term “failure” in a similar sense with Moffitt’s (2015) understanding which posits that failures are 
structural preconditions for crisis (Quoted from Hay, Moffitt 2015, 197) while crisis exist only when they are perceived as 
crisis by the people (197). Throughout the research, whenever I say a failure, I mean a phenomenon on the structural and 
national level which may actually or potentially have an impact over the society in a negative way. 
8. Due to the data I’ve been working on, I’ve focused on economic crisis perception of the people living in Turkey. 
However, I have also paid regard to how Erdoğan frames crises - not only outcomes of mere economic failures but also, and 
mostly indeed, a combination of both economic and political ones. 
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Because populism is a contextual phenomenon, I’ve thought that for populism research, case 
study may be the best method for this aim since it is known as studying a phenomenon 
extensively within its context. In concordance with my research interest, I’ve run a case study 
research based on 7 different periods of recent economic failures in Turkey that took place 
from May 2012 - one year before Gezi Events - to the end of 2018. The reason I’ve focused 
on such periods of economic failures is that I’ve considered when the economic decline is 
tangible and severe, Erdoğan may be more likely to attempt to perpetuate failures as crisis 
via a rhetoric that aims to deepen existing crisis perception further and this may give me 
insights about whether the associational pattern I’ve been seeking for seems possible or not. 
Economic downturn has begun to become visible and palpable since Gezi Events took place. 
Besides, data I’ve been able to get from Konda - crisis perception and electoral support to 
AKP – covers the period between 2012 and 2018 despite some missing monthly values. 
Cases, as periods of economic failures, are determined according to economic deteriorations 
of three key economic indicators: Exchange rate, inflation rate, and unemployment rate 
extracted from the official webpage of Central Bank of Turkey, relying on official TÜİK 
data. In accord with case selection criteria I’ll detailly mention, 7 cases in total are detected 
between October 2012 and September 2018. The reason I’ve focused on these economic 
indicators is that they all have immediate and non-negligible impact on Turkish electorate. 
Cases are built whenever at least two of these indicators simultaneously deteriorate within a 
period, varying from 3-month to 5-month periods. Detailed information about how these 
periods are determined can be found under “Case Selection” title. 
Once I’ve determined my cases, then I’ve intended to acquire discursive data of Erdoğan that 
fall into each case. My priority has been to obtain textualized discourses of him. Official 
presidential webpage of Turkish Republic (Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Cumhurbaşkanlığı 2019) 
has been a great source for me in terms of enabling me to run this study. However, this source 
has not been adequate since textualized discourses of Erdoğan exists on this page once he 
has been elected as the president in August 2014. Unfortunately, textualized discourses of 
Erdoğan’s prime ministry period (before August 2014) are completely missing since the 
official webpage of prime ministry has been directed to presidential webpage once Turkey 
has adopted a presidential system and abandoned the parliamentary one. Therefore, after an 
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extensive search on web, on a personal webpage of an AKP deputy (Karaca n.d.), I’ve been 
able to find some textualized discourses of Erdoğan’s that fall into my cases that refer to the 
term before August 2014. These discourses are checked whether they match with original 
discourses or not via video materials of Erdoğan related speeches that can also be found on 
web by a Google, Yandex, or Youtube search. However, even such texts couldn’t be enough 
due to missing data of some months. So, in order to textualize missing discourses, I’ve had 
to transcribe them by listening the content of video materials that are available on web. 
Details of how discourses are selected, which discourses are taken into consideration, and 
which criteria are followed in terms of discourse selection are extensively given under 
upcoming “On Discourses” title. But in short, textualized discourses - either comes from 
official presidential webpage or from Karaca’s personal webpage - which fit selection criteria 
are assessed with priority. Whenever such data becomes completely missing, I’ve transcribed 
the essential parts of remaining discourses by listening to the content that is available on web. 
By applying case study as my research strategy, Erdoğan’s appeals are qualitatively checked 
and quantified via coding. Once the required discursive data has completely been extracted, 
discourses are divided into what I call excerpts – the paragraphs that I’ve created due to the 
fact that paragraphs are arbitrarily given in some textualized data or they do not even exist 
because of the transcribed content I’ve had to type. Excerpts have been built according to 
their semantic unity within themselves, and detailly explained in following part of this 
chapter. Excerpts are taken into account according to their potential to refer an equivalential 
relation based on economic elements, between Erdoğan and the people of Turkey on the 
national level. They are coded and quantified according to the type of categories they fall 
into. Excerpt examples of each case are qualitatively given is once cases have been 
introduced in the last chapter. Moreover, graphical descriptive data based on quantities and 
proportions of coded excerpts of each case that fall into different categories is also provided 
under cases and analysis titles. In short, beside qualitative case studies, excerpts of each case 
are quantified via a content analysis logic. In this way, as a result of such mix-method 
approach, frequencies and proportions of excerpts are used for the empirical assessment of 
each case and for the analysis of all cases.  
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In order to conduct an explorative analysis, categories have been created with regards to their 
potential ability to increase/decrease or remain indifferent towards crisis perception of the 
people. With examples of coded excerpts, categories are extensively explained under 
“Categorical Variables” title, but I want to mention briefly on three main categories that I’ve 
used to categorize Erdoğan’s appeals in this work. In accord with this approach, first I’ve 
checked whether Erdoğan ignores or recognizes economic failures, or a package of failures9 
as he claims to be the source of economic ones.  
On the one hand, Erdoğan may ignore failures and he may pretend as if there are no failures 
at all. Erdoğan’s indifference vis-à-vis failures can be inferred via his positive remarks about 
Turkish economy by expressions on AKP’s contributions to Turkish economy so far or by 
his mentions about investments and huge projects of his government which aim to make 
Turkey among top 10 economies of the world in the future. For a failure ignoring rhetoric, a 
positive reference to the economy is required10. On the other hand, Erdoğan may recognize 
failures, simply by mentioning them during his speech. Once he has recognized failures, has 
two framing options: To emphasize and thereby perpetuate them as crisis or as a second 
option, deny framing them as crisis. While the former is expected to raise crisis perception 
of the people, the latter can be considered as an expression to lower or mitigate sense of 
crisis. The choice of framing failures as crisis or not depends on Erdoğan’s political strategy.  
Erdoğan denies framing failures as crisis by simply denying their actual or potential impact 
over the economy, or over the people of Turkey in an economic sense. He may do so, for 
instance, by pointing out the intention or determination for governmental action in order to 
overcome inconveniences that failures have created or about to create. Or he may remark that 
 
9. Economic failures do not have to be merely expressed; Erdoğan may also relate them with political failures as 
well.  This is done when both political and economic failures are combined and presented as a package – by pointing out 
the ultimate source of all failures. For instance, Erdoğan may associate economic downturn with political turbulence that 
has continued since Gezi Events. In such appeals, political and economic failures are framed as different projections of the 
same threat – a “mastermind.” Whenever Erdoğan associates economic failures with such political ones, discourses are 
holistically examined in order to code the related excerpts accurately and consistently. However, in order to take into 
consideration such excerpts for coding, a concrete association has to exist via certain words such as attack, assault, plot, 
trick, malicious games, etc. within the excerpt that is focused on during assessment. Detailed information with examples is 
given under “On Package of Failures” title. 
10. Positive remarks on AKP’s contribution to Turkish economy are viewed as referring implicit claims of 
hegemonic totality. On the condition that Erdoğan does not mention any failure of AKP governments, mere positive 
references to AKP without any antagonism against other political actors or groups is assessed within the scope of failure 
ignoring non-populist rhetoric. Whenever an antagonism is involved, then such appeals are viewed as examples of failure 
ignoring populist rhetoric. Detailed explanation with examples is provided under “Failure Ignoring Rhetoric” title. 
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the economic overview has changed or has begun to change recently, and failures or sources 
of failures have been eliminated or at least has been completely neutralized. Or he may 
simply deny the potential of failures or threats and claim that they can’t even have or couldn’t 
have had an impact over the economy or in an economic sense over the people of Turkey. I 
call such appeals as instances of crisis denying rhetoric and I’ve viewed them as appeals to 
lower or mitigate existing crisis perception of the people.  
Contrarily, Erdoğan can emphasize failures and frame them as crisis via crisis emphasizing 
rhetoric11. He may do so by simply putting the people into an alarming position while not 
denying framing them as crisis. Secondly, instead of pointing out governmental action, he 
may apply using pure political or religious appeals and frame them as ultimate solutions vis-
à-vis failures. Thirdly, due to the inability of the government to overcome troubles that 
failures have resulted with, he may ask help from the people to contribute solutions that he 
proposes. Fourthly, he may emphasize uncertainty for the future - either by remarks on a 
turning point for Turkey or via conditional statements that point out the probability of 
overcoming failures12. Fifthly, Erdoğan may try to perpetuate failures as crisis by using an 
offensive tongue that point out a threat on the global level, a “mastermind” – the ultimate 
source of all failures, against Turkish economy. In short, Erdoğan’s crisis emphasizing 
rhetoric via such appeals is expected to raise crisis perception of the people.  
I have to repeat that extensive information about these three major categories with examples 
of populist and non-populist excerpts that fall into each of them is given under “Categorical 
Variables” title. Detailed explanation on why I’ve viewed such types of appeals as attempts 
of crisis perpetuation or denial is also given in that part. Here, I just want to briefly mention 
on what I’ve intended to do, with regards to the path I’ve followed during this study. 
 
11. Both crisis emphasizing and crisis denying appeals have overwhelmingly populist characteristic since Erdoğan 
mostly frames economic failures as threats, plots, or attacks against Turkey and Turkish economy. Because an economic 
attack refers to an antagonism by implicitly pointing out an actor attempting against Turkey, and since Turkish economy 
interests all people living in Turkey and thereby includes an implicit totality claim, such appeals are viewed as instances of 
populist rhetoric for both categories. 
12. Inherently, uncertainty embodies a negativity and is expected to enhance existing anxiety and concerns of the 
people. Thus, I haven’t taken into account positive emphases for the future here. For instance, if Erdoğan says Turkey is 
about to become a great power again, as she had been in her glorious past experiences, this is not viewed as a remark about 
an uncertain future. Instead, what I mean is something like “We are on the edge of a catastrophe” or “The fate of our nation 
is completely dependent on our fight with these traitors.” These examples are given hypothetically. 
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During analysis, I’ve checked whether there is an association between Erdoğan’s crisis 
emphasizing attempts and a rise in crisis perception of the people during periods of failures. 
In accord with Moffitt’s (2015) core argument, my expectation is of Erdoğan’s populist 
appeals is that he must exercise less crisis denying populist rhetoric than crisis emphasizing 
one. In other words, if he uses crisis emphasizing populist rhetoric more frequently than crisis 
denying one and if an increase in sense of crisis is observed, then I can conclude that there 
seems to be an associational pattern between Erdoğan’s rhetorical framing of failures and 
rising crisis perception of the people. However, any such finding is not enough for what I’ve 
intended to check for. In addition, for the cases such associational pattern exists, I’ve also 
checked whether the electoral support to Erdoğan increases or not. If it does, then I can infer 
that Erdoğan may fit Moffitt’s (2015) “populist” profile – the one who perpetuates failures 
and turns them into crisis in order to perpetuate his term in the office.  
In short, the association I’ve been seeking for requires three conditions. First, Erdoğan must 
exercise crisis emphasizing populist rhetoric. Second, he must do so more frequently than 
crisis denying populist rhetoric. And third, an increase in sense of crisis must be observed. 
I’ve viewed these three conditions as necessary conditions to claim that there seems to be an 
association between Erdoğan’s crisis perpetuation attempts and rising crisis perception. But 
in order to comment on whether Erdoğan may use this strategy in order to remain in power 
or not, I also need to check how electoral support to AKP changes. If Erdoğan’s electoral 
support rises whenever there is an association, only then it can be possible to affirmatively 
comment on that Erdoğan may fit the “populist” profile that Moffitt (2015) talks about.  
 
 
3.2.1. Variables 
 
In order to have a measure for crisis perception among the people, I’ve got in touch with 
Konda. This is a famous research company in Turkey which is viewed as neutral in terms of 
distinguishing its own political stance and conducting unbiased surveys. I have been able to 
acquire a sense of crisis data from this research company. This indicator is built by monthly 
conducted surveys of Konda’s researchers with many respondents, also graphically 
demonstrated on Konda interactive webpage (Konda interaktif 2019). I obtained the measure 
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of a sense of economic crisis which relies on the total percentage of Konda respondents that 
expect an economic crisis for the upcoming months in Turkey. However, there is one issue 
with such surveys – they are not conducted every month, so there are some missing 
observations.  
In addition to sense of crisis data, I’ve also consulted to this research company for the data 
that shows electoral support to Erdoğan. Fortunately, again despite some missing 
observations, results of monthly surveys that are conducted to find out which party the people 
would vote for have been acquired. In such surveys, people are exactly asked to which party 
they would vote for if there were an election in Turkey today. Percentage values of electoral 
support to AKP are added to my analysis since they also manifest the electoral support to 
Erdoğan. Thus, potential electorate support to AKP is considered as an equivalence of 
potential support to Erdoğan. 
Remaining variables are the monthly values of three key economic indicators of Turkish 
economy. In order to pinpoint economic failure periods, I’ve checked such indicators since I 
believe that they all refer to concerns the people of Turkey, and have an immediate, non-
negligible impact over the people of Turkey, therefore have a direct impact on crisis 
perception. These indicators are exchange rate, unemployment rate, and inflation rate. I’ve 
obtained the data of these three indicators from electronic data delivery system of the official 
webpage of Turkish Central Bank (Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Merkez Bankası, n.d.). The ultimate 
source of these three measures is TUIK since it is the official institution that shares such 
statistical data in Turkey. Although Erdoğan mostly complains with the interest rate and 
occasionally attacks authorities working in the Central Bank of Turkey13, interest rate 
changes rarely and not frequently. Whenever it changes it, the possible impact of the change 
may not immediate, and mostly pertain to investments to Turkish economy. Due to the fact 
that he possible effect of investment can only understood only in the long run, one cannot 
 
13. When it comes to explicit references to any economic indicators, Erdoğan mostly emphasizes interest rate and 
frames it as the source of inflation and any other economic troubles. However, since interest rate does not change frequently, 
I’ve thought a case selection based on it is neither practical nor can serve to the purpose of this work. Besides, my intention 
has been to check the most significant, core indicators whose impact is immediate and non-negligible when it comes to the 
people of Turkey. Erdoğan’s appeals that frequently point out interest rate may be viewed more as responses of the 
government for economic downturn instead of what is actually deteriorating within the economy. Whenever Erdoğan 
mentions on interest rate, such appeals are taken into consideration. However, I haven’t used interest rate as an indicator 
that determine cases. 
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make any speculations or run an analysis in the short run depending on the interest rate. 
Therefore, I’ve decided that case analysis depending on the interest rate is neither practical 
nor can serve to the purpose of this work. 
For the exchange rate, I’ve taken the value of U.S. Dollar vis a vis Turkish Lira since it is 
most powerful option among indicators to be selected, due to the overall dependency on U.S. 
Dollar among every today’s global economies. But because Turkey is a developing country 
and does not have key strategic resources (such as, oil) to sustain an independent path on its 
own, thereby dependent on foreign inflows of capital, the value of U.S. Dollar matters much 
more for us. Inflows of U.S. Dollars contribute Turkish economy via investment projects and 
underpin sustainable economic growth of Turkey. However, circumstances causing an 
outflow of dollars do not only refer to a decline in investment and thereby in growth in the 
long run, but also immediately reduces the value of Turkish Lira vis-à-vis American Dollar, 
and thus leads an immediate overall rise in prices of many consumer goods especially when 
they are imports. In turn, that may contribute a rise in perceived economic crisis among the 
people living in Turkey. Moreover, Erdoğan’s appeals which are subjected to this work might 
be expected to be more sensitive to exchange rate hikes and might be more frequently 
expressed during periods of severe deteriorations of the exchange rate. Because the value of 
American Dollar is a very important indicator for Turkish economy, not only due to its 
substantial impact on the economy as a whole, but also its ability of shaping the people’s 
perceptions, because of some particular past devaluation experiences in 1994 and 2001. 
Besides, as I’ve mentioned before, claims of economic war intensified during exchange rate 
crisis of Summer 2018. 
Second, despite its worldwide imperfect calculation by official authorities in general, 
unemployment rate is a crucial variable that demonstrates the ability of an economy to 
provide sufficient job opportunities for its actively job seeking citizens. When an economy 
is unable to fulfill job demands of its citizens, then it may be considered as in a failing trend. 
Under high unemployment levels, people may get the idea that the economy is not working 
properly, and that may reinforce people’s perception of an economic crisis.  
Third, inflation rate, as the percentage change in consumer price index, simply demonstrates 
how much 1 Turkish Lira in pockets of the people loses its purchasing power over time due 
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to a rise in price level. Under circumstances of high inflation, people cannot afford their same 
standard level of living, and may consider that such conditions refer to an economic crisis. 
Besides, like exchange rate, historically, the impact that the inflation brought over Turkish 
economy and purchasing power of the people was severe before AKP governments. 
Especially during coalition government periods of 1990s, it is known to have brought a 
traumatic impact over the people of Turkey. Therefore, one may consider that it is among the 
first and foremost economic variables whose potential impact over the crisis perception 
among the people might be highly influential. Thus, I’ve taken it as my third key economic 
indicator. 
 
 
3.2.2. Case Selection 
 
In order to determine my cases, I’ve decided to focus on the time period between December 
2018 and May 2012, one year exactly before Gezi demonstrations. The reason is that after 
Gezi uprising occurred, it has triggered a serious rise in oppositional politics and 
corresponded the time that an apparent rising trend in exchange rate began to be observed 
again in Turkey. Within this time period, potential cases are pinpointed according to failure 
of three key economic indicators. The reason is that I think that Erdoğan may be more likely 
to perpetuate failures as crisis when the economy is in a downturn.  
 
When I determine cases, I’ve taken into consideration following conditions: 
• All cases have to include at least two economic failures. Only one deterioration of 
any economic indicator is not enough to label a case as a case of economic failures14.  
• Corresponding months of all cases only belong to one particular case. There are no 
common months for any cases. This is because every month has its own political and 
economic dynamics. Mixing cases with common months may end up with misleading 
implications. 
 
14. Because fluctuations in interest rate is high in my data and since short run tradeoff between inflation rate and 
unemployment rate is an acknowledged phenomenon that has already gained a ground in the economy literature, I’ve 
thought that labeling a period as a term of failures requires more than one deterioration since only one may not be enough 
to mark a serious economic downturn. 
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• Cases consist of consecutive months and a continuous deterioration for exchange rate 
and unemployment rate have to be observed before labeling a period as a case. A 
deterioration has to exist between 1st and 2nd month, 2nd and 3rd month, and so on.  Within a 
case, there has to be no interruption in continuous deterioration of the values of these two 
economic indicators. To label a time period of consecutive months as a case, with regards to 
deteriorations in exchange rate and unemployment rate, there must be at least 10 percent 
continuous deterioration for values of these indicators. An example is given below: 
 
Table 3.1 Case example in which all variables get deteriorated 
Date Exchange Rate Unemployment Rate Inflation Rate 
10.2013 1.99 9.10 1.799 
11.2013 2.02 9.30 0.008 
12.2013 2.06 9.60 0.460 
01.2014 2.22 10.30 1.978 
 
• When it comes to inflation rate, in order to label a period as a case due to this 
indicator, there has to be at least 1 percent monthly increase on average in inflation rate for 
the related case. Because I’ve focused on the average value of inflation rate deterioration for 
any possible case, deterioration for the values of inflation rate does not require a continuity. 
That is because, unlike trends of continuity in deterioration of the values of exchange rate 
and unemployment rate, fluctuation is severe in inflation rate data. In short, the average value 
of the positive inflation of related consecutive months must be at least 1 percent. Cases cannot 
include negative inflation rates.  
• The temporal scope of any case is limited to minimum 3 months and maximum 5 
months. All cases have to refer at least 3-month time period in order to be sure that 
deterioration is not an accidental fluctuation. Besides, cases can refer max maximum 5-month 
time periods since as the temporal volume of cases gets extended, then the impact of 
deteriorations on crisis perception may vary due to varying future deteriorations. People may 
more likely to perceive failures as crisis when the overall number of deteriorations gets 
increased. I’ve put 5 months maximum criterion due to the fact that in continuous 
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deterioration trend that goes beyond 5 months, the number of overall deteriorations may 
change, as I’ve observed during my scrutiny of economic failures that took place in 2018. 
Moreover, as the number of months within a case increases, within case political and 
economic dynamics of any potential subsequent case may shape crisis perception in a 
different way. So, I’ve considered it would be better to keep temporal dimension of any cases 
from 3 months to 5 months. In short, when a continuous deterioration trend that goes beyond 
5 months is observed, then cases are divided according to the overall number of economic 
deteriorations that possibly fall into each potential case, as long as the case criteria for the 
first potential case is satisfied.  
 
When we look at the values of three indicators for corresponding months in the table given 
below, we cannot take last two months in any case since November 2018 has a negative 
inflation rate, and from September 2018 to October 2018 deterioration in exchange rate 
reverses and continuous deterioration comes to an end. I’ve divided these 9 months into two 
cases: January to May, and June to September. This is done since 10 % deterioration in 
exchange rate is satisfied only in May 2018 while not for unemployment rate. Because cases 
must include at least two deteriorations, from January 2018 to May 2018, deteriorations in 
exchange rate and inflation rate satisfy case criteria. From June 2018 to September 2018, all 
indicators get deteriorated and this deterioration is continuous until October 2018. Therefore, 
I’ve taken the period from June 2018 to September 2018 as my second case for 2018.    
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Table 3.2 An example of a division of a continuous deterioration 
Date Exchange Rate Unemployment Rate Inflation Rate 
01.2018 3.77 10.80 1.02 
02.2018 3.78 10.64 0.73 
03.2018 3.88 10.12 0.99 
04.2018 4.05 9.60 1.87 
05.2018 4.41 9.70 1.62 
06.2018 4.63 10.16 2.61 
07.2018 4.75 10.76 0.55 
08.2018 5.73 11.12 2.29 
09.2018 6.37 11.40 6.30 
10.2018 5.86 11.60 2.66 
11.2018 5.37 12.30 -1.44 
 
According to such criteria given above and the data of my economic indicators I’ve checked 
for the time period between May 2012 and December 2018, I’ve detected 7 cases in total, 
one consists of 3-month time, four consists of 4-month time, and two consists of 5-month 
time.  
Table 3.3 An example of a division of a continuous deterioration 
Cases Corresponding Time 
Period 
Types of Economic Failures 
Case 1 10.2012 – 01.2013 Unemployment rate and inflation rate 
Case 2 10.2013 – 01.2014 
 
Exchange rate, unemployment rate, 
and inflation rate 
Case 3 01.2015 – 04.2015 
 
Exchange rate and inflation rate 
Case 4 09.2016 - 01.2017 Exchange rate, unemployment rate, 
and inflation rate 
Case 5 09.2017 – 11.2017 Exchange rate and inflation rate 
Case 6 01.2018 - 05.2018 
 
Exchange rate and inflation rate 
Case 7 06.2018 – 09.2018 
 
 
Exchange rate, unemployment rate, 
and inflation rate 
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3.2.3. On Discourses 
 
As I’ve mentioned earlier, the temporal scope of this research refers to the time period 
between May 2012 and December 2018 and due to my case selection criteria, my cases refer 
to a time period between October 2012 and September 2018. Erdoğan’s discourses that fall 
into this period exist on web, but not all of them can be found in textualized format. Because 
I view populism as a discursive phenomenon and working on discourses which are not 
textualized requires serious time and energy, I’ve firstly focused on Erdoğan’s available 
textualized discourses within this period15. Where I’ve checked for such textualized 
discourses (sources of textualized discourses) are given in detail once I’ll have explained 
which discourses I’ve focused on and according to what criteria I’ve made a selection. Before 
going into details of this section, I’d like to remind the reader that the list of all selected 
discourses with corresponding web links is given in the appendix. Moreover, all textualized 
discourses which are eliminated from selection process are available on whether official 
webpage of presidency (Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Cumhurbaşkanlığı 2019) or Harun Karaca’s 
personal webpage (Karaca n.d.). 
In terms of data collection, as I’ve just said, my priority has been to collect official textualized 
discourses as much as possible and make a selection among available ones according to a 
predetermined selection criterion. Hence, textualized discourses are selected with priority 
and the ones that I’ve been able to collect for selection, I’ve selected two of them per month 
on the condition that; 
• Erdoğan’s message is in Turkish16, and potentially must pertain to domestic political 
or economic issues of Turkey on the national level with regards to the audience Erdoğan 
speaks to17. In terms of the audience, discourses which pertain to issues of Turkey on the 
national level are taken into consideration with priority. 
 
15. De jure or de facto, Erdoğan has always been the leader of AKP and the ruler of Turkey, therefore only his 
discourses are taken into account during the whole study. Discourses of Ahmet Davutoğlu, as the prime minister and de jure 
elected leader of AKP, once Erdoğan has been elected as the president thereby he had officially remained away from his 
own party between August 2014 and May 2017, are only secondary to the scope of this study. 
16. Erdoğan’s messages which are given in English on presidential website are overwhelmingly about 
global/international matters which are irrelevant to the scope of this research.  
17. The first condition I’ve taken into account is the availability of domestic audience which Erdoğan speaks to 
and the fact that appeals are primarily towards Turkish people. Whenever Erdoğan talks towards with a mere 
global/international audience, it automatically violates this criterion. 
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• Selected textualized discourses consist of at least 1000 words18, 
• There should be at least one-week temporal distance between two discourses, 19 
• Discourses should not be in a question and answer format, like Erdoğan’s interviews 
or TV programs that he speaks as a guest20. 
What I mean by discourses which are viewed by priority with regards to the audience, 
Erdoğan’s potential appeals that pertain to Turkey as a whole are primarily viewed. And 
according to this objective, priority is given to: 
• First, party meetings that take place on the nation level: AKP group meetings or AKP 
extended provincial chairmen meetings, in both of which Erdoğan speaks on issues that 
pertain to Turkey on the national level. 
• Second, Erdoğan’s meetings with muhtars that is organized in the presidential palace 
in, Ankara, in which Erdoğan also uses references to domestic issues of Turkey as a whole. 
Hence, among textualized discourses, discourses of party meetings which are held on the 
national level are selected with priority. By party meetings on the national level, I mean AKP 
group meetings or extended provincial chairmen meetings21 of AKP in both of which 
Erdoğan appeals to the members of his party and dominantly talks about Turkey’s political 
and economic issues. AKP group meetings are held in the parliament and extended provincial 
 
18. This is about my focus on textualized discourses with priority and the fact that textualized data on presidential 
webpage is limited for some months. I’ve determined minimum 1000 words criterion for textualized discourses since 
Erdoğan will probably use greetings and pure political appeals during any speech he exercises. But because I’ve looked at 
proportions for analysis, I’ve considered discourses that are above a certain word count limit can also be viewed for the 
assessment. Besides, 51 discourses out of 58 are above 2000 words. 6 of the remaining discourses belong to case 7. For this 
case, textualized discourses exist on presidential webpage but the number of ones that fit my selection criteria is low, 
especially when I take into consideration temporal distance between potential selections. Except 6 discourses of case 7, last 
remaining one whose word count is between 1000 and 2000 words is the one that Erdoğan exercises in September 2017, 
during his visit to Turken Foundation, which I’ve also had to select due to limited availability of existing textualized 
discourses. Lengths of all selections in terms of word count will be given via tables during this chapter. 
19. I’ve endeavored to pay attention to the temporal distance between two discourses, not only for discourses 
which are exercised within the same month, but also with regards to discourses of consecutive months. However, as I’ll 
mention in detail, there are some exceptions due to limited availability of textualized data. Whenever available textualized 
discourses for a particular month do not satisfy one week temporal distance between two potential selections, I’ve strived 
for the maximization of the temporal distance between them while simultaneously, paying attention all selection criteria. 
Hence, while primarily keeping an eye on whether textualized discourses satisfy selection criteria or not, I’ve also paid 
regard to the maximization of the temporal distance among available options. 
20. I’ve decided to pay attention to this condition since such programs may mitigate Erdoğan’s choices and 
understate potential populist appeals. Erdoğan may only talk about what is being asked by the interviewer or the moderator 
of those programs, thus his answers may be directed by the questions of the questioner. I’ve preferred to focus on Erdoğan’s 
speeches in which he speaks totally independently, and in that no one asks any questions and expects an answer.   
21. In extended provincial chairmen meetings, Erdoğan appeals to provincial chairmen of 81 provinces 
of Turkey. 
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chairmen meetings take place in AKP headquarters, in both of which Erdoğan speaks as the 
leader of his party. Discourses of these two meetings are viewed as alternatives to each other. 
Although they have priority when compared with other available textualized discourses, 
among themselves, if there are more than two available textualized discourses of these party 
meetings, they are randomly selected by taking into account the temporal distance between 
each other. 
If there is no textualized discourse of such party meetings, then again due to concerns of 
appeals expressed on the national level and pertain to domestic political and economic issues 
of Turkey, I’ve given priority to Erdoğan’s meetings with muhtars in which Erdoğan 
welcomes them in presidential palace. Erdoğan’s meetings with muhtars began to be 
organized in January 2015, after he has elected as the president in August 2014. Due to his 
position, he left his own party22 and Ahmet Davutoğlu as the prime minister began to speak 
in AKP group meetings and extended provincial chairmen meetings. Meanwhile, Erdoğan 
did neither appear in AKP group meetings nor in extended provincial chairmen meetings of 
AKP since he officially left his party. However, while he was away, I’ve noticed that Erdoğan 
attempted to speak on national matters not only as a president but also as the founder and de 
facto leader of AKP, especially during his meetings with muhtars of Turkey, coming from 
different cities of the country. Therefore, as long as there is no textualized discourse of AKP 
group meetings or extended provincial chairmen meetings that Erdoğan appears as the orator, 
then in terms of the selection, I’ve given priority to Erdoğan’s meetings with muhtars. 
By focusing on AKP group meetings, AKP extended provincial chairmen meetings, or 
Erdoğan’s meetings with muhtars, I’ve tried to maximize my chances to merely focus on 
domestic political and economic issues of Turkey on national level. Among the remaining 
textualized discourses, a random selection has been made as long as they satisfy selection 
criteria, detailly given below. In terms of making a random selection with regards to the 
 
22. That’s why, there are no such party meetings in which Erdoğan speaks as the leader, up until May 2017. The 
first one when Erdoğan rejoins AKP and whose text is given on official presidential webpage does not fall into my cases. 
The remaining ones which are shared on presidential webpage fall into one of my cases (for case 6, during the first five 
months of 2018) are selected with priority among other available textualized discourses and randomly among themselves 
by checking their temporal distance with one another. Except group meetings, there are no such textualized speech of any 
extended provincial chainmen meetings on this official presidential page unfortunately, even after Erdoğan rejoined AKP 
in 2017. 
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audience that Erdoğan speaks to, in order to refrain an irrelevant selection to the scope of this 
work, I’ve taken into account the following criteria given below.  
Discourses are selected on the condition that; 
• Regardless of the location of the meeting in which Erdoğan speaks, he does not talk primarily 
towards foreign authorities or to a global/international audience 23, 
• He does not speak in a conference, meeting, or an event in general that would inevitably 
involve mostly Islamic references24, 
• He does not attend a meeting, organization, a ceremony, or an event in general of which 
scope seems to be merely about art or culture25, 
• He does not speak on an organization or an activity about sports26, 
• He does not talk on an event which potentially embodies mostly social references such as 
like women rights, the importance of family as the core institution of the society or appeals 
primarily about children.27 
• He does not speak on an academic event that the scope of event merely seems to be about 
education28. 
 
23. Discourses of global/international meetings are irrelevant to the scope of this study. For example, whenever 
Erdoğan speaks on United Nations General Assembly in the U.S. or NATO Parliamentary Assembly in Brussels. In addition, 
whenever Erdoğan meets with Angela Merkel for a press conference about Turkey’s relations with Germany or E.U., 
regardless of the location of the meeting, discourses exercised during such meetings are also irrelevant to the scope of this 
work. Another example is Erdoğan’s speech in International Ombudsman Conference which took place in Istanbul, on 
September the 25th, 2017. Such discourses are kept out of assessment in order to abstain potential intense or pure 
global/international appeals, which are irrelevant to the focus of this study. 
24. With regards to the audience that Erdoğan speaks to, if there is any Islamic reference that gives a clue that the 
discourse will consist of Islamic appeals, I’ve not taken it into consideration since my observation is for such events, 
Erdoğan mostly exercises pure political and religious appeals during them. Therefore, they are not in the scope of this study. 
25. For instance, if Erdoğan attends a ceremony or a commemoration for Necip Fazıl Kısakürek, this is again 
irrelevant to the scope of this work. As another example, if he speaks on the opening ceremony or a historical building 
which has a cultural value and has undergone a restoration process, the speech he exercises at that event is also irrelevant 
to the focus of this study. 
26. Because Erdoğan may not even talk about politics in such meetings, such discourses are kept out of selection. 
27. Such events which potentially would be full of social appeals rather than political and economic ones, thereby 
ignored during selection of discourses. Although not limited to, examples can be given as Erdoğan’s speeches on March 8 
international women’s day or his statements during his meetings with children on April 23 national sovereignty and 
children's day.  
28. Not only Erdoğan’s discourses that are exercised during inauguration ceremonies of upcoming academic year, 
but also his speeches in special invitations from educational institutions are ignored. For instance, there are numerous 
attendances of Erdoğan to receive honorary doctorate titles which are awarded by various universities, not only from Turkish 
universities but also from the ones all around the world. Because potential appeals during these events are irrelevant to the 
scope of this study, such discourses are not taken into consideration. 
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In terms of selecting remaining possible textualized discourses according to criteria listed 
just above, I haven’t further generated priorities in order to avoid any possible subjectivity. 
So, apart from textualized discourses of AKP group meetings, AKP extended provincial 
chairmen meetings, and Erdoğan’s meetings with muhtars, for the remaining textualized 
speeches, in terms of my concerns of avoiding from a more complicated discourse selection 
process, I’ve decided to make a random selection by not taking into account any further 
criteria, on the condition that discourses satisfy selection criteria detailly given above29.  
However, for some months of my cases, due to limited availability of textualized discourses, 
I’ve had to add an additional criterion before making a selection since especially for one 
month, no discourse satisfies any of my selection criteria given above. Thus, in order to make 
a selection among limited textualized discourses for some exceptional months, I’ve paid 
regard to the following additional criterion beside initial selection criteria: 
• For exceptional months due to limited available textualized discourses that satisfy initial 
selection criteria, I’ve checked whether Erdoğan speaks primarily towards a domestic 
audience or not. If so, then the ones that he appeals to the crowd within geographical confines 
of Turkey are selected with priority when compared with the ones he speaks abroad30.  
After clarifying this extra criterion for exceptional months, now I can conclude that 
remaining discourses which do not violate any selection criteria are viewed as alternatives to 
each other and a complete random selection is made among them. For instance, when there 
are no party meetings on the national level for a particular month, discourses which violate 
selection criteria are eliminated from selection process and kept out of assessment. A random 
selection is made among remaining ones, regardless of where Erdoğan speaks within 
 
29. During my focus on Erdoğan’s various discourses, apart from discourses that are kept out of assessment due 
to the selection criteria given above (In terms of the title of the discourse and the audience Erdoğan appeals to, the ones that 
are exercised primarily towards a global/international audience/authorities; discourses that is expected to embody strong 
Islamic references; discourses which are expected to include appeals on art and culture; or discourses that will probably be 
about pure social issue; or discourses exercised on an academic event), I’ve realized that he can more or less can talk on any 
issue according to his political agenda, regardless of where speaks within geographical confines of Turkey and the particular 
audience he speaks to. By primarily focusing on Erdoğan’s discourses in AKP group meetings, in AKP extended provincial 
chairmen meetings, or in his meetings with muhtars and selecting discourses of these meetings with priority, I’ve tried to 
maximize my chances to merely focus Erdoğan’s remarks on domestic political and economic issues of Turkey on the 
national level and abstain a possible biased selection. 
30. This is the case for both September 2017 and 2018, when Erdoğan mostly speaks abroad, especially during the 
former. I’ve had to give priority to discourses which are exercised within territory of Turkey as long as they are exercised 
primarily towards domestic audience.  
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boundaries of Turkey, or which audience he speaks to. Details of this random selection will 
be given with examples shortly after. But before that, I must clarify from where I’ve extracted 
textualized discourses from. 
 
 
3.2.3.1. On sources of discourses 
 
In terms of sources of discursive data, I’ve first checked discourses which are shared on the 
official web page of Presidency of the Turkish Republic (Türkiye Cumhuriyeti 
Cumhurbaşkanlığı 2019). Fortunately, for the term that Erdoğan has been serving as the 
president (since August 2014), textualized discourses are mostly available on this website. 
However, for to the period before August 2014, I haven’t been able to acquire textualized 
discourses that easily. I’ve got in touch with AKP headquarters and asked whether I could 
acquire discourses that I need for my study. Unfortunately, I’ve got no positive response and 
directed to the official webpage of AKP (Ak Parti, n.d.) instead. After checking available 
data on official webpage of AKP, I couldn’t find discourses I’ve been looking for. Moreover, 
for the period that Erdoğan has served as a prime minister, there are no textualized discourses 
available to public since the webpage of prime ministry is directed to the webpage of 
presidency, due to the fact that Turkey has adopted presidential system. So, there is no such 
an official webpage of prime ministry anymore since there is no prime ministry at all due to 
the presidential system that Turkey has adopted. That means, for the time period between 
October 2012 and August 2014, when Erdoğan serves as a prime minister, official textualized 
discourses are completely missing on existing official websites of Turkish Republic. Because 
full texts of Erdoğan’s discourses are not regularly given by national or local newspapers, 
nor they are shared by AKP official website, I’ve attempted to look for remaining missing 
discourses of the period between October 2012 – July 2014 when Erdoğan serves as a prime 
minister, again by checking web. Fortunately, I’ve been able to find most of the discourses 
I’ve been seeking for on an AKP’s deputy personal webpage, named Harun Karaca. 
Discourses which are acquired from this webpage are checked whether they are genuine or 
not, by comparing them with related video materials of each particular discourse, which are 
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also available on web31. Fortunately, all have turned out to be original, no significant error 
has been detected32. Besides, under some discourses that exist on Karaca’s web page, an 
explicit reference to the official webpage of AKP is given (Karaca 2013). For my first two 
cases (case 1 and case 2), I’ve extracted the majority of textualized discourses of AKP party 
meetings from this personal webpage33 since they are genuine, and they match with original 
speeches of Erdoğan whose video materials can be easily found on Youtube. For months 
which have more than two discourses, a random selection has been made since Karaca has 
mostly shared AKP group meetings or AKP extended provincial chairmen meetings on his 
page.  
However, some discourses were still missing due to limited shared content of this webpage. 
Moreover, some of them even do not satisfy selection criteria and thereby are not in the scope 
of my research interest. That’s why I’ve still had to search for remaining missing discourses, 
whose textualized formats exist nowhere on web. For the missing content, I’ve had to check 
video materials on web. And without any other possible option, I’ve had to transcribe these 
videos that do not exist in a textualized format on anywhere. Before going into details of 
transcribed discourses, I want to give a detailed information on how selections of textualized 
discourses are made and mention on exceptions due to limited availability of textualized data. 
 
 
3.2.3.2. On selections of textualized discourses 
 
 
31. I’ve done this by typing the title of each discourse on Google and Yandex. By the help of these two search 
engines, I’ve realized that all videos of such textualized discourses can be found on Youtube. I’ve checked these videos of 
each particular text by listening to the content. 
32. By significant, I mean some textualized discourses may partially include Erdoğan’s greetings at the beginning 
of his speeches. These parts, which refer to first one or two sentences of each discourse are not significant with regards to 
the focus of this work. They are not assessed even when they are readily found textualized. In short, because they have 
nothing to do with my research interest, partial greetings at the beginning are viewed as insignificant. This is also true for 
videos since many of them have a live stream break of related TV channels at the beginning. 
33. Among the discourses that I’ve acquired from this webpage, there is only one discourse of extended provincial 
chairmen meeting, which took place on 14th of November 2012. This is also the reason that the discourses of November 
2012 have a 6 days temporal distance with one another, since there are no other existing textualized discourses for November 
2012 on this page. Apart from this one, the rest of the discourses I’ve been able to acquire from this website completely 
consists of textualized discourses of AKP group meetings. 
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The list of textualized discourses that are selected with priority is given in the table below 
while the list of discarded textualized counterparts of them due to random selection can be 
found in the appendix.  
 
Table 3.4 Textualized discourses that are selected with priority 
Case / Discourse ID Meeting / 
Audience 
Date / 
Location 
Length 
as Word 
Count / 
Number 
of Coded 
Excerpts 
Number of 
Discarded 
Textualized 
Alternatives 
per month 
due to 
Random 
Selection 
Case 1 / D03 
 
AKP Extended 
Provincial 
Chairmen 
Meeting / AKP 
Members 
14.11.12 / 
Ankara 
3361 / 17 0 
 
Case 1 / D04 AKP Group 
Meeting / AKP 
Members 
20.11.12 / 
Ankara 
5392 / 15 
Case 1 / D07 AKP Group 
Meeting / AKP 
Members 
15.01.13 / 
Ankara 
4100 / 18 0 
 
Case 1 / D08 AKP Group 
Meeting / AKP 
Members 
22.01.13 / 
Ankara 
3473 / 7 
Case 2 / D10 AKP Group 
Meeting / AKP 
Members 
22.10.13 / 
Ankara 
3831 / 10 0 
Case 2 / D11 AKP Group 
Meeting / AKP 
Members 
05.11.13 / 
Ankara 
4091 / 19 2 
 
Case 2 / D12 AKP Group 
Meeting / AKP 
Members 
19.11.13 / 
Ankara 
5047 / 5 
Case 2 / D13 AKP Group 
Meeting / AKP 
Members 
03.12.13 / 
Ankara 
6250 / 11 0 
Case 2 / D15 AKP Group 
Meeting / AKP 
Members 
14.01.14 / 
Ankara 
4363 / 18 0 
 
73 
 
Case 2 / D16 AKP Group 
Meeting / AKP 
Members 
28.01.14 / 
Ankara 
4421 / 9 
Case 3 / D18 Erdoğan’s 
Meeting with 
Muhtars / 
Muhtars 
27.01.15 / 
Ankara 
3989 / 10 0 
Case 3 / D19 Erdoğan’s 
Meeting with 
Muhtars / 
Muhtars 
17.02.15 / 
Ankara 
3990 / 14 0 
Case 3 / D20 Erdoğan’s 
Meeting with 
Muhtars / 
Muhtars 
24.02.15 / 
Ankara 
3510 / 2 
Case 3 / D21 Erdoğan’s 
Meeting with 
Muhtars / 
Muhtars 
10.03.15 / 
Ankara 
4099 / 8 0 
Case 3 / D22 Erdoğan’s 
Meeting with 
Muhtars / 
Muhtars 
23.03.15 / 
Ankara 
3683 / 5 
Case 3 / D23 Erdoğan’s 
Meeting with 
Muhtars / 
Muhtars 
08.04.15 / 
Ankara 
3250 / 4 0 
Case 4 / D26 Erdoğan’s 
Meeting with 
Muhtars / 
Muhtars 
29.09.16 / 
Ankara 
4739 / 10 0 
Case 4 / D27 Erdoğan’s 
Meeting with 
Muhtars / 
Muhtars 
19.10.16 / 
Ankara 
3289 / 0 0 
Case 4 / D28 Erdoğan’s 
Meeting with 
Muhtars / 
Muhtars 
26.10.16 / 
Ankara 
3600 / 0 
Case 4 / D31 Erdoğan’s 
Meeting with 
Muhtars / 
Muhtars 
07.12.16 / 
Ankara 
2829 / 20 1 
Case 4 / D32 Erdoğan’s 
Meeting with 
14.12.16 / 
Ankara 
2482 / 2 
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Muhtars / 
Muhtars 
Case 4 / D33 Erdoğan’s 
Meeting with 
Muhtars / 
Muhtars 
04.01.17 / 
Ankara 
2696 / 7 1 
Case 4 / D34 Erdoğan’s 
Meeting with 
Muhtars / 
Muhtars 
19.01.17 / 
Ankara 
2873 / 7 
Case 5 / D38 Erdoğan’s 
Meeting with 
Muhtars / 
Muhtars 
18.10.17 / 
Ankara 
2947 / 2 0 
Case 5 / D40 Erdoğan’s 
Meeting with 
Muhtars / 
Muhtars 
09.11.17 / 
Ankara 
3412 / 3 0 
Case 6 / D41 AKP Group 
Meeting / AKP 
Members 
09.01.18 / 
Ankara 
2995 / 4 1 
Case 6 / D42 AKP Group 
Meeting / AKP 
Members 
16.01.18 / 
Ankara 
2364 / 9 
Case 6 / D43 AKP Group 
Meeting / AKP 
Members 
06.02.18 / 
Ankara 
2677 / 7 0 
Case 6 / D44 AKP Group 
Meeting / AKP 
Members 
13.02.18 / 
Ankara 
2840 / 0 
Case 6 / D45 AKP Group 
Meeting / AKP 
Members 
06.03.18 / 
Ankara 
3940 / 4 0 
Case 6 / D46 AKP Group 
Meeting / AKP 
Members 
20.03.18 / 
Ankara 
2687 / 2 
Case 6 / D47 AKP Group 
Meeting / AKP 
Members 
10.04.18 / 
Ankara 
3343 / 5 1 
Case 6 / D48 AKP Group 
Meeting / AKP 
Members 
24.04.18 / 
Ankara 
3853 / 14 
Case 6 / D49 AKP Group 
Meeting / AKP 
Members 
08.05.18 / 
Ankara 
3066 / 20 0 
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One should keep in mind that Erdoğan’s discourses expressed during his meetings with 
muhtars may only refer to alternatives when there is at least one missing textualized discourse 
of AKP group meeting or AKP extended provincial chairmen meeting for the related month. 
Otherwise, textualized discourses of muhtar meetings are not viewed as alternatives to 
textualized discourses of AKP group meetings or AKP extended provincial chairmen 
meetings34. When both discourses are the ones that are viewed for the selection with priority 
- AKP group meetings or AKP extended chairmen meetings - then their alternatives must 
also refer to remaining textualized discourses of discourses AKP group meetings or AKP 
extended chairmen meetings. By the same token, discourses of Erdoğan’s meetings with 
muhtars are viewed as alternatives for other available discourses of muhtar meetings.  
For months in which only one textualized discourse of AKP group meetings or of Erdoğan’s 
meetings with muhtars is available on presidential webpage (Türkiye Cumhuriyeti 
Cumhurbaşkanlığı 2019), alternatives as remaining available textualized options, are given 
once they have been filtered both according to the selection criteria with regards to the 
audience and one week temporal distance between this one discourse that has been selected 
with priority35. For instance, for some months such as, January 2015, April 2015, etc., once 
I’ve eliminated discourses that do not fit selection criteria with regards to the audience, I’ve 
also eliminated the ones that do violate one-week temporal distance and have not assessed as 
potential selections. As an example, a detailed explanation for random selection of April 
2015 is given in the following pages.  
 
34 Indeed, there is no such month due to available discursive data on presidential webpage. Due to availability of 
textualized data, there is no textualized discourse of AKP extended provincial chairmen meeting at all, on presidential web 
page. But there are textualized discourses of AKP group meetings. Such discourses fall into case 6, from January 2018 to 
May 2018. From January 2018 to April 2018, because there are at least two discourses of AKP group meetings on 
presidential web page, in the previous table, only discourses of such meetings are given as possible alternative selections 
that can substitute each other, regardless of whether Erdoğan’s discourse of a muhtar meeting exists. For May 2018, there 
is only one discourse of AKP group meeting, but there is no discourse of Erdoğan’s meetings with muhtars. In short, for the 
previous table, I haven’t been able to assess discourses of Erdoğan’s muhtar meetings as discarded textualized alternatives 
due to random selection for his discourses which are exercised in AKP group meetings. 
35. What I mean is once a discourse that is viewed with priority has been selected, second selection is made 
according to the date of this initially selected discourse. So, only options whose dates are one week before and after the date 
of this initial selection are viewed as potential random selections. This is important especially when only one discourse 
which is selected with priority (discourses of AKP group meetings, AKP extended provincial chairmen meetings, or 
Erdoğan’s muhtars meetings) is available in textualized format for a month. In such cases, second discourse is selected 
among remaining available options that do not violate selection criteria and that have at least one week interval between the 
initial selection, which has already been selected with priority. 
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In the following table, details of remaining randomly selected textualized discourses 
according to the selection criteria are given. In the last column of the table, total number of 
discarded textualized alternatives due to random selection is given while numbers in 
parentheses refer to the total number of discourses that belong to a meeting or event in which 
Erdoğan is expected to express economic appeals more frequently with regards to the 
audience he speaks to. This detail is given because some selections also refer to discourses 
which are expressed in such events. As a response to the reader’s concerns of a possible 
biased selection, I can say these selections have been made randomly. In terms of the 
audience Erdoğan appeals to, there is no violation of selection criteria. Besides, one week 
temporal distance between two selections of each month is protected, except some 
exceptional months due to limited available data. As one can clearly notice that all randomly 
selected textualized discourses that belong to an economic event or meeting given in the table 
below is in accord with the fact that the majority of available textualized discourses indeed 
belong to economic events or meetings for each related month36. Hence, in terms of random 
selection, any concern of a possible biased selection to manipulate results of this study does 
not have a solid ground.  
 
  
 
36 As one can realize that this is true for April 2015, November 2016, and November 2017. During related months 
that these discourses are exercised Erdoğan overwhelmingly speaks in an economic event or meeting and therefore such 
selections overlap with the majority of all potential selections for related months. The only one exception is D30, which 
may not be viewed as a discourse of an economic event or meeting although 5 out of 6 discourses of November 2016 
exercised during economic meetings or events. But I must underline D29 has already been selected randomly as the first 
discourse of November 2016. So, one can only talk about a balanced random selection for this month. And indeed, a 
balanced selection exists not only for November 2016, but also for January 2015, April 2015, November 2017. For these 
last three months, due to available discursive data, there are one already selected discourse of Erdoğan’s meetings with 
muhtars for each month. Thus, for January 2015, April 2015, November 2017, because all available options beside such 
existing selections overwhelmingly consist of Erdoğan’s discourses that are exercised in an economic event or meeting, any 
concern of a possible biased selection is void. If to talk on January 2015, Erdoğan’s discourse towards TÜGİK (The Young 
Businessmen Confederation of Turkey) members is again randomly selected. Except this discourse, there are 2 available 
options whereas 1 of them is also Erdoğan’s discourse in an economic event or meeting. So, random selection is made 
among 3 available alternatives, while 2 of them Erdoğan is expected to exercise economic appeals more frequently. 
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Table 3.5 The list of remaining randomly selected textualized discourses 
Case / 
Discourse 
ID 
Event or Meeting / 
Audience 
Date / 
Location 
Length 
as Word 
Count / 
Total 
Number 
of Coded 
Excerpts 
Total 
Number of 
Discarded 
Textualized 
Alternatives 
per month 
due to 
Random 
Selection 
Case 3 / D17 Erdoğan Welcomes 
Members and the 
president of TUGİK / 
TUGİK Members 
19.01.15 / 
Ankara 
4220 / 21 2 (1) 
Case 3 / D24 23rd MÜSİAD General 
Assembly / MÜSİAD 
members 
25.04.15 / 
Istanbul 
4324 / 26 4 (4) 
Case 4 / D25 Erdoğan Welcomes 
Governors of 81 
Provinces / Governors of 
Turkey 
08.09.16 / 
Ankara 
3095 / 0 1 (0) 
Case 4 / D29 16th MÜSİAD Expo 
Exhibition & 20th 
International Business 
Forum Congress / 
MÜSİAD Members & 
Businesspeople 
09.11.16 / 
Istanbul 
2713 / 8 6 (5) 
Case 4 / D30 The Conference of 
Turkey’s New Security 
Concept / Police Academy 
Members 
22.11.16 / 
Ankara 
4165 / 4 
Case 5 / D35 Gala Dinner of TURKEN 
Foundation / Members of 
TURKEN 
Foundation 
21.09.17 / 
New York 
1677 / 0 0 (0) 
Case 5 / D36 Inauguration Ceremony of 
2016-2017 Academic 
Year / Academics & 
Students 
26.09.17 / 
Ankara 
3442 / 3 
Case 5 / D37 Meeting with Opinion 
Leaders and 
Representatives of Civil 
Society Organizations / 
Opinion Leaders and 
Representatives of Civil 
Society Organizations 
05.10.17 / 
Ankara 
2467 / 6 2 (0) 
78 
 
Case 5 / D39 The Publicity Meeting of 
Turkey’s Automobile 
Joint Venture / 
Businesspeople of Turkey 
02.11.17 / 
Ankara 
2062 / 12 1 (1) 
Case 6 / D50 Iftar Program with 
Families of Martyrs / 
Families of Martyrs 
16.05.18 / 
Ankara 
2053 / 3 0 (0) 
Case 7 / D52 Erdoğan’s Balcony 
Speech / The people of 
Ankara 
24.06.18 / 
Ankara 
1063 / 3 0 (0) 
Case 7 / D53 Presidential Inauguration 
Ceremony / Authorities of 
Turkey and Participants of 
the Ceremony 
09.07.18 / 
Ankara 
1377 / 7 3 (0) 
Case 7 / D54 Erdoğan’s Speech on the 
July 15 Martyrs' Bridge / 
The people of Istanbul 
15.07.18 / 
Istanbul 
1753 / 0 
Case 7 / D55 The 10th Ambassadors 
Conference / 
Ambassadors of Turkey 
13.08.18 / 
Ankara 
2409 / 11 4 (0) 
Case 7 / D56 Graduation Ceremony of 
Ground Sergeants / 
Graduated Sergeants and 
their Families 
31.08.18 / 
Ankara 
1564 / 4 
Case 7 / D57 Veterans Day Ceremony / 
Participants of the 
Ceremony 
19.09.18 / 
Ankara 
1806 / 8 0 (0) 
Case 7 / D58 TEKNOFEST Istanbul / 
Members of 
TEKNOFEST 
Foundation 
22.09.18 / 
Istanbul 
1921 / 4 
 
Before going into details of random selection, I want to emphasize that my aim in this work 
is to check my cases and, if possible, find Erdoğan’s more frequently exercised crisis 
emphasizing populist appeals than crisis denying populist. My objective, as I’ve mentioned 
before, is to detect any possible associational pattern in accord with Moffitt’s (2015) core 
claim, that leaders who are infamously apply populism more than other leaders do it by 
perpetuation of failures as crisis in order to remain in power. However, random selection of 
speeches that Erdoğan speaks in economic events or meeting mentioned above cannot 
overrate Erdoğan’s crisis emphasizing populist appeals vis-à-vis crisis denying ones. In order 
to be transparent at this point, in the table given below, I’ve added frequencies of each type 
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of rhetoric that belong to my main three categories. I’ve also added frequencies of D30 
although it does not take place in an economic event or meeting. One can notice that in none 
of these discourses, crisis emphasizing populist rhetoric is more frequently applied than crisis 
denying populist one. Hence, any concern of a biased selection in order to overrate Erdoğan’s 
crisis emphasizing populist appeals in accord with the objective of this work is void. 
 
Table 3.6 Frequencies of excerpts of randomly selected discourses of economic events 
Type of Rhetoric / Discourse ID D17 D24 D29 D39 D30 
Crisis emphasizing populist 4 4 0 0 2 
Crisis emphasizing non-populist 0 0 0 0 0 
Crisis denying populist 4 5 2 3 2 
Crisis denying non-populist 2 0 0 0 0 
Failure ignoring populist 3 10 0 0 0 
Failure ignoring non-populist 8 7 6 9 0 
 
In order to be more transparent in my selections of randomly selected textualized discourses 
given above, I want to mention on selection examples of two months in detail and then I 
intend to shed light on some exceptional months and explain what makes them exceptional. 
But before that, I have to remind that all discourses mentioned above with their dates and 
particular audience are available on official presidential webpage (Turkiye Cumhuriyeti 
Cumhurbaşkanlığı 2019). Web links of all selected discourses and discarded potential 
selections can be found in the appendix part. 
For example, D2437 is a random selection of April 2015. Total number of all available 
textualized discourses on presidential webpage for this month is 23. Once textualized 
discourse of Erdoğan’s meeting with muhtars that takes place on April the 8th, 2015 (as D23 
given in the appendix) has been selected with priority, no other discourses of party meetings 
 
37. As one can realize, all discourses which are selected throughout this work are assigned with a particular 
discourse ID. For D24, Erdoğan talks in MÜSİAD General Assembly and appeals to MÜSİAD members on April the 25th, 
2015. 
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on the national level or muhtar meetings have been found in a textualized format as the 
second discourse of this month. Therefore, in order make selection among remaining 
textualized discourses, I’ve checked available textualized discourses that have a one week 
temporal distance between D23. On 1st of April, Erdoğan visits Romania and exercises two 
speeches here. One is exercised in Romania-Turkey business forum and the other belongs to 
the press conference with Romanian president Iohannis. These discourses are eliminated 
from selection process since they violate selection criteria due to their global/international 
scope. After April the 15th, the number of available textualized discourses on presidential 
webpage then falls to 14. So, I’ve randomly selected one discourse among these 14 available 
options once I’ve further eliminated the ones that violate selection criteria with regards to the 
audience Erdoğan speaks to. For instance, on 16th of April, Erdoğan visits Kazakhstan and 
two discourses of this day are similar to the ones exercised in Romania on the first day of the 
month. Precisely, Erdoğan talks in Kazakhstan-Turkey Business Forum and he speaks in a 
press conference with Kazak president Nazarbayev. Again, these discourses are eliminated 
from selection process since they violate selection criteria due to their global/international 
scope. One day after, on April the 17th, Erdoğan talks in Hoca Ahmet Yesevi International 
Turk-Kazak University while he was awarded as a title of honorary PhD. This one is also 
kept out of selection since it violates selection criteria. One day after, he talks in 51st 
Presidential Turkey Bicycle Tour publicity event. Because the title of this discourse points 
out a sports activity, this discourse is also eliminated from selection process. One day after, 
on April the 18th, Erdoğan talks in the award ceremony of Siyer-i Nebi contest, which is kept 
out of selection due to its religious and cultural scope. On 21st of April, Erdoğan speaks to 
children who attend to the International 23 April Child Festival and on 23rd of April, he talks 
during his welcome to children in presidential palace for April 23 National Sovereignty and 
Children's Day. Both are eliminated from selection process since they violate selection 
criteria. On 22nd of April, he speaks in the press conference with Iraqi president Fuad Masum. 
On 23rd of April, he also speaks toward a global audience in Istanbul for the Peace Summit 
that is arranged due to 100th anniversary of Çanakkale War. This one is also eliminated from 
selection process due to its global/international scope. Thus, for April 2015, once discourses 
that do not fit the selection criteria have been kept out of selection, a random selection among 
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the remaining 5 discourses is made. These 5 textualized discourses are given in the table 
below: 
 
Table 3.7 Textualized discourses of April 2015 that are qualified for random selection 
Case / Date Meeting or Event / 
Audience 
Links 
Case 3 / 
18.04.2015 
Opening Ceremony 
in Kocaeli / The 
People of Kocaeli 
https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/31829/
kocaelinde-toplu-acilis-toreninde-yaptiklari-
konusma 
Case 3 / 
19.04.2015 
Opening Ceremony 
of Levent-Hisarüstü 
Subway Line / the 
People of Istanbul 
https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/31831/l
event-rumeli-hisarustu-metro-hatti-acilis-
toreninde-yaptiklari-konusma 
Case 3 / 
21.04.2015 
175th Anniversary of 
Establishment 
Ceremony of Turk 
Telekom / Members 
of Turk Telekom 
Company 
https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/31970/t
urk-telekomun-175-kurulus-yil-donumu-
dolayisiyla-duzenlenen-torende-yaptiklari-
konusma 
Case 3 / 
25.04.2015 
23rd MÜSİAD 
General Assembly / 
MÜSİAD members 
https://tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/32122/musiad
-23-genel-kurulunda-yaptiklari-konusma 
Case 3 / 
29.04.2015 
Publicity of Turkey 
Agriculture and 
Rural Development 
Attempt Project 
Practices / Farmers 
and Producers 
https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/32123/t
urkiye-tarim-ve-kirsal-kalkinma-hamlesi-proje-
uygulamalari-tanitim-programinda-yaptiklari-
konusma 
As one can realize, all these 5 remaining textualized discourses belong to economic events 
or meetings in which Erdoğan is expected to exercise more economic appeals. The one that 
Erdoğan speaks in 23rd MÜSİAD General Assembly is selected totally randomly. Therefore, 
total number of discarded textualized alternatives due to random selection is 4 while all of 
them refer to discourses that Erdoğan exercises in economic events or meetings. Discarded 
4 alternatives are also given in the appendix part, in a list of all discarded discourses of other 
cases due to random selection, among available textualized alternatives which do not violate 
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selection criteria and do not belong to events or meetings whose discourses are selected with 
priority38 
For September 2016, there are only six available textualized discourses on presidential 
webpage. Two of them are held in the U.S. and exercised during Erdoğan’s meetings in the 
U.N. on September the 20th. First, he talks in the 71st meeting of United Nations General 
Assembly and then speaks in U.N. Summit for refugees and migrants. These two discourses 
are not eliminated from selection process since they apparently violate the selection criteria. 
There are 4 remaining discourses for this month: In the first one, On September the 1st, 
Erdoğan talks in the inauguration of 2016-2017 court year in presidential palace. In the 
second, on September the 8th, he again speaks in presidential palace while he accepts 
governors of 81 provinces of Turkey. In the third, he speaks during his meeting with members 
of Turkish civil society organizations in the U.S. on September the 22nd, and in the fourth 
one, he speaks when he accepts muhtars in presidential palace on September the 29th. Due to 
selection criteria, fourth one is picked with priority as the first selection of September 2016. 
For the third discourse of this month, although he appeals to a domestic audience during his 
meeting with members of Turkish civil society organizations in the U.S., he does so within 
territories of the U.S. Due to the availability of additional two discourses which took place 
within territories of Turkey, third one is eliminated from selection. So, for the second 
selection of this month there are only two remaining options which do not violate any 
selection criteria: The one exercised during the inauguration of 2016-2017 court year and the 
one that is exercised when Erdoğan accepts governors of 81 provinces. These two discourses 
both took place in presidential palace, Ankara. The latter is selected randomly. And the total 
number of discarded available textualized discourses for this month thereby equals to 1. 
 
 
3.2.3.3. On exceptional selections of textualized discourses 
 
When it comes to exceptional selections, I’ve realized that textualized discourses of some 
months do not have a one-week temporal distance with one another. Moreover, the ones that 
 
38. If to repeat, discourses which are selected with priority are Erdoğan’s speeches which are exercised in AKP 
group meetings, AKP extended provincial chairmen meetings, and if both are missing, in his meetings with muhtars. 
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have enough temporal distance with one another obviously violate the selection criteria. For 
exceptional months, I’ve primarily checked whether available discourses violate selection 
criteria or not. Then I’ve made my selections among the ones which do not refer to any 
violation and strived for maximizing the temporal distance between two possible selections. 
Any violation of this temporal distance is due to limited availability of textualized data. There 
are 3 days interval between discourses of September 2018, 5 days between the ones of 
September 2017, and 6 days of November 2012 and of July 2018. Except these four 
exceptional months all other remaining discourses I’ve selected have at least one-week 
interval between one another, even when they belong different months.  
For November 2012, there are only two available textualized discourses and both are 
extracted from AKP deputy Harun Karaca’s personal website39. On November the 14th, 2012 
Erdoğan speaks in an AKP extended provincial chairmen meeting and on November the 20th 
he appeals members of his party during an AKP group meeting. Once I’ve verified that such 
textualized discourses match with the original discourses by checking video materials on 
Youtube, I’ve selected both although they have 6 days temporal distance with one another. 
Like every other selection, links of this month’s textualized discourses and their 
corresponding video links can be seen in the appendix. 
Before going into details, I want to remind the reader that, except discourses of November 
2012, all remaining discourses mentioned below are available on official presidential 
webpage (Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Cumhurbaşkanlığı 2019). 
For July 2018, there are only five available discourses on presidential webpage and none of 
them violates any selection criteria. Possible maximum temporal distance with any of these 
five discourses is 6 days. Two of them are exercised on July the 15th, 2018 and there is no 
other discourse given for the rest of this month.  Hence, I’ve randomly selected the on that 
Erdoğan speaks on July 15 Martyrs' Bridge among those two and in order to maximize 
temporal distance with it, I’ve selected the earliest discourse of this month that is exercised 
on July the 9th, 2018 during Erdoğan’s presidential inauguration as the second one. 
 
39. Given as D03 and D04 in the appendix. 
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For September 2017, I’ve paid special attention to maximize the temporal distance with one 
another while keeping an eye on selection criteria. However, both discourses of these month 
can be viewed as exceptions due to limited availability of textualized data. For September 
2017, among textualized discourses of Erdoğan that exist on presidential webpage, Erdoğan 
first speaks on science and technology summit of Organization of Islamic Cooperation in 
Astana, Kazakhstan. Due to its global scope and purely Islamic focus, this discourse is not 
taken into account for the assessment. Then he visits the U.S. and meets with authorities of 
the U.S. and U.N. During this tour, he speaks on 72nd meeting of United Nations General 
Assembly on September the 19th 2017. This one is ignored due to its mere global-
international scope. He talks on the opening ceremony of Turkish House in New York. This 
discourse contains only 769 words, thereby also not taken into consideration. Then on 
September the 21st 2017, he meets with members of Turkish-American and American 
Muslim Society and he speaks at the dinner meeting of Turken Foundation. Because the 
former is expected to have an overwhelming Islamic scope, it apparently violates the 
selection criteria. When it comes the latter, it may be expected to potentially involve 
references on education since Turken Foundation is known to have education purposes for 
Turkish youth in the U.S. despite the fact that is also seems to have a political scope. Once 
Erdoğan has returned from his U.S. tour, he speaks on International Ombudsman Conference 
on September the 25th 2017. Although he talks in Istanbul, the audience of this speech 
consists of international ombudsmen, among countries of Islamic Cooperation. Thereby, I 
haven’t taken it into account. The last textualized discourse of this month is the one that he 
gives a speech on the inauguration ceremony of 2017-2018 academic year on September the 
26th 2017. This is also in the scope of discourses on education. In short, all discourses more 
or less violate selection criteria for September 2017. Therefore, I’ve made my selection 
according to additional criteria I’ve determined. In concordance with that, I’ve checked 
whether he appeals to domestic audience, and if so, whether he does so within Turkey or not. 
Therefore, I’ve selected the last discourse as my first selection since it takes place in Ankara 
and the audience is domestic. For the second one, between Erdoğan’s meeting with members 
of Turkish-American and American Muslim Society and the one at the dinner in Turken 
Foundation, I’ve selected the latter since Erdoğan primarily appeals to domestic audience in 
that speech whereas the audience of the former may be highly mixed due to its overwhelming 
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Islamic scope. In short, discourses of September 2017 more or less violate initial selection 
criteria. However, my selections for this month are most convenient ones among available 
textualized discourses and the selection is made according to the additional criterion I’ve 
determined for months which have limited availability of textualized discourses. 
When it comes to Erdoğan’s textualized discourses of September 2018, again they mostly 
consist of Erdoğan’s global meetings and speeches that are expressed abroad. On September 
the 2nd, he is in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, attending a business forum and then he visits University 
of Manas for a title of honorary PhD which is prepared for Erdoğan. These two discourses 
are not eliminated from selection process since the former is primarily have a 
global/international scope in which Erdoğan primarily appeals to a foreign audience and the 
latter also violates the criterion I’ve put about education. In the following period within 
September 2018, Erdoğan gives a speech in Baku on September the 15th, due to 100th year 
anniversary of the independence of the city, which is totally irrelevant to my focus, thereby 
ignored. Then he speaks on the inauguration ceremony of 2018-2019 education season on 
September the 18th, again not selected due to its mere potential focus on issues of education. 
Among remaining discourses Erdoğan also talks on 73rd meeting of United Nations Assembly 
on September the 25th and during a meeting with members of the Turkish Muslim society in 
the U.S. The former is not selected due to its mere global scope while the latter is not taken 
into consideration with regards to its potential overwhelming Islamic references. The number 
of remaining discourses of this month equals to three: the one that Erdoğan makes a speech 
in Turken Foundation on September the 24th, 2018; the one that Erdoğan appeals war veterans 
on September the 19th 2018; and the one that Erdoğan speaks in TEKNOFEST Istanbul 
Aerospace and Technology Festival on September the 22nd 2018. Although they all have 
domestic audience, but Erdoğan’s Turken foundation speech is made in New York. 
Moreover, as I’ve mentioned before, Turken Foundation is a foundation built for educational 
purposes. Due to limited availability of textualized discourses, despite the fact I have had to 
select one of Erdoğan’s speeches that was exercised in Turken Foundation one year before, 
for September 2018 I’ve selected two that Erdoğan spoke within geographical confines of 
Turkey since they have priority due to additional criterion I’ve determined for discourse 
selection. That’s the underlying reason of 3-day temporal distance between two discourses 
of September 2018. 
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3.2.3.4. On transcriptions and selections of transcribed discourses 
 
For video materials of Erdoğan’s discourses, my selection criteria for textualized discourses 
is almost the same for transcribed ones. The only difference is that for videos, there is not 
any word count condition, but durations of videos and dates of discourses are taken into 
account before making a selection. Among videos which are available to be transcribed, 
priority is again given to discourses of AKP party meetings that take place on the national 
level – AKP group meetings or AKP extended provincial chairmen meetings. Among such 
discourses, the ones whose video durations are the shortest are selected with priority in order 
to gain pace for the study. But while doing that, I’ve also paid attention not to make any 
selection that can violate one week temporal distance with the second potential selection for 
each month. If there are no available videos of such meetings, then in accord with selection 
criteria for all discourses, I’ve checked whether Erdoğan speaks in his meetings with muhtars 
or not. However, Erdoğan’s meetings with muhtars began to be organized in January 2015. 
There is only one month after January 2015 in which a transcription is required due to one 
missing textualized discourse, and that is June 2018. But during June 2018, Erdoğan only 
speaks in meetings for the approaching June the 24th elections and no muhtar meeting is 
arranged during this month. So, if there are not any available video of AKP group meetings 
or extended provincial chairmen meetings, then a selection is made among the remaining 
videos of Erdoğan’s discourses, as long as they do not violate selection criteria.  
For any transcriptions, a selection is made according to the following conditions as long as 
no violation of the selection criteria with regards to the audience Erdoğan appeals to is 
observed: 
• Transcriptions are made only when textualized discourses are unavailable. If there is only 
one available textualized discourse for a particular month, then for the second discourse 
of the related month, transcription is required. If there aren’t any textualized data for one 
month, then both discourses are transcribed by checking available video materials on 
web.  
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• Videos of AKP group meetings or extended provincial chairmen meetings are selected 
with priority, as in the case of selection of textualized discourses. 
• Durations of the videos of Erdoğan’s discourses, whose video materials are available on 
web and can be found via Google, Yandex or Youtube search, must be over 40 minutes, 
while only videos with shortest durations for related months are selected.  
• While focusing on shortest available videos of discourses, one week temporal distance of 
potential transcriptions with one another is strictly protected since transcription is 
required in one way or another.40 Because two discourses are selected for each month 
that is subjected to this study, once a video is selected due to its duration, then the second 
one is sought among the videos whose dates are one week earlier and later than the first 
one. If one discourse is already available in a textualized format for a particular month, 
then the second discourse is checked among options that comes one week before or after 
than the available textualized one.  
In order to find video materials of discourses, I’ve typed on Google, Yandex, and Youtube 
the following key words while adding related month and year at the end, and then push enter. 
If results do not refer to the time period I’ve focused on, I’ve used search preferences to select 
corresponding month and year and repeated my searches41: 
• “Erdoğan grup toplantısı konuşması (corresponding month year)”42 
• “Erdoğan genişletilmiş il başkanları konuşması (corresponding month year)”43 
• “Erdoğan konuşması (corresponding month year)”44 
I want to emphasize that videos might be partially given on web (for instance as part 1, part 
2, etc. for the same speech). Such partial discourses are not eliminated, and their partial 
durations are added up in order to check if they were not given as partial, what their aggregate 
 
40. Different than the flexibility I’ve expressed in my selections when textualized discourses are highly limited, 
for transcriptions I’ve shown no such flexibility in terms of temporal interval between two selections. So, for transcribed 
discourses, there is no exception with regards to one week interval criterion – they all have at least one temporal distance 
with one another, or with the ones which are already available in a textualized format. 
41. I have added month and year at the end of my searches and whenever required, I’ve written year before month. 
But I have neither used quotation marks nor parentheses during search process. Parentheses are given above only to point 
out that related month/year varies from discourse to discourse.  
42. “Erdoğan group meeting speech (corresponding month year)” 
43. “Erdoğan extended provincial chairmen speech (corresponding month year)” 
44. “Erdoğan speech (corresponding month year)” 
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duration might refer to. However, if videos are given as one part but they are incomplete 
(Erdoğan does not conclude his speech), or interrupted during in the middle, such videos are 
not taken into account as options, and eliminated from the selection process45. 
Because transcribed discourses are simply in video format, additional work is required to 
convert them into textualized forms. However, transcribing entire speeches of videos are 
highly labor intensive processes and require serious amount of time. Moreover, it is pointless 
since not all appeals will be in the scope of my study. Even among textualized discourses, 
not all excerpts are coded and assessed since Erdoğan mostly apply pure political appeals. 
That’s why once I’ve made the selection for any transcription, I’ve decided to transcribe 
videos of Erdoğan’s speeches whenever I have to. I mean whenever a part of the discourse 
that needs to be coded is expressed by Erdoğan during his speech, I’ve transcribed it.  
Among 58 discourses which are subjected to my analysis, 7 of them are transcribed by 
checking videos on web due to missing textualized data. For months whose textualized 
discourses are missing, first I’ve checked whether discourses which are viewed with priority 
due to selection criteria are available on web. If there are at least two videos of such 
discourses, the ones with shortest durations on the condition that they are above 40 minutes 
are selected while paying attention the temporal distance with one another. Once a video of 
Erdoğan’s discourses of such meetings with the shortest duration has been selected, 
remaining options that comes one week before and after are eliminated from selection, and 
only videos of the remaining part of the related month are viewed as available options. So, 
two conditions given above require an initial selection of the video with the shortest duration 
of an AKP group meeting or AKP extended provincial chairmen meeting since for every 
month, I’ve selected two discourses throughout this work. Once the initial selection has been 
made, I’ve made the second selection while checking the temporal distance between the 
initially selected discourse and other potential selections that do not violate selection criteria. 
However, if there is only one available discourse of AKP group meeting or AKP extended 
provincial chairmen meeting, then it is selected regardless of the duration of its video. 
Moreover, if there is an available textualized option of such meetings for any month, second 
 
45. This is not the case for videos in which Erdoğan’s greetings to the audience is interrupted at the beginning or 
at the end. The reason is for many videos, live streams of TV channels do not start at the very beginning of Erdoğan’s 
speaking. Moreover, Greetings are not even transcribed since they are not relevant to the scope of this work. 
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discourse is selected among discourses of whose dates do not violate one week temporal 
distance with the existing textualized option. Details will be given once I’ve detailly 
explained transcribed discourses in the following pages.  
In the table given below, all selected transcribed discourses and discarded remaining options 
are listed. I’d like to use the word “options” instead of “alternatives” here. That is because 
there are not any alternatives for selected ones since each selection has the possible shortest 
video duration and all of them are among videos of discourses which fit the selection criteria. 
So, while a random selection is possible for textualized discourses, it is not for transcribed 
ones. A detailed explanation for each month of transcribed selections is given once the table 
given below has been presented. 
 
Table 3.8 The list of videos of transcribed discourses and discarded remaining options 
Case / 
Discourse 
ID / 
Discarded 
Remaining 
Options 
Meeting / 
Audience 
Date / 
Location / 
Duration 
Number 
of Coded 
Excerpts 
Link 
Case 1 / D01 AKP Group 
Meeting / AKP 
Members 
02.10.12 / 
Ankara / 
63:21 
21 https://www.youtube
.com/watch?v=CwB
s92-HiP0 
Case 1 / D02 AKP Group 
Meeting / AKP 
Members 
30.10.12 / 
Ankara / 
58:52 
9 https://www.youtube
.com/watch?v=RhL
QpW1WTrE 
Discarded 
Remaining 
Option #1 of 
October 
2012 
AKP Group 
Meeting / AKP 
Members 
09.10.12 / 
Ankara / 
65:13 
N/A https://www.youtube
.com/watch?v=NLT
Gq4LjLCc 
Discarded 
Remaining 
Option #2 of 
October 
2012 
AKP Extended 
Provincial 
Chairmen 
Meeting / AKP 
Members 
17.10.12 / 
Ankara / 
68:26 
N/A https://www.youtube
.com/watch?v=9_R
OUoCsXLM; 
https://www.youtube
.com/watch?v=WNc
-sRWn5-I; 
https://www.youtube
.com/watch?v=Jcr29
sBc6k8 
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Case 1 / D05 AKP Extended 
Provincial 
Chairmen 
Meeting / AKP 
Members 
05.12.12 / 
Ankara / 
58:44 
14 https://www.youtube
.com/watch?v=ftBB
StRT5DI 
Case 1 / D06 Meeting Open 
to Public / The 
People of 
Şanlıurfa 
29.12.12 / 
Şanlıurfa / 
40:58 
6 https://www.youtube
.com/watch?v=0-
7fdOPssrU 
Discarded 
Remaining 
Option #1 of 
December 
2012 
AKP Group 
Meeting / AKP 
Members 
 
04.12.2012 / 
Ankara / 
66:09 
N/A https://www.youtube
.com/watch?v=qufca
pZooNQ; 
https://www.youtube
.com/watch?v=yAZr
ZDVMq5M 
 
Discarded 
Remaining 
Option #2 of 
December 
2012 
Erdoğan’s 
speech in 
provincial 
advisory 
council of 
Şanlıurfa / AKP 
local members 
29.12.201 / 
Şanlıurfa /  
58:47 
N/A https://www.youtube
.com/watch?v=luuB
gIjakGo 
Discarded 
Remaining 
Option #3 of 
December 
2012 
Erdoğan’s 
speech in Blue 
Tunnel and 
Bağbaşı Dam / 
The people of 
Konya 
16.12.2012 / 
Konya / 
41:17 
N/A https://www.youtube
.com/watch?v=FR0l
WPraCOk 
Discarded 
Remaining 
Option #4 of 
December 
2012 
Erdoğan’s 
Speech in 
Ankara 
Chamber of 
Industry / 
Businesspeople 
27.12.2012 / 
Ankara / 
51:55 
N/A https://www.youtube
.com/watch?v=oWH
mvP5ALR4; 
https://www.youtube
.com/watch?v=9Xjt
YkKH8aE 
Case 2 / D09 AKP Group 
Meeting / AKP 
Members 
08.10.13 / 
Ankara / 
74:57 
 
10 https://www.youtube
.com/watch?v=77G
HGfFSb3M 
Discarded 
Remaining 
Option of 
October 
2013 
AKP Extended 
Provincial 
Chairmen 
Meeting / AKP 
Members 
25.10.13 / 
Ankara /  
49:28 
N/A https://www.youtube
.com/watch?v=hdO-
SWDO25s 
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Case 2 / D14 AKP Extended 
Provincial 
Chairmen 
Meeting / AKP 
Members 
25.12.13 / 
Ankara / 
55:21 
25 https://www.youtube
.com/watch?v=1hD5
Oaul9Vs 
Case 7 / D51 Meeting Open 
to Public / The 
People of 
Adıyaman 
01.06.18 / 
Adıyaman / 
40:31 
3 https://www.youtube
.com/watch?v=o2am
Pum2-cU 
 
Discarded 
Remaining 
Option of 
June 2018 
#1 
Meeting Open 
to Public / The 
People of 
Sakarya 
05.06.2018 / 
Sakarya /  
42:00 
N/A https://www.youtube
.com/watch?v=xWh
Z4YI2JHY 
Discarded 
Remaining 
Option of 
June 2018 
#2 
Meeting Open 
to Public / The 
People of 
Trabzon 
13.06.2018 / 
Trabzon /  
42:01 
N/A https://www.youtube
.com/watch?v=CN_
XOXLY98Y 
Discarded 
Remaining 
Option of 
June 2018 
#3 
Meeting Open 
to Public / The 
People of 
Kayseri 
08.06.2018 / 
Kayseri /  
43:10 
N/A https://www.youtube
.com/watch?v=fku5z
PauvcA 
Discarded 
Remaining 
Option of 
June 2018 
#4 
Meeting Open 
to Public / The 
People of Hatay 
07.06.2018 / 
Hatay /  
43:22 
N/A https://www.youtube
.com/watch?v=kRtjz
L0ipGM 
Discarded 
Remaining 
Option of 
June 2018 
#5 
Meeting Open 
to Public / The 
People of 
Denizli 
10.06.2018 / 
Denizli /  
43:45 
N/A https://www.youtube
.com/watch?v=mV8
hvOramMI 
Discarded 
Remaining 
Option of 
June 2018 
#6 
Meeting Open 
to Public / The 
People of 
Zonguldak 
05.06.2018 / 
Zonguldak / 
44:39 
N/A https://www.youtube
.com/watch?v=z7Tj
GDVSZjg 
Discarded 
Remaining 
Option of 
June 2018 
#7 
Meeting Open 
to Public / The 
People of 
Mersin 
07.06.2018 / 
Mersin / 
44:44 
N/A https://www.youtube
.com/watch?v=b5K
BT3CdOak 
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Discarded 
Remaining 
Option of 
June 2018 
#8 
Meeting Open 
to Public / The 
People of 
Konya 
02.06.2018 / 
Konya /  
44:57 
N/A https://www.youtube
.com/watch?v=a6fo
EBuOhSM 
 
I aim to shed light on which videos of discourses are chosen for transcription while why other 
available options are discarded from selection. Therefore, in the table given above, only 
videos whose durations are above 40 minutes and that do not violate remaining selection 
criteria with regards to the audience are given as available options. If a selection is merely 
made among discourses of videos of AKP group meetings or AKP extended provincial 
chairmen meetings, then for the related month, other videos are not even listed among 
discarded remaining options. Moreover, videos of AKP group meetings or AKP extended 
provincial chairmen meetings are given as discarded options even if they violate one week 
temporal interval between possible selections although they are not selected. Remaining 
videos are filtered due to one week criterion and only videos of discourses that do not violate 
this criterion are given as discarded remaining options in the table given above.  
For October 2012, transcribed videos of Erdoğan’s discourses are randomly selected among 
three available AKP group meetings of the same month (02.10.2012, 09.10.2012, and 
30.10.2012 respectively) and one extended provincial chairmen meeting takes place on 
October the 17th, 2012. D01 and D02 are selected since videos of these two discourses have 
shortest durations and the temporal distance with one another is much more than one week. 
For December 2012, I’ve encountered an AKP extended provincial chairmen meeting that 
takes place on December the 5th and whose duration is shorter than an AKP group meeting 
that is held one day before (58:44 vs 66:09). When the former is selected, I’ve checked videos 
whose dates go beyond December the 11th, 2012. Unfortunately, there are not AKP group 
meeting or extended provincial chairmen meeting for the rest of this month. Among four 
possible options as the second selection, I’ve chosen Erdoğan’s meeting speech that is 
exercised in Şanlıurfa and in which Erdoğan appeals to the people of Şanlıurfa since the 
duration of the video of this discourse has the least duration (40:58). On the very same day, 
Erdoğan appeals towards local party members, by his speech exercised during provincial 
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advisory council of Şanlıurfa. Because this meeting is not held on the national level, it is 
assessed as an alternative for the second selection, unfortunately not selected due to its longer 
duration (58:47).  
For October 2013, I haven’t encountered any alternative group meeting for the one I’ve 
selected which took place on October the 8th. There is an option of extended provincial 
chairmen meeting that took place October the 25th 2013 and its duration is far lower. 
However, it violates the temporal distance with another group meeting that I’ve already been 
able to find in textualized format for this month and takes place on October the 22nd46. 
For December 2013, I’ve already found one group meeting of this month that is available in 
a textualized format47. For the second discourse, I’ve had to select the extended provincial 
chairmen meeting speech which was held on December the 25th, 2013 since there are no other 
AKP group meetings or any alternative extended provincial chairmen meeting for this month. 
Thereby, because I select AKP party meetings that is held on the national level with priority, 
Erdoğan’s speech in AKP extended provincial chairmen meeting that took place 25.12.2013 
is selected as the second discourse of this month since it is the only available option. 
In June 2018, due to June the 24th elections, Erdoğan runs a campaign in which he only speaks 
in meetings of different cities and towns in Turkey. Because of that, there is only one 
available discourse on presidential webpage for this month it is Erdoğan’s balcony speech 
due to his electoral victory. Because my priority is getting textualized discourses, first I’ve 
picked this one available one as my first selection of June 2018. Beside this, I’ve had to pick 
one meeting speech of Erdoğan in Adıyaman, which took place on June the 1st, 2018. Because 
all other available meeting discourses exist in video format on web, I’ve checked videos 
whose duration are no shorter than 40:00 minutes. Among available discourses, the one that 
is exercised during Adıyaman meeting is selected by taking into account its slightly over 
40:00 duration. For June 2018, videos whose durations are below 45 minutes are given as 
discarded remaining options while total number of discarded videos are much higher than 8 
because of Erdoğan’s electoral campaign. 
 
46. Given as D10 in the appendix. 
47. Given as D13 in the appendix. 
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In accord with discourse selection process and criteria detailly explained, I’ve completed the 
selection of 58 discourses in total, two discourses per month, given in the appendix with their 
web links. The summary of the complete selection process is given below via a table. 
 
Table 3.9 Complete Selection Process in one table 
Followed 
Steps 
Selection Process Selection Criteria Sources of 
Selection 
Step 1 Check available Erdoğan’s 
textualized discourses on web 
in order to select two 
discourses per month for the 
period between October 2012 
and September 2018. 
1) Erdoğan’s message 
must be in Turkish 
2) Selected 
textualized discourses 
consist of at least 
1000 words 
3) There should be at 
least one-week 
temporal distance 
between two 
discourses 
4) Discourses should 
not be in a question 
and answer format, 
like Erdoğan’s 
interviews or TV 
Primary Source: 
official 
presidential 
webpage 
(tccb.gov.tr) 
Secondary 
Source48:  AKP 
deputy Harun 
Karaca’s personal 
webpage 
(harunkaraca.com) 
 
48. On this webpage, among Erdoğan’s textualized speeches that fall into my cases, only Erdoğan’s discourses 
that are exercised during AKP group meetings or AKP provincial chairmen meetings fits the selection criteria. And all 
available ones belong to the term when Erdoğan served as a prime minister. Hence, only these textualized discourses which 
are viewed with priority are extracted from this webpage. No muhtar meeting was organized when Erdoğan served as a 
prime minister. No other textualized discourses are available that fits selection criteria and fall into my cases. 
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programs that he 
speaks as a guest 
Step 2 Among available textualized 
discourses, focus on AKP 
group meetings and AKP 
extended provincial chairmen 
meetings with priority. 
Among available textualized 
findings of such meetings 
make a random selection of 
two discourses per month. If 
there is only one discourse of 
such meetings for a particular 
month, select it with priority 
as the first selection of that 
month. 
Textualized 
Discourses of AKP 
group meetings and 
AKP extended 
provincial chairmen 
meetings are selected 
with priority 
Primary Source: 
official 
presidential 
webpage 
(tccb.gov.tr) 
Secondary 
Source:  AKP 
deputy Harun 
Karaca’s personal 
webpage 
(harunkaraca.com) 
Step 3 For remaining months in 
which there are no textualized 
data of AKP group meetings 
or AKP extended provincial 
chairmen meetings, then 
primarily focus on Erdoğan’s 
textualized discourses that he 
exercises during his meetings 
with muhtars. Among 
available textualized findings 
of such meetings make a 
Textualized 
Discourses of 
Erdoğan’s meetings 
with muhtars are 
selected with priority 
Source: official 
presidential 
webpage 
(tccb.gov.tr) 
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random selection of two 
discourses per month. If there 
is only one discourse of such 
meetings for a particular 
month, select it with priority 
as the first selection of that 
month. 
Step 4 Once selection have been 
made among discourses which 
are viewed with priority 
mentioned above, eliminate 
discourses which violate 
selection criteria from the 
selection process. Run an 
elimination process while also 
checking selection criteria 
with regards to the audience. 
Among remaining ones, make 
a random selection while 
paying attention to protect one 
week temporal distance 
between two possible 
selections not only of 
discourses exercised within 
the same month but also of 
discourses exercised between 
two consecutive months. 
Make a selection 
among remaining 
textualized discourses 
of Erdoğan on the 
condition that; 
1) He does not talk 
primarily to foreign 
authorities or a 
global/international 
audience regardless 
of the location of the 
meeting/event 
2) He does not speak 
in a conference, 
meeting, or an event 
in general that would 
inevitably involve 
mostly Islamic 
references 
3) He does not attend 
a meeting, 
organization, a 
Source: official 
presidential 
webpage 
(tccb.gov.tr) 
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ceremony, or an 
event in general of 
which scope seems to 
be merely about art or 
culture 
4) He does not speak 
on an organization or 
an activity about 
sports 
5) He does not talk 
on an event which 
potentially embodies 
mostly social 
references such as 
like women rights, 
the importance of 
family or children 
6) He does not speak 
on an academic event 
that the scope of 
event merely seems 
to be about education 
Step 5 If available textualized 
discourses are unable to 
satisfy selection criteria for 
some months, then make a 
selection among available 
options according to 
additional criteria. 
Erdoğan must appeal 
primarily to a 
domestic audience, 
and if possible, he 
should do so within 
geographical confines 
of Turkey 
Source: official 
presidential 
webpage 
(tccb.gov.tr) 
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Step 6 Once completed the selection 
of all discourses which are 
already available as written 
texts, then for the missing 
ones, run a transcription 
process by searching video 
materials of Erdoğan’s 
discourses on Google, 
Yandex, and Youtube. Run a 
search by typing: 
“Erdoğan’s group meeting 
speech (month year)” 
“Erdoğan’s extended 
provincial chairmen meeting 
speech (month year)” 
 
 
1) Erdoğan’s 
speeches which are 
exercised during 
AKP group meetings 
and AKP extended 
provincial chairmen 
meetings are selected 
with priority.  
2) Durations of 
videos of discourses 
that need to be 
transcribed must be 
over 40:00 minutes 
while only videos 
with shortest 
durations are selected 
3)If no textualized 
discourse is already 
available for that 
month, then first 
select video with the 
shortest duration, and 
make the second 
selection while 
protecting one week 
temporal distance 
between two. If there 
is already a selected 
Source: Youtube 
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textualized discourse 
but second one is 
missing, then make 
the second selection 
while protecting one 
week temporal 
distance between of 
its date and the date 
of available 
textualized one. 
 
 
Step 7 Once transcriptions of AKP 
group meetings and AKP 
extended provincial chairmen 
meetings are completed, for 
missing discourses, search 
video materials of Erdoğan’s 
discourses on Google, 
Yandex, and Youtube. Run a 
search by typing: 
“Erdoğan speech (month 
year)” 
And make a selection 
according to the selection 
criteria. 
 
1) Durations of 
videos of discourses 
that need to be 
transcribed must be 
over 40:00 minutes 
while only videos 
with shortest 
durations are selected 
2) One week 
temporal distance 
between two 
selections must be 
protected. So, only 
take into 
consideration videos 
of Erdoğan’s 
speeches that take 
Source: Youtube 
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place one week 
before or after the 
first selected 
discourse49. 
 
 
3.2.4. On Excerpts and How I’ve Measured Populism in This Research 
 
My understanding of populism does not allow merely focusing on keywords or checking 
discourses sentence by sentence since this may turn out ending up with biased results. 
Sentences may lack one core criterion of populism, and thereby cannot be assessed as 
populists on their own. A group of consecutive sentences may refer to a populist tone by 
constituting a cohesive semantic unity. So, I’ve initially considered to focus on paragraphs 
in order to measure populist rhetoric. However, my observation is that, sometimes even 
paragraphs may also lack such cohesion, and in some circumstances, they may only 
correspond a populist tone when they are combined. What is more troublesome is that I’ve 
also encountered with paragraphs which are given as arbitrarily in textualized discourses I’ve 
used during this work. They are given as arbitrarily divided, merged, or sometimes they are 
not even given as paragraphs, but a group of sentences as provided as paragraphs. Moreover, 
because I’ve had to transcribe some discourses since they cannot be found in a textualized 
format on anywhere on web, I’ve had to build my own paragraphs, by taking into 
consideration the semantic unity and cohesion of a group of consecutive sentences. Hence, 
because counting on paragraphs may cause troubles of consistency and since there are not 
textualized paragraphs in the videos I’ve transcribed in order to make discourses textualized, 
I’ve decided to form my own paragraphs, and call them “excerpts” during this whole study. 
In short, throughout this research, while my unit of analysis is discourse, my unit of 
measurement is excerpt50. The reason I focus on excerpts is no different than my initial 
intention to focus on paragraphs - that sentences may lack one core criterion of populism, 
 
49. There are two months I’ve followed step 7 – December 2012 and June 2018, in both of which initial selections 
of first discourses have been made during previous steps. 
50. I mean populism is measured via coded excerpts, not via coded discourses as in Hawkins’ (2009, 2010) holistic 
grading. However, due to Erdoğan’s some expressions, a holistic examination of the text may be required in order to 
understand whether he points out an antagonism or not. This will be explained detailly in upcoming paragraphs. 
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and thereby cannot be assessed as populists on their own. However, because relying on 
paragraphs is problematic in some textualized discourses and because they do not even exist 
in a written format in videos which are transcribed, I’ve taken excerpts as my unit of 
measurement51.  
While focusing on excerpts, my assessment of them may not be independent from Erdoğan 
whole speech since a semantically conducted holistic overview of the text may also be 
required. At this respect, I’ve had to view discourses according to a holistic examination of 
the text in order to find out whether subjects of his antagonistic rhetoric or certain words that 
are used as equivalences of failures are implicitly given or not. In terms of antagonistic 
attacks, Erdoğan may apply implies or pronouns (such as, “these”) while he implicitly points 
out an actor or a group of actors in an antagonistic way. This is done since ignoring such 
appeals would lead an underrated assessment of populism and end up with biased results. 
Hence, in terms of pinpointing antagonism, I’ve paid attention to references that embody 
them either explicitly or implicitly and have also assessed them according to their possible 
semantic unity of the text. With regards to claims of hegemonic totality, whenever he 
mentions a certain failure, he may associate it with some certain labels or words such as 
operation, surgery, attack, conspiracy, plot, etc.52. Hence, indirectly and implicitly, a claim 
of hegemonic totality may not be given only via words such as Turkey, our economy, our 
country, us, etc. All these references are taken into consideration as instances of implicit 
hegemonic totality claim since they interest the whole nation. Moreover, besides appeals that 
interest the whole nation, references which explicitly or implicitly refer to members of 
Turkish society on the national level, whenever they correspond a mass, a plurality and 
thereby potentially refer to an alternative equivalential chain against an actual or potential 
power bloc are also taken into account as instances of claims of hegemonic totality. Appeals 
towards individuals who belong to an occupation category (for instance, whenever Erdoğan 
say my workers, my farmers, my doctors, etc.) are taken into account as long as the message 
is on the national level an pertain to economic elements. Similarly, for instance, appeals that 
 
51. I’ve thought that a pure holistic assessment of discourses, like Hawkins (2009, 2010) does, in order to generate 
a populism score for each discourse may boost concerns of subjectivity for the reader. Thereby, I’ve preferred to focus on 
excerpts, while also qualitatively sharing examples of them as much as possible during my focus on each case. 
52. How I’ve assessed excerpts and holistically examined discourses whenever Erdoğan uses these words are 
detailly explained under “On Package of Failures” title at the end of this chapter. 
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point out expenditure that is made for disabled individuals are taken into consideration due 
to the same logic. This logic refers to the assumption that such individuals are 
homogeneously dispersed to the territory of the country, and thereby appeals exercised 
towards them may have an impact over the economic equivalential chain between Erdoğan 
and such groups. So, on the condition that Erdoğan applies a totality claim for such 
individuals53, if he also uses an antagonistic tone during such appeals, then his rhetoric is 
assessed within the scope of populist appeals. If not, then his rhetoric is viewed as having a 
non-populist quality.  
One important issue at this point is that populist excerpts are not double coded whenever they 
embody more than one antagonism. In some cases, Erdoğan uses more than one antagonism 
during his attacks on a certain power bloc while instrumentalizing some other targets as 
complementary to the primary one, while he claims a hegemonic totality for a plurality. In 
such examples, I’ve focused on the primary target of such populist antagonism and code such 
paragraphs as one instance of populism, not more than once. 
My primary concern throughout this work is to check whether Erdoğan perpetuates failures 
that pertain to the economy of Turkey, thereby touch the people of Turkey, and present those 
failures as crisis. I am looking for a pattern that might give clues about the variation of his 
framing failures as crisis. Therefore, a reference to a plurality, and Erdoğan’s attempts of 
identifying that mass with himself accompanied by an inherent pretention of representation 
such plurality is required to decide on a claim of hegemonic totality. However, in his 
speeches, Erdoğan may claim totality of various groups and pluralities. For instance, during 
his visits to the Eastern Turkey, Erdoğan may frequently say “my Kurdish brothers and 
sisters” in his attempts to explicitly claim a totality for them while positioning them against 
terrorism and Kurdish Movement in general. Erdoğan also applies humanitarian messages 
and claim a totality of all Syrian refugees or Muslim population in the Middle East during 
his emphasis on the inconveniences these pluralities often face with, during his antagonistic 
attacks against the E.U. and superpowers of global politics. Due to the scope of this research, 
I neither focus on such regional/local messages nor appeals those are exercised for a 
particular ethnic group. Besides, global/international appeals also have nothing to do with 
 
53. As I’ve mentioned before, totality claim, either implicitly or explicitly exists in all appeals which are in the 
scope of this work. 
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my research interest. In short, totality claim with a mass must be on national level, not local, 
regional, or even global one, and should not be exercised for a certain ethnic group at the 
local/regional level. Only appeals that are on the national level are taken into account. 
Appeals that merely exercised towards the nation can be considered as an option to assess 
Erdoğan’s populist rhetoric. However, as I’ve mentioned above, references towards a mass, 
a plurality that can be assumed as homogeneously dispersed within the national borders also 
should not be overlooked since, on the national level, they also potentially refer to an 
equivalential chain based on economic elements that Erdoğan claims to represent via claims 
of hegemonic totality discursively.  
As I’ve mentioned above, when textualized discourses are missing, I’ve used video materials 
of speeches. And when I listen to videos of Erdoğan’s speeches, I’ve divided speeches as 
excerpts to their semantic coherence, like paragraphs that are not built arbitrarily. In order to 
be consistent, paragraphs of textualized discourses are not viewed as excerpts for textualized 
discourses because they are arbitrarily given even by the official page. Besides, there are no 
textualized paragraphs given on available video material. Therefore, I’ve had to distinguish 
speeches into excerpts and check whether paragraphs are arbitrarily given in textualized 
discourses. For the latter, paragraphs are reorganized as excerpts accordingly by taking into 
consideration the semantic coherence of them within themselves.  
 
 
3.2.4.1. Excerpt Examples 
 
Here I just want to mention on how I’ve divided discourses into excerpts and which excerpts 
are kept out of assessment. More except examples will be given once categories have detailly 
been explained in the following pages.  
An example of division of discourses into excerpts is given below. This paragraph is taken 
from Erdoğan’s speech in which he appeals to members of TÜGİK while accepting them in 
presidential palace on January the 19th, 2015.54  
 
54. Discourse ID: D17. Link is available in the appendix. 
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“…Şimdi istihdamda bir sıkıntı görünüyor. Yani birçok batı ülkesiyle mukayese 
edilmeyecek derecede iyiyiz de, ama niye buralarda olsun, daha da aşağılarda 
olsun inelim yüzde beşe kadar, düşelim buralara. Tabii biz geldiğimizde hizmet 
sektörü felaketti. Şimdi hizmet sektöründe hamdolsun birçok alanlar açıldı. Yani 
en basitinden Turizm’de otellerimiz bizim biliyorsunuz sadece yaz mevsiminde 
çalışırdı. Onun dışında kapanırdı. Ama şimdi dört mevsim, otellerimiz çalışır hale 
geldi. Bu tabi bizim için çok çok önemli bir sıçrama, çok önemli bir atak.”55 
However, I’ve viewed it as two excerpts merged arbitrarily and composed one paragraph 
since Erdoğan indeed talks about two different issues: employment and service industry 
(particularly tourism). Therefore, according to semantic unity within themselves, the 
paragraph given on this webpage is divided into two excerpts and assessed accordingly: 
 
“…Şimdi istihdamda bir sıkıntı görünüyor. Yani birçok batı ülkesiyle mukayese 
edilmeyecek derecede iyiyiz de, ama niye buralarda olsun, daha da aşağılarda 
olsun inelim yüzde beşe kadar, düşelim buralara.” 56 
“…Tabii biz geldiğimizde hizmet sektörü felaketti. Şimdi hizmet sektöründe 
hamdolsun birçok alanlar açıldı. Yani en basitinden Turizm’de otellerimiz bizim 
biliyorsunuz sadece yaz mevsiminde çalışırdı. Onun dışında kapanırdı. Ama 
şimdi dört mevsim, otellerimiz çalışır hale geldi. Bu tabi bizim için çok çok 
önemli bir sıçrama, çok önemli bir atak.”57 
 
Both are non-populist excerpts since antagonism is missing for both of them. In the first one 
Erdoğan recognizes a failure in employment, but he does not frame it as a serious one while 
comparing its level with employment levels of Western countries. And he mentions his good 
intentions to pull unemployment down. I’ve assessed this firs excerpt is a crisis denying non-
populist excerpt. In the second, Erdoğan gives a positive message about what has achieved 
in tourism so far, under AKP rule. He makes a comparison of the term before AKP rule while 
not using an antagonistic tongue. He does not point out a failure that belong to AKP 
 
55. “…Now, there seems to be a trouble with employment. We are so good as not to be compared with many 
Western countries, but why is it here, at these levels, let’s fall into 5 percent, fall into these levels. Of course, when we 
arrived, service industry was a disaster. Thank God, many areas have been opened in service industry recently. I mean, as 
a simple example, in tourism you know our hotels had only worked during summer seasons. Except summers, they had 
remained closed. This is a very very important bounce for us, a very important attack.” 
56. “…Now, there seems to be a trouble with employment. We are so good as not to be compared with many 
Western countries, but why is it here, at these levels, let’s fall into 5 percent, fall into these levels.” 
57. “…Of course, when we arrived, service industry was a disaster. Thank God, many areas have been opened in 
service industry recently. I mean, as a simple example, in tourism you know our hotels had only worked during summer 
seasons. Except summers, they had remained closed. This is a very very important bounce for us, a very important attack.” 
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governments. Therefore, it is an instance of what I call failure ignoring non-populist excerpt. 
Detailed explanation of such categories will be provided under “Categorical Variables” title.  
An example of a pure political populist excerpt which is out of assessment is given below58: 
 
“…Suriye’de ve Irak’ta oynanan bölme, parçalama, etnik ve mezhebi kışkırtma 
oyunlarının amacı, Türkiye’yi güneyden kuşatmaktır. Bu kuşatma faaliyeti 
sadece fiziki sınırlarımızdan ibaret de değildir. Burada ülkemizin içini de 
kapsayan büyük bir oyundan bahsediyorum. Allah’ın izni, milletimizin 
dirayetiyle, diğer saldırıları nasıl boşa çıkardıysak, bu oyunu da bozacağız, hiç 
şüphem yok.”59 
 
In this excerpt, while Erdoğan claims the totality of whole Turkish nation, he exercises an 
antagonism against the actors who are involved in such plots of division, fragmentation, and 
provocation of ethnic and religious conflict in Syria and Iraq. Pure political appeals are out 
of assessment since they do not refer to any economic equivalential relation between Erdoğan 
and the people of Turkey.  
Due to the scope of this work, I am also not interested in Erdoğan’s appeals against 
global/international power blocs such as Western powers, E.U., U.S., or U.N., on the 
condition that such appeals do not refer to an ability to build an opposing equivalential chains 
vis-à-vis such power blocs, with regards to economic concerns and anxieties of the people 
living in Turkey. Besides, I have to remind that failures of this work are failures of Turkey. 
Global appeals that mention failures of other countries or blocs are not in the scope of this 
study. Erdoğan’s appeals that are primarily on the global level are not taken into 
consideration, even they might refer to affect the equivalential relation between Erdoğan and 
the people living outside of Turkey. Moreover, Erdoğan’s appeals that are about expenditures 
that have been made for Syrian refugees living in Turkey are used as a political weapon 
whenever he criticizes the indifference of the E.U. authorities towards refugees and 
immigrants. Although there are Syrian refugees still residing in Turkey, the issue is not even 
 
58. Discourse ID: D37. Link is available in the appendix. 
59. “…The aim of games of division, fragmentation, and provocation of ethnic and religious conflict in Syria and 
Iraq is to surround Turkey from its southern border. This surrounding action is not limited to physical borders. I am talking 
about a bigger game that involves the inner part of Turkey. With God’s will and wisdom of our nation, we will spoil this 
game just like we have nullified other attacks, I have no doubt about that.” 
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framed by Erdoğan as a failure of Turkey, rather it was framed as a failure of the E.U. and 
the West in general. During his speeches on Syrian refugees and immigrants, Erdoğan says 
that his government will continue to help these people despite the neglect of the E.U. Such 
appeals may refer building an equivalential chain between Erdoğan and refugees against 
power blocs that is claimed to cause Syrian War. But they are assessed as appeals on the 
global level, thereby do not fall into the scope of this work. In short, when it comes to failures, 
this work only focuses on failures of Turkey, and they are either recognized or ignored while 
Erdoğan speaks. Therefore, despite its populist tone, the following speech60 is not in the scope 
of my attention during this study: 
 
“… Onun için Birleşmiş Milletler Genel Kurulunda defaatle ‘Dünya 5’ten 
büyüktür’ dedik. Ve 196 ülkenin yaşadığı bu dünyada dedik ki; 196 ülkenin 
kaderini bir ülkenin iki dudakları arasına mahkûm edemezsiniz. Gelin, artık 
İkinci Dünya Savaşı’nın sonrasındaki şartlar bugün yok, bunu gözden geçirelim 
ve yeniden reforme etmek suretiyle tüm dünya ülkeleri Birleşmiş Milletler 
Güvenlik Konseyinde yer alsın. 20 ülke mi, 20 ülke dönerli olarak bunlar orada 
yer alsınlar ve karar sürecine katılsınlar.61” 
 
In this excerpt, antagonism is primarily against one country (implicitly against the U.S.) and 
secondarily it is against five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council 
while hegemonic totality is explicitly claimed for all countries. It embodies populism in a 
global sense, but not in the scope of my assessment due to my focus through this research. 
As I’ve emphasized before, populism is inherently in the scope of what is political. But 
economic messages cannot be regarded independent from politics. Due to empirical nature 
of this study, I only focus on Erdoğan’s appeals on economic issues which can potentially or 
actually turn into alternative equivalential chains via economic matters, concerns or anxieties 
of the people, who Erdoğan claims the totality for. But one key issue here is that not every 
excerpt that might have an impact over the equivalential relation between Erdoğan and the 
people are coded. Excerpts are coded only when they embody references that may actually 
 
60. Discourse ID: D29. Link is available in the appendix. 
61. “That’s why we have repeatedly said ‘The world is bigger than 5’ at United Nations General Assembly. We 
said, on a World that 196 countries exist, the fate of 196 countries cannot be doomed to between lips of one country. Let’s 
come, conditions of post-World War II no longer exist today, let’s revise this, and on the condition to reform it again, all 
countries of the World should appear on United Nations Security Council. Is it 20 countries? Then 20 countries by taking 
turns appear there and join decision making process.” 
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or potential have an impact on equivalential relation between Erdoğan and the people living 
in Turkey, when involved economic elements are on the national or structural level. They 
may refer issues pertain to the national Turkish economy as a whole, or to the economic 
conditions and wellbeing of a plurality, a mass of individuals that can be taken as a sample 
only due to their potential homogeneous dispersion within the country. I also view the latter 
within the scope of what is national, as long as such plurality is not stuck into a local/regional 
scope62. In this way, a totality claim may rise over an equivalential relation between Erdoğan 
and the people of Turkey, when the people refer to subjects on the national level or when 
they refer to a mass that is dispersed homogeneously among the county, therefore have an 
impact on the equivalential relation on the national level. Thus, as I’ve mentioned before, 
appeals embodying local/regional emphasis as given below63, are irrelevant to this work even 
though whenever they refer to instances of populism while embodying economic appeals at 
local/regional level: 
 
“…Şimdi benim Kürt kardeşim soruyor. Ya ne istiyorsun kardeşim, onu söyle? 
Bırak sen şu bölücü terör örgütünün ağzını, bırak sen onların siyasi 
temsilcilerinin ağzını. Sana yapılmayan ne var ya bunu söyle? Batı’da olup da 
sende olmayan ne var? İstihdam diyorsan onun vebali sende. Niye? Çünkü sen 
girişimcinin, yatırımcının Güneydoğuya, Doğuya gelmesine katkıda 
bulunacaksın değerli kardeşim. Niye? Bölücü terör örgütünün karşısına sen de 
dikileceksin, dimdik duracaksın. Bak oraya o zaman girişimci nasıl geliyor orada 
yatırım yapmaya nasıl başlıyor.64”  
 
 
3.2.5. Categorical Variables 
 
62. This plurality may refer workers, farmers, doctors, the police, etc. Although these people have the same 
profession within themselves, they are assumed to disperse homogeneously within the country, and they refer to a non-
ignorable body of plurality. Appeals exercised towards these pluralities mat have an impact on the sense of crisis. Thus, 
excerpts that contain references towards these pluralities are taken into consideration and coded. Appeals that are exercised 
for a body of individuals that live in a particular region/city are not taken into account since they are not homogeneously 
dispersed. My observation is that Erdoğan mostly makes references towards a body of individuals whenever he exercises 
failure ignoring rhetoric, and while he talks about how his party has improved social and economic conditions of such people 
or whenever he mentions a body of individuals and asks their contribution to the economy, during his appeals pointing out 
“economic attacks against Turkey.” 
63. Discourse ID: D05. Link is available in the appendix. 
64. “Now my Kurdish brother ask. What do you want my brother, tell me? Give up using the language of this 
terrorist organization, give up the language of their political representatives. What has not provided for you, tell that? What 
exists in the West that you don’t have? If you say employment, that is your fault. Why? Because my dear brother, you will 
contribute to entrepreneur’s, investor’s coming to Southeast, East. Why? You will stand against the separatist terrorist 
organization, and you stand against it. Then look how entrepreneur comes to there, how he starts to invest in there.” 
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As I’ve mentioned before, I’ve coded excerpts of Erdoğan’s each discourse and categorized 
them according to their potential impact on crisis perception of the people as long as they 
contain references that can actually or potentially have an impact over the equivalential chain 
between Erdoğan and the people of Turkey, with regards to economic elements: economic 
concerns, anxieties, or even pleasures of the people of Turkey on the national level. 
Equivalential relation itself is indeed a political relationship, but what I’ve taken into 
consideration during this work excerpts which only embody or refer economic elements, 
thereby influential on crisis perception of the people. This relationship may be weakened or 
strengthened according to the variation of Erdoğan’s rhetoric. But it may get stronger not 
only due to relieving, appeasing, or pleasing references but also due to appeals that 
exacerbate economic concerns and anxieties of the people. So, categorical variables are built 
whether they have a possible impact over crisis perception of the people and the strength of 
the equivalential relation between Erdoğan and the people on structural or national level. For 
instance, if Erdoğan mentions how well Turkey has performed in economy lately, this would 
strengthen the equivalential relation of the existing equivalential chain which Erdoğan claims 
to represent the totality of and may also enable new articulations of remaining members of 
the society to it65. Another example can be given as whenever Erdoğan recognizes failures 
during his appeals, again the strength of the equivalential relation between Erdoğan and the 
people changes according to the type of rhetoric that Erdoğan uses, due to its varying impact 
over the people’s perception. Indeed, my intention throughout this work, in accord with 
Moffitt’s (2015) core argument, is to check whether Erdoğan’s crisis deepening efforts that 
aim to exacerbate crisis perception of the people exist, and if so, whether such efforts work 
for his advantage with regards to strengthen this equivalential relationship or not. 
While coded excerpts are only pertain to issues of the economy on the national level (the 
whole economy or ingredients of it such as; investments, huge projects, social expenditures, 
wages, etc.) my intention is to focus on Moffitt’s (2015) core claim in explaining populism: 
Populism uses failures and perpetuate them into a sense of crisis via populist performances. 
This may shed light on how some politicians who are infamous with their excessive populist 
 
65. The interpretation of these new articulations in terms of politics is Erdoğan enhances electoral support to his 
party whenever he achieves to enable such articulations. 
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rhetoric are able to remain in power for a long period of time. But as I have explained 
extensively, different than Moffitt’s conception of populism, mine requires handling it as a 
discursive phenomenon, not a vague performative style. In accord with my understanding, I 
want to focus on whether Erdoğan’s populism emphasizes failures and perpetuates them into 
a sense of economic crisis among Turkish people via populist discourse. If Erdoğan uses this 
tactic to perpetuate his rule, my concern is to pinpoint under what circumstances such 
attempts of perpetuating failures and framing them as crisis exist. In concordance with 
Moffitt’s (2015) claim, my primary focus is to find a simple answer for the following inquiry: 
Does Erdoğan emphasize failures of AKP rule in order to perpetuate them as crisis via 
populist rhetoric? If so, under what conditions does it happen? What might possibly explain 
for the variation of Erdoğan’s tendency towards perpetuating failures as crisis?  
During my focus on Erdoğan’s discourse, I’ve tried several categorization scenarios. After 
endless efforts and an intensive focus, I’ve decided to ask a key question before coding 
excerpts: Does Erdoğan agree with that Turkey experiences failures that potentially or 
actually affect the economy? If yes, Does Erdoğan’s framing potentially contribute to create 
a sense of crisis among the people? Does he endeavor to rise the crisis perception? Or does 
he strive to lower crisis perception and attempt to appease the people by denying perpetuation 
of failures? I’ve assessed the first category as crisis emphasizing rhetoric while I’ve viewed 
the second one as his crisis denying rhetoric. In both cases, Erdoğan recognizes those 
failures, but his framing of the issue varies according to his political strategy. As a third 
option, Erdoğan may also apply using a rhetoric which ignores failures, he may just pretend 
that economy is fine, and he can merely mention about AKP’s contribution to the economy, 
by giving information that his governments have achieved so far. He may also point out that 
Turkey moves towards her 2023 targets and he may emphasize investments, huge projects 
that will enable Turkey’s achieving those targets. For this third category, I’ve assessed such 
appeals under the category of failure ignoring rhetoric. The third option will also be 
mentioned in detail once I’ve explained the first two ones more clearly. 
Excerpts which fall into these three broad categories are coded and assessed. They are labeled 
as populist or non-populist with regards to their inclusion of Manichaean antagonism and 
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hegemonic totality claim, either implicitly or explicitly66. As I’ve mentioned before, excerpts 
including implicit antagonism may require a semantically conducted holistic overview of the 
text. That is due to the fact that Erdoğan often uses words, a group of words, phrases, or 
pronouns (such as, “these”) as implies during his antagonistic appeals or during his mentions 
on a certain failure as an outcome of some actors he points out during his speech. Whenever 
he does so, he implicitly exercises antagonism against them. The target of antagonistic 
rhetoric does not have to be explicitly given. Rather Erdoğan might frame them as if the ones 
who are mainly responsible for failures. In short, whenever there is an implicit antagonism 
in Erdoğan’s appeals, I’ve had to assess such excerpts according to a holistic examination of 
the text in order to find out whether subjects of his antagonistic rhetoric or certain words that 
are used as equivalences of failures are at least implicitly given or not. This is done since 
keeping such appeals out of assessment would lead an underrated assessment of populism 
and end up with biased results.  
One may ask for sure, according to what criteria appeals that refer to crisis emphasizing and 
crisis denying rhetoric are determined? At this point, I’ve applied one key inquiry: Do these 
appeals have a potential to increase or decrease the level of perceived crisis of the people? 
Does Erdoğan claim that deterioration in the economy or the source of it has stopped and 
indicators has started to move in an opposite direction? In other words, does he claim that 
the economic landscape has changed recently? Have failures been overcome or the source of 
failures (during Erdoğan’s speeches, mostly framed as a threat) been eliminated or 
completely neutralized? Or is Turkey still under risk of failures? Does Erdoğan mean that he, 
his party, or even Turkey given in a totality extent, will continue to struggle? Does he 
emphasize his confrontational rhetorical style and say something like “we will not surrender” 
which definitely perpetuates the failure? During my analysis on Erdoğan’s discourses, there 
have been times that I could find no clear-cut answers for these inquiries due to the existence 
of ambiguous and equivocal appeals. That’s why, in accord with Moffitt’s (2015) emphasis 
on his exemplifications of crisis perpetuation, I’ve further checked whether there are any 
answers for the following ones: Due to failures, does Erdoğan mention any critical turning 
point that Turkish people are at? Or does Erdoğan advice the people to take certain types of 
 
66. As I’ve mentioned before, due to the nature of this study, all appeals within the scope of this work have 
either implicit or explicit hegemonic totality claims. 
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actions in order to overcome potential future inconveniences of failures? In other words, is 
there a responsibility that is attributed to the people in order to mitigate actual/potential 
impact of failures? Or does Erdoğan exercises mere political or religious appeals that are 
presented as solutions other than concrete steps to be taken to solve the issue? If Erdoğan 
applies none of these, does he at least give appeasing messages about potential damage of 
failures and claim that precautions in order to hinder such negative consequences are taken 
by the government as the core responsible actor and the issue will be taken care of in 
following period, near future? 
 
 
3.2.5.1. Crisis emphasizing rhetoric 
 
As I’ve mentioned above, if Erdoğan recognizes failures during his discourses, there are only 
two options for them. One option is crisis emphasizing rhetoric, the other is crisis denying 
rhetoric. In both options, if Erdoğan recognizes failures by mentioning on them. If Erdoğan 
recognized failures, then one strategy for him can be perpetuation of those failures as crisis. 
I’ve named this category as crisis emphasizing rhetoric. This rhetoric can be exercised in five 
ways. 
If Erdoğan recognizes failures and if he intends to perpetuate them as crisis, the first 
possibility is after the introduction of those failures, putting the people into an alarming 
position while not using any type of crisis denying rhetoric. In this first option of crisis 
emphasizing rhetoric, Erdoğan mostly presents failures as if they are caused by a threat, 
which attempts against Turkish economy or the people of Turkey in an economic sense. Thus, 
if Erdoğan does not use any instance of crisis denying rhetoric whenever he mentions about 
failures or sources of failures (threats), he exercises a kind of crisis emphasizing rhetoric. An 
example is given below67: 
 
“… Bakın, dikkatlerinizi çekiyorum, Hükümet değil, Hükümet politikaları değil, 
AK Parti değil, topyekûn Türkiye, topyekûn Türkiye ekonomisi hedef alınarak 
adeta 76 milyonun bir arada yolculuk ettiği geminin tabanına delik açılmak 
 
67. Discourse ID: D16. Link is available in the appendix. 
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istenmiştir. Son derece basit, ama aynı derecede ihanet boyutunda bir planı 
devreye sokmak istediler ve halen de istiyorlar. Ekonomi kötü giderse Hükümet 
yıpranacak, ama 76 milyona, çalışanlara, üretenlere, çiftçiye, esnafa, sanayiciye 
ne olacağını zerre kadar umursamadılar ve umursamıyorlar.68” 
 
Here, Erdoğan does emphasize that the threat is still active and attempts against Turkish 
economy and the people of Turkey in an economic sense. So, in the excerpt given above, 
Erdoğan accepts the impact of failures over the economy but he does not show any effort to 
deny framing the failure as crisis. Here, antagonism is built against Gülenist Movement 
although not explicitly given but can easily be understood when the speech is holistically 
examined. Totality is explicitly claimed for the whole nation. 
This first option of emphasizing is not assessed with priority during coding. However, 
following four options are coded with priority. That means even though Erdoğan uses a crisis 
denying rhetoric in an excerpt, if he also uses the following four options of crisis emphasizing 
appeals, then that excerpt has been assessed as an instance of crisis emphasizing rhetoric and 
coded accordingly. 
As a second option of his crisis emphasizing attempts, Erdoğan may apply pure political 
references instead of concrete steps to be followed (for instances, the situation can be handled 
once we have achieved our national political unity or if he says something like “the source 
of our power is not the amount of our money, but the strength of our unity, solidarity, and 
brotherhood” 69) or whenever he applies to religious references as ultimate solutions other 
than concrete actions that the government can take (for instance “Allah is enough for us”) 70 
then these are viewed as strong signs of weakness against failures or threats, therefore they 
are assessed within the scope of crisis emphasizing rhetoric.  Another crucial example of 
mere political or religious responses to failures is that during exchange rate crisis in Summer 
2018, Erdoğan claimed that evil external forces in collaboration of domestic traitors, 
attempted to implement an economic war in order to put Turkey in a position of bending the 
 
68. “Look, I am calling your attention, not the government, not government policies, not AK Party, but Turkey as 
a whole, by targeting Turkish economy as a whole, a hole was wanted to be opened on the base of the ship that 76 million 
people sail together. They wanted to activate a plan that is very simple but at the same time at the treachery level, and they 
still want to do so. If the economy deteriorates, the government will be chafed. But they do not care and have never cared 
about at all what will happen to 76 million, laborers, producers, farmers, craftsmen, industrialists.”   
69. For the related except, discourse ID is D31. Link is available in the appendix. 
70 This example is a hypothetical one. 
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knee for them. These traitors and the “mastermind” they have been serving for strived to 
handicap the sovereignty of Turkish people by market tricks since they couldn’t achieve to 
do so by force during the failed coup attempt. Erdoğan applied a significant Manichaean 
antagonism against the U.S. authorities while combining it with a claim of hegemonic totality 
of Turkish citizens whose population overwhelmingly consists of Muslims, thereby exercised 
an apparent crisis emphasizing populist speech: “If they have their Dollar, we have our 
people, we have our Allah”(Gall 2018). This rhetoric obviously agrees with the claim that 
Turkey was in deep economic trouble. Nevertheless, Erdoğan’s strategy can be interpreted 
as an attempt to deepen existing economic anxieties of the people while positioning them 
against the common enemy via us and them antagonism by merely religious references. Any 
pure political or religious references that is framed as a solution rather than concrete 
governmental action is assessed within the scope of crisis emphasizing rhetoric, no matter if 
Erdoğan uses any instance of crisis denying rhetoric with it. 
One important issue at this point is that not all religious appeals are viewed in this scope. 
AKP claims to be conservative democrat and Erdoğan uses religious references too 
frequently, almost in his all discourses. Wishes that embody religious elements such as “with 
God’s permission” or “with prays of our nation” are out of such assessment. Religious 
references have to be framed as mere solutions vis-à-vis failures, in order to be taken as 
instances of crisis emphasizing rhetoric. Another important point is, wishes or prays of forces 
which are framed as threats (for instance domestic opposition in collaboration with external 
threats) against Turkey are also not enough to pose a threat to Turkish economy. If threat is 
active, then its activity must be framed as corresponding an action. For example, during his 
talks about CHP and Gülenist Movement, Erdoğan denies their potential impact over Turkey 
by claiming that “these can only organize imprecation sessions together.”71 Religious 
references here are not given as solutions for failures, rather they are used to disdain 
oppositional political actors and groups and demonstrate how much weak they are vis-à-vis 
Erdoğan and his government. 
Thirdly, Erdoğan may ask help from the people to contribute the solution of the problem that 
failures have created. In such appeals, the solution becomes dependent on actions of the 
 
71. For the related excerpt, discourse ID is 14. Link is given in the appendix. 
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people. By actions, here I mean actions of the people to downgrade economic downturn or if 
possible, eliminate it or the source of it that Erdoğan frames during his speech. Whenever 
Erdoğan explicitly ask help from the people in order to mitigate or overcome inconveniences 
that failures have created, such appeals are indeed signs of inability to overcome failures by 
merely governmental action, thereby assessed within the scope of crisis emphasizing 
rhetoric. One crucial example is Erdoğan’s calls for the people to convert U.S. Dollars into 
Turkish Lira, thereby to disable possible sharp exchange rate hikes. In these kinds of appeals, 
Erdoğan mostly uses a populist tone. However, Erdoğan may ask the people to take other 
kinds of actions to contribute to possible solutions against inconveniences that failures have 
created. He may also ask investors and businessmen to produce and employ more in order to 
contribute Turkish economy, as given in the following excerpt72: 
 
“…Değerli kardeşlerim, ben buradan tüm iş adamlarımıza, yatırımcılarımıza, 
esnafımıza, sanatkarımıza da seslenmek istiyorum: Yaşadığımız zorlukları, 
tereddütleri, sıkıntıları biliyorum. Ama gelin ülkenize güvenin, ülkenize sahip 
çıkın. Böyle bir dönemde üretime yüklenmeyeceksiniz, istihdamı 
artırmayacaksınız, ticaretin çarklarının dönmesini sağlamayacaksınız da bunu ne 
zaman yapacaksınız? Türkiye, üretimdeki düşüşü, istihdamdaki düşüşü, 
ticaretteki daralmayı hak eden bir ülke değildir. Potansiyelimiz de hedeflerimiz 
de tam tersine daha çok büyümeyi, daha çok istihdamı, daha çok ticareti işaret 
ediyor…73” 
 
The excerpt given above can be assessed an instance of crisis emphasizing non-populist 
rhetoric since economic failures are emphasized via “a period like this” (when the related 
speech is examined holistically, such emphasis can be understood easily) while antagonism 
is totally missing, and the subject of antagonism is not even implied. If Erdoğan asks people’s 
help for their contribution to overcome failures, or their actual or potential impact over the 
economy, then it is assessed as crisis emphasizing rhetoric, no matter if Erdoğan uses any 
instance of crisis denying rhetoric with it. 
 
72. Discourse ID: D31. Link is available in the appendix. 
73. “…My dear brothers, I want to appeal all our businessmen, investors, craftsmen, artisans from here: I know 
the difficulties, hesitations, distress that we experience. But come and trust your country, claim your country. If you did not 
produce, increase employment, and make the wheels of trade to turn in a period like this and then when would you do that? 
Turkey is not a country that deserves the fall in employment, recession in trade. On the contrary, both our potential and our 
targets points out greater growth, greater employment, greater trade…” 
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Fourthly, whenever Erdoğan emphasizes an uncertain future which may cause trouble for the 
people of Turkey in an economic sense, this is assessed within the scope of crisis emphasizing 
rhetoric. Erdoğan may do so by associating solutions of failures via conditional statements, 
or by emphasizing a turning point, which may lead not only a happy ending but also embodies 
perils to the people of Turkey and Turkish economy.  For example, if Erdoğan speaks with 
members of his party like “If you perform well and stand upright, then we will handle the 
situation”74 then handling the situation depends on the condition that members of Erdoğan’s 
party perform well and stand upright. In this case, if members of Erdoğan’s party fail to 
perform enough, then the situation cannot be handled. I’ve viewed such appeals as crisis 
emphasizing rhetoric since they not only put the people into an alarming situation but also 
emphasize the undesirable outcome for them, even if Erdoğan pretends to be determined for 
the solution of the issue. In a similar vein, Erdoğan may also use a rhetoric that emphasizes 
a turning point, a juncture that Turkey faces once he recognizes failures and accepts the actual 
of potential impact of them. For instance, if he says something like Turkey is at crossroads 
once he has presented failures or claimed sources of them (threat), then such appeals are also 
assessed within the scope of crisis emphasizing rhetoric since they also point out an uncertain 
future for the people, which may not result in a happy ending. Hence, the potential 
undesirable outcome for the people is given due to a conditionality or an emphasis on a 
turning point that points an uncertain for the people, I’ve assessed it as an instance of crisis 
emphasizing rhetoric, regardless of how much Erdoğan is determined to overcome the issue 
or no matter if he uses any other instance of crisis denying rhetoric. An example is given 
below75: 
 
“…En küçük bir ihmale artık yer yok, en küçük bir rehavete boş vermişliğe, hele 
hele umutsuzluğa moralsizliğe yer yok. Açık söylüyorum, siz çalışırsanız 
Türkiye kazanacak. Eğer siz ihmal ederseniz, bütün Türkiye kaybedecek, milli 
irade kaybedecek, bütün Türkiye kaybedecek. Bu süreç, unutmayın, yeni 
Türkiye’nin istiklal mücadelesi sürecidir, bu kadar önemli. Bu süreç, Türkiye 
üzerine hesapları olanların hesaplarının bozulacağı süreçtir. Bu süreç faiz 
lobisinin Türkiye’den son darbeyi yiyeceği süreçtir. Yeise kapılmadan 
 
74. I’ve given the full excerpt below. When holistically examined, by “situation” Erdoğan means December the 
17th incident. Because he frames this incident not only a political but also an economic attack against Turkey, this excerpt 
is assessed, and his such appeals are taken into consideration as instance of crisis emphasizing rhetoric. 
75. Discourse ID: D14. Link is available in the appendix. 
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karamsarlığa asla prim vermeden moralleri yüksek tutarak kararlı bir mücadele 
vereceğiz. Tekrar ediyorum, millet bizimle. Milletin hayır duası bizimle. Bırakın 
onlar manşetleriyle ihanet içinde olsunlar. Bırakın onlar milletin emeğini faiz 
lobilerine pazarlamanın gayreti içinde olsunlar. Bırakın sosyal medyada, iğrenç 
internet sitelerinde kasetlerinin içinde onlar boğulsunlar. Bırakın o kaset 
montajcıları, o itibar suikastçıları Müslümanlara beddua etsinler. Biz bedduaya 
lanet, duaya evet diyeceğiz…”76 
 
And fifthly, once Erdoğan has recognized failures, he may choose to frame their sources as 
global threats. On the condition that the alleged threat exists on the global level, and if 
Erdoğan uses an offensive77 tongue against such threat, any attempt that extends the temporal 
scope of the political confrontation thereby framing the threat as a perpetual danger against 
the economy or the people of Turkey in an economic sense is assessed within the scope of 
crisis emphasizing rhetoric, no matter if Erdoğan uses any instance of crisis denying rhetoric. 
At this point, the threat may also be domestic on the condition if it is associated with its 
global partners and discursively framed as positioned against Turkish economy or the people 
of Turkey in an economic sense. For example, whenever domestic oppositional actors, Gezi 
protestors, or Gülenist Movement are associated with global/external threats and framed as 
their domestic collaborators or internal extensions, on the condition such association must be 
given during discourse at an earlier time, these domestic threats are viewed as threats working 
for global threats. Thereby, offensive rhetoric against them and extending the scope of 
confrontation or struggle with such domestic threats are also assessed within the scope of 
crisis emphasizing rhetoric.   
One might ask why I have two necessary conditions - a threat on global level and an offensive 
tongue - for this last crisis emphasizing option. The underlying reason is that Turkey is 
 
76. “...There is no room for any piece of neglect, any piece of slackness, nonchalance, and most particularly, there 
is no room for hopelessness, no room for downheartedness. I am putting this clearly, if you work, Turkey will win. If you 
neglect, the whole Turkey will lose, the national will will lose, the whole Turkey will lose. This process, do not forget, the 
struggle for the independence of New Turkey, it is that much important. This process is the process that calculations of the 
ones that have calculations on Turkey will be ruined. This process is the process that the interest rate lobby will take the 
death blow from Turkey. Without getting into desolation, not promoting pessimism, and keeping our morale high, we will 
decidedly struggle. I repeat, the nation is with us. Prayers of the nation is with us. Let them strive for marketing the labor of 
the people to interest lobbies. Let them choke on social media, and in their tapes on their disgusting websites. Let those tape 
editors, those assassins of reputation imprecate Muslims. We will say curse to imprecation, yes to prayer.…” 
77. Appeals that Erdoğan in a defensive position like “…we do not surrender” are considered as defensive while 
the ones that Erdoğan in an offensive position like “we will struggle forever, until the last of us remains/until the last drop 
of our blood!” or “…Now they say we cut your Dollar. Do whatever you want, this nation will choke you!” are accepted as 
offensive.  
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developing country that is highly dependent on foreign capital. A rational logic points out 
that any offensive confrontation with Western global powers can only hurt Turkey and puts 
Turkey in a weaker economic position. Moreover, Turkey does not have any key strategic 
resources (such as, oil) to sustain an independent path on its own. That’s why any offensive 
perpetual confrontation with “global threats” can have a huge potential to exacerbate existing 
crisis perception of the people. Appeals of this option thereby are assessed within the scope 
of crisis emphasizing rhetoric. 
One crucial point about crisis emphasizing category is that the possible confusion and 
concerns of the reader about appeals whenever both crisis emphasizing references are given 
as combined with crisis denying ones, why I’ve given priorities to some options of crisis 
emphasizing rhetoric. Particularly, one may ask why I’ve taken the last four options of crisis 
emphasizing rhetoric as having an ultimate dominance vis-à-vis Erdoğan’s crisis denying 
attempts. The reason is I’ve considered negative references that explicitly points out the 
inability of the government would inevitably raise sense of crisis among the people, 
regardless of the intensity of Erdoğan’s crisis denying efforts. After all, categories are 
determined according to potential impact of Erdoğan’s appeals over crisis perception of the 
people. In the first option of crisis emphasizing rhetoric, Erdoğan mentions a failure, this 
would inevitably put some people into an alarming position, so it is an inevitable outcome. I 
mean, recognition of failures and using them in appeals means that more or less, the people 
will be put into an alarming position due to discursive framing of those failures.  If there are 
no denying remarks on the actual or potential impact of failures over the people of Turkey in 
an economic sense, then as expected, this would be assessed within the scope of crisis 
emphasizing rhetoric. But while frames failures or threats as source of failures, if he appeases 
the people in a way that they do not need to worry about them, then he accentuates that the 
government as a functional body exists, and the government does its job by eliminating any 
actual or potential inconvenience that failures or threats have generated or may lead. But 
whenever he gives pure political appeals as mere solutions, or whenever he asks the people’s 
help to overcome failures, or whenever points out an uncertain future via conditional 
statements or emphases on turning points, or whenever he attempts to perpetuate failures as 
crisis by using an offensive rhetoric against a global threat, I’ve thought that such appeals 
may signal the people who listen Erdoğan’s speeches in a way that the government has either 
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been unable to overcome failures or will be unable to do so. Hence, the outcome would an 
inevitable rise in the crisis perception. Besides, not limited to Erdoğan, but politicians all 
over the world more frequently use appeasing and positive appeals than their negative failure 
acknowledging ones. In this work, I’ve also figured out that Erdoğan also uses failure 
ignoring appeals more frequently than his failure recognizing ones. What I want to mean is 
that people are used to hear appeasing remarks of politicians and rulers whenever they face 
a negative situation. Among various references, I’ve assumed that people are expected to be 
more sensitive and selective for negative references or implies. If they infer from those 
messages that the government, highly probably, is or will be unable to handle the situation, 
then their crisis perception is expected to rise, no matter how frequently they hear appeasing 
appeals. 
 
 
3.2.5.2. Crisis denying rhetoric 
 
For this category, Erdoğan again must recognize threats but his strategy of framing threats 
completely differs from crisis emphasizing rhetoric. The necessary condition of this rhetoric 
is not to use any instances of crisis emphasizing rhetoric, except only appeals that put the 
people into an alarming position, as I’ve mentioned above, which is indeed inevitable due to 
recognition of failures and mentioning about them during speeches.  
However, in the first option of crisis denying rhetoric, Erdoğan may deny the undesirable 
outcome for Turkish economy or for the people of Turkey in an economic sense by claiming 
that the government has begun to take required steps to overcome inconveniences of failures, 
or threats as sources of failures have created. In a sense, Erdoğan points out determination of 
the government for the solution via governmental action. However, he may also point out an 
intention to overcome the issue as well while not giving concrete action plans. In short, as 
long as Erdoğan does not use any crisis emphasizing rhetoric (given as 2nd, 3rd, 4th, and 5th 
option under crisis emphasizing rhetoric title) while he points out an intention to handle 
inconveniences that failures and threats have caused either by a pure appeasing rhetoric or 
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by pointing out governmental action vis-à-vis failures or threats, then this is viewed within 
the scope of crisis denying rhetoric. An example78 is given below: 
 
“…Değerli kardeşlerim, on yıllardır ellerinde tuttukları imtiyazları tek tek 
yitirenler, Türkiye’nin felaketi için şu anda gayret ediyorlar. Allah’ın izniyle bu 
gayret, bu temenni hiçbir zaman gerçeğe dönüşmeyecek. Milletin hayır duası tüm 
bu beddua ve temennilere inşallah galebe çalacaktır. Biz de işimizi sağlam 
tutacağız, sıkı tutacağız, yere sağlam basacağız, ülkesinin felaketinden medet 
umanlara fırsat tanımayacak, zemin hazırlamayacağız. Biz belli bir çevrenin, 
belli bir zümrenin ikbali için değil, 76 milyonun tamamının ikbali, tamamının 
çıkarı, faydası için çalışacak, 76 milyonu bir ve beraber olarak 
kucaklayacağız…”79 
 
Despite its religious references of the excerpt given above, imprecations of the opposition 
are counteracted with prays of nation, framed with a populist emphasis. However, prays of 
the nation are only framed as against wishes of the opposition, not as the mere solutions that 
should be taken against the threat. So, Erdoğan does not attribute any responsibility to the 
people. The action of the active threat is emphasized by “striving for the calamity of Turkey,” 
which points out attempts of the threat to downgrade the economy, can be understood when 
the discourse is holistically examined. Here, Erdoğan shows a determination against the 
threat on the domestic level and accentuates that governmental actions will be taken against 
such attempts, although he does not explicitly pronounce any particular policy that is going 
be implemented against the threat. Antagonism is against the ones who have lost their 
privileges, totality is claimed for the nation. Thus, it is an example of crisis denying populist 
rhetoric. 
In his second option, Erdoğan may exercise crisis denying rhetoric via appeals that point out 
the economic overview has changed or has begun to change recently, and failures or sources 
of failures have been eliminated or at least has been completely neutralized. At this point, he 
may also share some statistical data that indicates the economic downturn has begun to 
 
78. Discourse ID: D11. Link is available in the appendix. 
79 “…My dear brothers, the ones who have lost their privileges that they have been holding for decades in the 
hands strive for the calamity of Turkey now. With God’s permission, these efforts, wishes will not turn into a reality.  The 
benediction of our nation will surmount such curse and wishes. We will also hold our duties tight, we will do so firmly, we 
will get our feet on the ground firmly, we will not give opportunities to the ones who hope the destruction of their country, 
we will not provide a proper ground for them. We will work not for the future of a particular group or class but for the 
future, benefit, and advantage of the totality of 76 million, and we will embrace 76 million as a whole and together…” 
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reverse. Such excerpts are coded as instances of crisis denying rhetoric because such appeals 
give a signal to the people that “no one needs to worry about it since the problem is over, and 
everything is under control,” thereby aims to lower the sense of crisis among the people.   
The following excerpt (TRT Haber 2014) is an example of such an apparent denial Erdoğan 
claims that the threat against Turkish economy is completely neutralized80. The condition of 
the threat is not an issue here, it may still be active but framed as harmless to the economy. 
Excerpt given below also has a populist tone since antagonism exists against Gülenist 
Movement and a hegemonic totality of the whole nation is claimed not only implicitly via 
attacks against economy and national institutions but also with “Turkey” as the main body 
of the people: 
 
“…Şunu özellikle bilmenizi istiyorum değerli kardeşlerim: 17 Aralık darbe 
girişimi tam anlamıyla çökmüştür, tam anlamıyla geri tepmiştir. Ekonomiye, 
milli kurumlara, istikrara yönelik saldırı tamamen püskürtülmüştür. İşte şu anda 
şu kısa sürede bakın 4 milyar dolar yaklaşık tekrar Türkiye’ye döndü. Şimdi bu 
onları rahatsız ediyor tabi, bu onları rahatsız ediyor81” 
 
In his third option, Erdoğan may deny the potential of failures or threats, and claim that they 
cannot even have an impact over the economy or in an economic sense over the people of 
Turkey in the following period. Similarly, as long as they took place during AKP rule, 
Erdoğan may also claim that failures could not have had any effect over the economy or in 
an economic sense over the people of Turkey. In the following excerpt82, Erdoğan claims 
totality of the nation while he positions 76 million vis-à-vis both the ones who try to scare 
and startle foreign capital and TÜSİAD and similar organizations of elites. 
 
“…Birileri yabancı sermayeyi korkutmaya, ürkütmeye çalışırken Türkiye bu 
alanda büyük başarılara imza atmaya devam ediyor. İstikrar sayesinde, güven 
ortamı sayesinde, özellikle de yargıda yaptığımız reformlar sayesinde Türkiye 
uluslararası yatırımlar için cazip bir ülke haline geldi. Yabancı sermaye bundan 
 
80. This excerpt belongs to a discourse which does not fall into my cases. However, I want to give as an example 
in order to be transparent in terms of explaining how I’ve viewed crisis denying rhetoric throughout this research. 
81. “…I want you to know this my dear brothers: Coup attempt of December the 17th has completely collapsed, 
completely backfired. Attacks against economy, national institutions, and stability have completely been repelled. Look, at 
this moment, in a very short time around 4 billion Dollars has returned to Turkey. Now this discomforts them of course, this 
discomforts them…” 
82. Discourse ID: D16. Link is available in the appendix. 
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sonra da Türkiye’ye gelmeye devam edecek, ama öyle görünüyor ki TÜSİAD 
gibi kuruluşlar kendi ülkelerine yabancı kalmaya devam edecekler. Bugüne kadar 
kendi ülkelerine yabancı kaldılar, belli ki bundan sonra da yabancı kalacaklar. 
Eski Türkiye’nin aktörleri artık şunu bir defa kabul etsinler: Türkiye’de artık 
kazanan elitler, seçkinler, belli sermaye çevreleri değil, Türkiye’de bundan sonra 
kazanan her zaman 76 milyon olacak…”83 
 
 
3.2.5.3. Failure ignoring rhetoric 
 
Beside crisis emphasizing and denying rhetoric, Erdoğan may also ignore economic failures 
as a third option. In that scenario, he may pretend as if there are no failures at all, and merely 
prefer to accentuate AKP’s positive contribution to Turkish economy by sharing some 
statistical data about some economic indicators, or by mentioning investments and huge 
projects of his government that has undertaken so far to prepare Turkey for 2023, 2071, etc. 
Likewise, Erdoğan may also use appeals like “we will continue to make Turkey grow without 
a pause as we’ve done so far.”84 In short, for ignoring appeals, I’ve only taken into account 
Erdoğan’s positive remarks about the economy since failure ignoring excerpts refer the ones 
that no failure is mentioned. As long as these have economic references on the national level, 
they are taken into account and coded.  
During his ignoring populist discourse, Erdoğan may attack previous economic failures of 
past governments and accuse them that they treated Turkish people in an unjust manner by 
increasing economic burden over their shoulders. However, in order to assess such references 
as ignoring appeals, Erdoğan’s appeals must contain positive references to the economy with 
regards to his party’s contribution to it. Those can be services, projects, investments, or 
statistical data of Turkish economy, or he may just emphasize AKP’s services to the people. 
Likewise, hypothetical election talk is also assessed within the scope of failure ignoring 
 
83. “…While some try to scare, startle foreign capital, Turkey continues to succeed in this area. With the help of 
stability, environment of trust, especially due to reforms that we have made in judiciary Turkey has become an attractive 
country for international investments. Henceforward, foreign capital will also come to Turkey, but it seems organizations 
like TÜSİAD will remain to be stranger to their own country. So far, they have been stranger to their country, they will 
apparently do so henceforth. Actors of the Old Turkey should accept this: Winners in Turkey will no longer be elites, 
notables, or certain capital circles, from now on the winner in Turkey will be 76 million…” 
84. These appeals are given hypothetically; however, one can realize that they are indeed so common in many 
speeches of Erdoğan. 
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category. The reason is whenever Erdoğan blames opposition parties just before elections 
while emphasizing their possible future actions that do not refer failures but framed as 
potential failures of the future, he talks hypothetically. On the condition that, Erdoğan’s 
mentions on positive contributions of AKP to Turkish economy and the people of Turkey in 
such appeals at the same time, his accusation to the opposition party members for things that 
they haven’t done yet, and his future oriented accusations are assessed in failure ignoring 
rhetoric. Because such appeals inevitably include an antagonism, they are instances of failure 
ignoring populist rhetoric, indeed.  
One important point at this respect is that economic appeals within this category such as 
mentions on projects, investments, services should not be stuck in a local/regional scope. 
Investments and expenditures to a certain city is not taken into consideration since they have 
no repercussion on national level. Despite their locality, huge projects which are attributed 
to services on the national level (for instance, Kanal İstanbul, 3rd Airport, 3rd Bridge, 
Marmaray, etc.) are taken into consideration and assessed within this scope since they have 
a serious potential to bring a non-negligible impact over the national economy. Religious and 
pure cultural investments are not taken into consideration since they are assumed as not 
primarily conducted to build an economy or directly contribute to it. Another point here, mere 
meetings with regards to economic matters are not taken into consideration as long as they 
do not refer to actions or services other than meeting, on the condition that Erdoğan does not 
associate them with Turkey’s growth, prosperity, rising welfare, etc. 
Following excerpt85 is an instance of failure ignoring populist rhetoric in which both 
antagonism and totality claim is given implicitly. Antagonism is built against DSP-MHP-
ANAP while totality of the people is claimed over the amount of foreign exchange reserve 
stocked in Turkish central bank, whose national quality is also emphasized86: 
 
“…Bakınız, önceki gün Kızılcahamam’da da ifade ettim, Merkez Bankası 
rezervimiz yeniden rekor seviyeye ulaştı. 2002 sonunda görev geldiğimizde 
değerli arkadaşlar, iktidarda kim vardı? MHP-DSP-ANAP. Ve milli bankamız 
 
85. Discourse ID: D11. Link is available in the appendix. 
86. Even if Erdoğan had not put an emphasis on the national character of the central bank, I would have viewed it 
as an implicit totality claim anyway. Throughout this research, as I’ve mentioned before, both antagonism and totality 
relationship can be either built explicitly or implicitly. And as I’ve repeated before, totality claim inherently exists for all 
appeals that are in the scope of this work. 
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Merkez Bankamızın döviz rezervi neydi? 27,5 milyar dolardı. Arkadaşlar, şu 
anda geldiğimiz nokta ne? Merkez Bankamızın döviz rezervi 134 milyar dolar 
seviyesine çıktı; 27,5 milyar dolardan 134 milyar dolara...”87 
 
Erdoğan may also attempt to use “failure ignoring non-populist rhetoric” as in the following 
excerpt of the same discourse88. This excerpt lacks antagonism therefore it is non-populist: 
 
“…Ve milli gelire oranla biliyorsunuz Türkiye’nin dış borcu yüzde 73, yüzde 74, 
buralardaydı, şimdi yüzde 36’ya düştü arkadaşlar; bunu bu şekilde izah edeceğiz, 
milli gelire oranla ne, buna bakacağız…”89 
 
However, when Erdoğan does not point out any positive remarks with regards to AKP’s 
contribution to the economy or its services provided for the people, then such appeals are out 
of assessment since they do not point out a failure during AKP governments. So, excerpts 
like the one given below (Gündem 2013), even though they have a populist characteristic, 
they are merely about past failures of previous governments, therefore cannot be taken into 
account during coding process and kept out of assessment90: 
 
“…Değerli kardeşlerim, biz milliyetçiyiz, biz şöyleyiz, biz milletimizi çok 
seviyoruz; Bahçeli, IMF’e borçlanan kim? Siz. Neyi ödediniz IMF’e, IMF’e neyi 
ödediniz? Siz o dönem içerisinde stand-by anlaşmalarıyla olsun, aldığınız 
talimatlarla olsun 3,5 yıl geçirdiniz. Ve yanlış yönetimleriniz neticesinde bu 
ülkenin en önemli bankası Ziraat Bankası sürekli görev zararı yazıyordu sizden 
dolayı. Halk Bankası çöktü gidiyordu, Vakıfbank hakeza öyle. Ve bütün bunlarla 
beraber enflasyon yüzde 30, buralardaydı. Devletin borçlanma faizini yüzde 
63’e, ey Bahçeli, siz çıkarttınız. Yüzde 63 faizle Türkiye Cumhuriyeti 
borçlanırken bunun bedelini kim ödüyordu? Benim milletim ödüyordu, bunu siz 
milletimize ödettiniz.”91   
 
87. “…Look, I’ve also said this the previous day in Kızılcahamam, our foreign exchange reserve in central bank 
again has broken a record. When we took the office in 2002, who was in charge? MHP-DSP-ANAP. And what was the 
amount of foreign exchange reserve in the central bank, in our national bank? 27.5 billion Dollars. Friends, where do we 
stand at present? Foreign exchange reserve has increased to 134 billion Dollars; from 27.5 billion Dollars to 134 billion 
Dollars….” 
88. Discourse ID: D11. Link is available in the appendix. 
89. “…And with regards to its proportion to national income, Turkey’s foreign debt was around 73, 74 percent, 
around here, now it has declined to 36 percent my friends; we will explain this in this way, what is the proportion to national 
income, we will check this …” 
90. This excerpt belongs to a discourse which does not fall into my cases. However, I want to give as an example 
in order to be transparent in terms of explaining how I’ve viewed failure ignoring rhetoric throughout this research. 
91. “…My dear brothers, we are nationalist, we are like this, we love our nation very much; Bahçeli, who became 
indebted to the IMF? You. What did you pay to the IMF, what did you pay to the IMF? You went through 3,5 years via 
stand-by agreements, via orders that you got. And as a result of your false governance, because of you the most important 
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Table 3.10 Three Main Categories 
 
 
 
Before going into next section, I’d like to give three tables simplifying categorical 
distinctions. In the table given below, conditions with asterisks are viewed with priority when 
to determine the category of an excerpt and code it accordingly. 
 
  
 
bank of this nation, Ziraatbank lost money. Halkbank was about to collapse, and so did Vakıfbank. And with all these, 
inflation was around 30 percent, around these values. Borrowing rate of the government was at 63 percent, hey Bahçeli, you 
increased this. While Turkish republic borrowed by 63 percent, who paid the price of this? My nation paid; you made our 
nation to pay this...”   
Recognize 
Ignore 
Failures 
Crisis emphasizing rhetoric Crisis denying rhetoric 
 
Failure ignoring rhetoric 
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Table 3.11 Three Main Categories and Categorical Criteria 
 Type of Rhetoric 
Conditions Crisis Emphasizing Crisis Denying Failure Ignoring 
Condition 
#1 
Emphasizing failures 
by putting the people 
into an alarming 
position while not 
using any type of 
crisis denying 
rhetoric. 
 
Denying the actual or 
potential impact of 
failures by 
accentuating the 
determination of the 
government for the 
solution, or by 
mentioning concrete 
steps and 
governmental action, 
or at least an 
intention to overcome 
the issue. 
Ignoring failures by 
simply not 
mentioning on them 
while accentuating 
AKP’s positive 
contribution to 
Turkish economy and 
the people of Turkey 
in an economic sense 
instead. 
Condition 
#2 
Emphasizing failures 
by framing pure 
political or religious 
appeals as solutions* 
Denying the actual or 
potential impact of 
failures via appeals 
that point out the 
economic overview 
has changed or has 
begun to change 
recently, and failures 
or threats, as sources 
of failures, have been 
eliminated or at least 
has been completely 
neutralized. 
 
Condition 
#3 
Emphasizing failures 
by pointing out an 
uncertain future that 
may cause trouble for 
the people, via 
conditional 
statements or turning 
point emphasis* 
Denying the potential 
impact of failures or 
threats, via claims 
that they cannot even 
have an impact over 
the economy or over 
the people of Turkey 
in an economic sense 
in the following 
period. 
 
Condition 
#4 
Emphasizing failures 
by asking the 
people’s help to 
downgrade economic 
downturn and 
emphasizing people’s 
possible assistance to 
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take certain kinds of 
actions to overcome 
it.* 
Condition 
#5 
Emphasizing failures 
by perpetuating the 
temporal scope of the 
political 
confrontation with a 
global threat via an 
offensive tongue* 
  
 
Populist appeals of each rhetoric requires, implicitly or explicitly, both a claim of hegemonic 
totality and an antagonism. As I’ve mentioned before, because I’ve viewed excerpts 
according to economic equivalential relation between Erdoğan and the people, and since the 
economy interests all people, a totality claim implicitly exists for all appeals. However, not 
all appeals include antagonism. While most crisis emphasizing and denying appeals have a 
populist tone, failure ignoring rhetoric is mostly exercised in a non-populist way. For crisis 
emphasizing and denying rhetoric, since all appeals that are in the scope of this work include 
either implicit or explicit hegemonic totality claims since appeals are about the economy 
which interest all people, whenever such appeals lack antagonism, they are viewed as non-
populist excerpts. That’s why for these two categories, as one can see in the last chapter, 
frequencies of non-populist appeals are too low when compared with populist ones. The view 
is reverse when we look at appeals within the scope of failure ignoring rhetoric. In Erdoğan’s 
positive remarks about the economy, the majority of his failure ignoring appeals lack 
antagonism. 
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Table 3.12 Populist vs non-populist distinction of three main categories 
 
Type of Rhetoric Populist Non-populist 
Crisis Emphasizing Includes antagonism Does not include 
antagonism 
Crisis Denying Includes antagonism Does not include 
antagonism 
Failure Ignoring Includes antagonism Does not include 
antagonism 
 
 
3.2.6. On Failures and Package of Failures 
 
As I’ve mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, I’ve used the term “failure” in a similar 
sense with Moffitt’s (2015) understanding and whenever I say a failure, I mean a 
phenomenon on the structural and national level which may actually or potentially have an 
impact over the society in a negative way. When it comes to individuals, despite their 
personal characteristic, incidents that some individuals are involved may have a potential to 
turn into failures, especially once such individuals are involved in politics or got engaged 
with other individuals who fall into the scope of politics. The potential of such incidents to 
turn into failures are based on their ability to be viewed on the national level by the members 
of the society. In this study, these failures are viewed in the scope of mere political failures 
and they are not taken into consideration during coding process unless they are associated 
with economic elements or their possible impact over the equivalential relationship between 
Erdoğan and the people via issues pertain to the economy. That’s why incidents like 
deportation of Turkish minister in Holland or the trial of Reza Zarrab are viewed as political 
failures since they have brought an impact on the national level politics. Diplomatic relations 
were suspended, and the issue was framed as a national cause by Erdoğan. Whenever such 
incidents are discursively associated by Erdoğan with plots against Turkey that affects the 
economy, they are assessed as framed as package of failures and thereby coded. Moreover, 
by the same token, corruption claims against Erdoğan and some ministers of the government 
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of the related period during December 17th-25th incident also refer to political failures. 
However, since charges were against prominent politicians, corruption claim on the personal 
level turned into a national political failure not only because Erdoğan as the prime minister 
but also, he was among the accused politicians. However, the issue was framed by Erdoğan 
as a cover for economic attacks against Turkey and gained a national characteristic. I’ve 
viewed such excerpts in the pure political zone since corruption charges couldn’t be proved 
and whether there was public loss or not is unknown. Even if there was a public loss, whether 
that impact was negligible or not is not known for sure. Besides, failures should be on 
national on national level not only with regards to political but also in terms of economic 
deterioration. Whenever corruption charges are framed as economic attacks against Turkey 
by Erdoğan, those are taken into consideration within a package of failures. 
Throughout this study, I’ve focused on deterioration periods of three key indicators which 
I’ll explain under research strategy and data title. And my claim was to check whether there 
is a pattern between such economic failures and Erdoğan’s crisis emphasizing rhetoric. 
However, I’ve noticed that Erdoğan rarely mentions failures that merely pertain to these 
economic indicators explicitly during his discourses. My observation is that in most cases, 
Erdoğan strives to combine any existing or possible economic deterioration with various 
political failures and present them as a wider framework of a group of failures. This attitude 
is also emphasized by Moffitt (2015) while he gives examples from Hugo Chávez, during his 
remarks on perpetuation of failures as crisis. In a similar vein, Erdoğan associates 
oppositional actors with attempts to downgrade Turkey’s economic performance. During 
serious economic troubles, he may mention that certain powers target Turkey’s growth and 
development or Turkey faces with an economic war. Because of that, I’ve decided to check 
not only Erdoğan’s mere references to economic indicators, but also appeals that he has 
economic references while mentioning an ultimate source of failures, which is mostly framed 
as an enemy, a threat to Turkish economic sovereignty. Such threat does not have to be 
explicitly mentioned but also might be implicitly framed as the source of failures and actual 
or potential economic deteriorations. These association attempts of Erdoğan should not 
surprise one since populism is inherently political and framing of economic downturns 
inevitably involves political messages. Therefore, leaders who intends to frame economic 
deteriorations in a populist manner may apply instrumentalizing political failures and use 
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them during their rhetorical attacks. For instance, Erdoğan may claim that Gezi 
demonstrations took place not due to environmental concerns but against Turkey’s stability, 
growth, and great investments. In his claims, he may argue that once demonstrations have 
spread, external forces with the help of their domestic extensions, began to manipulate 
Turkish economy. He may also apply using a rhetoric that emphasize plots, conspiracies, evil 
games against Turkey; a coup attempt against Turkey, which also aims to tear down Turkish 
economy as in cases of conflict with Gülenist Movement. Such appeals that associate 
political failures with actual or possible economic failures have huge potential to change the 
level crisis perception of the people.  
Due to the fact that Erdoğan often applies to benefit from package of failures in his populist 
attacks, related political failures cannot be ignored. Beside Gezi Events and conflict with 
Gülenist Movement (December the 17th-25th, and July the 15th coup attempt), there have been 
some other serious political incidents that Turkey has gone through since 2013 and Erdoğan 
uses as instruments during his populist rhetorical attacks. Terrorism and the rise of the armed 
conflict with Kurds after June the 7th elections are some of them. Confrontation with E.U. 
and U.S. also often mentioned by Erdoğan in his speeches. Turkey has experienced serious 
diplomatic crisis with the U.S. due to Reza Zarrab’s arrestment in the U.S. in April 2016, and 
Hakan Atilla’s involvement to the case as the general manager of Halkbank while being 
accused violation of U.S. sanctions against Iran. Moreover, confrontation with the U.S. gets 
intensified during debates over Pastor Andrew Brunson’s imprisonment in Turkey, which 
resulted with a huge exchange rate hike, in Summer 2018.  
Whenever Erdoğan uses references of a package of failures, these appeals are examined 
thoroughly. Erdoğan may claim something like enemies are working against Turkey’s growth 
and development. In such mentions that embody a presentation of a package of failures which 
affect the economy, the key point here is that Erdoğan must make a remark about such 
failures and economic elements such as Turkish national economy or a reference to the 
people’s economic conditions. Such association of package of failures with economy is 
required for the assessment. When there is not any association between such threats and the 
economy, I’ve viewed such appeals in the scope of pure political appeals, thereby haven’t 
taken them into consideration during coding. Appeals that refer to a package of failures are 
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assessed via a holistic examination of each discourse92. The reason is that Erdoğan frequently 
uses some certain keywords during his whole speech for instance; operation, surgery, attack, 
conspiracy, plot, etc.93 once he has presented failures as combined within a package of 
failures as he speaks. If Erdoğan uses such a label or word, then they are viewed as 
equivalences of a package of failures, on the condition that they have been associated with 
failures during the discourse at an earlier time and not explicitly associated with pure political 
elements in an excerpt in the remaining part of the speech. Due to such possible associations, 
all discourses are read and assessed very detailly, and holistically examined by taking into 
consideration whether Erdoğan makes such associations once he has presented failures or the 
source of them (threat) during his speech at an earlier time during his talk and does not 
apparently associate them with pure political elements94. Unless otherwise specified (an 
explicit association with pure political elements) the target of the threat that Erdoğan frames 
as certain words such as; plots, conspiracies, games, assault, attack, etc. is assumed as 
Turkish economy. 
 
“…Değerli kardeşlerim, yolsuzluk kılıfına gizlenmiş Türkiye’ye millete, 
Türkiye’nin geleceğine kasteden bir saldırıyla biliyorsunuz karşı karşıyayız. 
Şunu herkes görüyor: Bu bir yolsuzluk soruşturması değildir. Bu siyasete ve 
millete karşı açık bir komplodur, açık bir tezgahtır. Allah’ın izniyle bu tezgâh, bu 
oyun milletimiz tarafından 30 Mart’ta sandıkta bozulacaktır. Yeni Türkiye 
yürüyüşümüzü hiç kimse durdurmayacak.”95 
 
In the excerpt given above96, “assault” refers to December 17th – 25th incidents and this failure 
is associated with attacks against Turkey political and economic structure at an earlier time, 
during the same speech. As one can realize, he also uses words like “plot, stage, conspiracy” 
 
92. Whenever Erdoğan associates a past failure of his government and frame it as a collaborator of a threat, which 
has an actual or potential impact over the economy, such association is taken into consideration during the assessment. For 
instance, Gezi demonstrations is associated with the initial conflict with Gülenist Movement during December the 17th and 
25th incident and framed as reflections of an active threat for that period. 
93. These words are used as interchangeable throughout this work. Erdoğan may use different labels for the same 
threat. As long as he implies the same phenomenon, they are assessed as equal references. 
94. But one should keep in mind that holistic examination of discourses does not mean a holistic assessment of 
populism. 
95. “…My Dear brothers, as you know we are against an assault that is hides under the cover of corruption and 
attempts against Turkey, the nation, the future of Turkey. Everybody sees this: This is not a corruption investigation. This 
is a clear plot against politics and the nation, it is an apparent conspiracy. With God’s permission, this conspiracy, this stage 
will be spoiled by our nation on March 30th in the ballot box. No one will be able to stop our New Turkey march…” 
96 Discourse ID: D14. Link is available in the appendix. 
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as an equivalence for the same incident. Erdoğan not only agrees with the failure but also, he 
attributes a responsibility to the people to spoil such attempts in the ballot box of upcoming 
local elections. Moreover, the excerpt is an instance of populism since totality is claimed for 
the nation while antagonism is built against the ones who participated the assault. Therefore, 
it is an apparent example of crisis emphasizing populist rhetoric. 
Another important point is that whenever Erdoğan says that our economy is under attack or 
that there is an attempt to Turkish economy, such appeals are viewed as the threat is on the 
global level. The following excerpt points out not only domestic but also global threats. 
However, Erdoğan’s tone is defensive while he emphasizes the continuity of the struggle. He 
mentions the determination of the government vis-à-vis threats. Thereby, the following 
excerpt pointing out a package of failures which includes terrorism, activities of societal and 
political engineering in Turkey. It is an example of crisis denying populist rhetoric since 
Erdoğan builds an antagonism against the groups that pose a threat to Turkey’s economic 
growth, peace, and stability and totality is claimed for the whole nation implicitly97: 
 
“…Bunu şurada çok açık olarak ifade etmek durumundayım: Türkiye’nin 
büyümesini engellemek, Türkiye’nin kalıcı bir huzur ve istikrara kavuşmasını 
önlemek amacıyla, içeride olduğu kadar dışarıda da tuzaklar kurulmuş, dışarıda 
pişirilen o zehirli aşlar içeride servis edilmiştir. Biz 11 yıldır sadece içerideki 
karanlık odaklarla mücadele etmiyoruz, ama bunun dışında içeride olduğu gibi 
buna paralel dışarıda da yoğun bir mücadele halindeyiz. Türkiye’ye kasteden o 
terörü besleyen, kanlı terör örgütlerini koruyan, kollayan, çeşitli araçlarla 
Türkiye içinde tahriklere girişen, ülke içinde toplum ve siyaset mühendisliği 
yapmak isteyen odaklara karşı da hukuk içinde, diplomasi kuralları çerçevesinde 
çok yoğun bir mücadele veriyoruz…”98 
  
 
97.  Discourse ID: D10. Link is available in the appendix. 
98. “…I have to put this right here very clearly: To hamper Turkey’s growth, to prevent Turkey’s convergence 
with a permanent tranquility and stability, as much as traps that are settled inside of Turkey, traps are also settled outside of 
her, those poisonous meals that were cooked outside, were served inside. We’ve not only been struggling with domestic 
dark powers, apart from those, we’ve also been in a busy struggle with external ones. Within the scope of law and rules of 
diplomacy, we have been intensively wrestling with powers that feed the terror which attempts against Turkey, that protect, 
watch after bloody terrorist organizations, that undertake provocations within Turkey with several means, that want to run 
a societal and political engineering within the country…” 
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4. EMPIRICAL PART 
 
 
 
4.1. Cases 
 
 
During empirical analysis of each cases, I’ve intended to seek answers to the following 
inquiries as much as possible: Does Erdoğan more likely to recognize or ignore failures? 
Among the excerpts that Erdoğan recognize failures, does he more likely to emphasize or 
deny crisis? What about populist vs non-populist excerpts with regards to three main 
categories? Does he present failures as if they are a package of failures, or does he merely 
make references to a deteriorating economic indicator? When packages are involved and 
associated for failures, does he attempt to perpetuate temporal scope of past failures that 
emerged during AKP rule? Does Erdoğan mention an economic indicator explicitly during 
his perpetuation/denial? What options does he apply during his crisis emphasizing appeals? 
By focusing on seven cases, I’ve sought answers for these questions while giving additional 
excerpt examples that fall into each case.  
 
 
4.1.1. Case 1: 10.2012 – 01.2013 
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Table 4.1 Changes in economic indicators within case 1 
Date Exchange Rate Unemployment Rate Inflation Rate 
10.2012 1.79 8.30 1.960 
11.2012 1.79 8.60 0.378 
12.2012 1.78 9.30 0.381 
01.2013 1.76 9.70 1.646 
 
During this case period, only unemployment rate and inflation rate deteriorate. Deterioration 
level in in unemployment rate 16.9 %, and average value of inflation rate is 1.091 %. Monthly 
values of each indicator are given above. 
 
Table 4.2 Frequencies & proportions of each rhetoric within case 1 
Type of Rhetoric Within Case 
Frequencies 
Within Case 
Proportion 
Crisis emphasizing populist 0 0 
Crisis emphasizing non-populist 0 0 
Crisis denying populist 3 0.033 
Crisis denying non-populist 2 0.022 
Failure ignoring populist 37 0.407 
Failure ignoring non-populist 49 0.538 
 
My first case refers to a period when Turkey did not have serious political turbulence, 
especially when compared with other cases. Moreover, this is the only case in which Turkish 
Lira keeps its potency, thereby no exchange rate deterioration exists. Moreover, within this 
case, when Erdoğan’s political agenda and his discourses are checked in detail, one can 
realize that Erdoğan’s appeals are mostly towards building a perpetual peace with Kurds via 
a democratic peace process. 
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Table 4.3 Frequencies & proportions of overall appeals within case 1 
Type of Rhetoric Within Case 
Frequencies 
Within Case 
Proportion 
Crisis emphasizing overall 0 0 
Crisis denying overall 5 0.055 
Failure recognizing overall 5 0.055 
Failure Ignoring overall 86 0.945 
Overall populist 40 0.44 
Overall non-populist 51 0.56 
Overall coded excerpts 91 1.000 
 
Within the case, Erdoğan’s appeals mostly have a failure ignoring characteristic. Only 5 
excerpts are detected which point out a failure. All of them are crisis denying appeals while 
3 of them are exercised with a populist tone. In 2 crisis denying non-populist excerpts, 
Erdoğan either mentions on government’s precautions and determination against potential 
troubles of ongoing global crisis, started in 2008 or he denies the actual impact of this 
phenomenon over Turkey. Because this excerpt lacks antagonism, it is assessed as an instance 
of crisis denying non-populist rhetoric. One of them is given below99: 
 
“…Aynı şekilde ihracatta Türkiye İhracatçılar Meclisinin tespitlerine göre bize 
ait olan rekoru yine biz egale ettik. 2012 yılı ihracatımız dünyadaki tüm 
olumsuzluklara, küresel krizin dünya ticareti üzerindeki tüm olumsuz etkilerine 
rağmen 152 milyar dolar olarak gerçekleşti. Hatırlayın, göreve geldiğimizde 
bizim ihracatımız Türkiye olarak 36 milyar dolardı, 36 milyar dolardan 152 
milyar dolara tırmandık...”100 
 
On October the 2nd, Erdoğan talks in AKP group meeting. While he attacks the 
opposition in an antagonistic way, he denies detrimental effects of global crisis over 
Turkey as he gives statistical data of exportation101: 
 
99. Discourse ID: D07. Link is available in the appendix. 
100. “…Likewise, according to findings of Turkish Exporters Assembly, we have equalized our own record. Our 
exportation in 2012 reached 152 billion Dollars, despite all negativities in the world, despite all negative effects of the global 
crisis over the world trade. Remember, when we took the office, our exportation as Turkey was 36 billion Dollars, we 
reached 152 billion Dollars from 36 billion Dollars…”  
101. Discourse ID: D01. Link is available in the appendix. 
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“İşte bak az önce rakam verdim ihracatla ilgili. 36 milyar Dolar ihracat vardı. Şu 
anda 146 milyar Dolar ihracatı konuşuyoruz. Ve dünyadaki tüm ekonomik krize 
rağmen bunu konuşuyoruz. Ya nasıl oluyor da hangi yüzle çıkıp bunu 
söyleyebiliyorsunuz?”102 
 
2 out of 3 crisis denying appeals take place on October the 2nd, 2012 while the remaining 1 
crisis denying populist rhetoric instance is exercised on January the 22nd, while Erdoğan uses 
an antagonistic tone against PKK, blaming it as a threat to the people’s welfare. This excerpt 
is taken into consideration since the people are not specifically framed as the people in the 
region but whether Erdoğan mentions the people in Turkey or in the region is not clear. That 
discourse mostly has regional emphasis and references pointing out certain individuals that 
are lost during the armed conflict with PKK. Except this one, on October the 2nd, in another 
crisis denying appeal, Erdoğan attacks the opposition by claiming that oppositional actors 
despite their weakness in the parliament strive for hindering Turkey’s development by 
applying interpellation while being aware that their attempts will remain inconclusive. To 
Erdoğan, that can be explained by just slowing down the functioning of the parliament, and 
thereby Turkey’s progress in her development path. Remaining crisis denying appeals refer 
to Erdoğan’s claims accentuating the success of the government despite many developed 
economies are still fighting against global crisis.  
 
  
 
102. “…Look I’ve given numbers about exportation. There was 36 billion Dollar exportation. Now we talk about 
146 Billion Dollar exportation. And we talk about this despite all economic crises over the World. How can you just show 
up and say something like that?” 
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Figure 4.1 Categories: Populist vs non-populist of case 1 
 
 
This period does not have any instances of crisis emphasizing rhetoric. Because there is only 
3 failure recognizing populist excerpts, and they are all instances of crisis denying populist 
appeals, overwhelming majority of populist excerpts are failure ignoring ones (3 vs 37). 
Those appeals are mostly failure ignoring excerpts which are exercised against domestic 
oppositional actors, and mostly against the main opposition party.  
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Figure 4.2 Overall appeals: Failure recognizing vs failure ignoring of case 1 
 
 
On October the 30th, Erdoğan attacks main opposition and its supporters due to boos during 
the award ceremony in world women tennis championship organization, that took place in 
İstanbul Sinan Erdem Sports Complex. Erdoğan associates such defamation attempts with 
envy and the fact that previous elites of Turkey have lost their privileges once they had before 
AKP came to power. During his appeals he underlines AKP’s efforts to host these 
organizations and endeavors to bring more sport activities. Erdoğan accentuates investments 
and government expenditure and tough work in this area to achieve such targets of the 
government. On November the 14th, he accuses previous CHP governments and the 
bureaucracy as the core source of poverty and inefficiency in Turkey while informing the 
audience about what AKP tries to do via new municipality law: Enhancing quality and 
quantity of all services for the people who even live in distant small villages. On November 
the 20th, he attacks CHP and MHP due to their jealousy of AKP’s accomplishments while 
giving statistical information about such achievements. An example of a failure ignoring 
populist rhetoric that is taken from Erdoğan’s speech of November the 20th is given below103: 
 
 
103 Discourse ID: D04. Link is available in the appendix. 
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“…Değerli kardeşlerim, Cumhuriyeti muasır medeniyetler seviyesinin üzerine 
çıkarma hedefini gerçekleştirmek bugün AK PARTi’ye nasip olmaktadır. Çünkü 
biz diğerleri gibi bunun lafını değil, gereğini yapıyoruz.”104 
 
On December the 5th, he rhetorically attacks the head of CHP due to his corruption claims 
against AKP. Erdoğan, in his responses shares statistics about how much his party has 
contributed to Turkish economy and how previous governments failed to do so. In such 
appeals, Erdoğan continuously attacks the main opposition party. Such appeals are coded as 
instances of failure ignoring populist rhetoric. Failure ignoring populist appeals are expressed 
more only in December due to such claims of the head of the main opposition party. The rest 
of the case, Erdoğan mostly uses a failure ignoring non-populist rhetoric. One short example 
is given below105: 
 
“…2012 yılında otomobil satışlarına bakıyorsunuz, 2011 yılının bir miktar 
gerisinde olsa da yıllık 556 bin adet olarak gerçekleşti. Bu miktar 2002 yılında 
sadece 91 bin adetti; 91 binden 552 bine…”106  
 
Failure ignoring excerpts are more likely to have a non-populist quality (49 out of 86 for the 
whole case period). For case 1, one may comment that Erdoğan is more likely to ignore 
failures and more likely to exercise non-populist rhetoric since he has not encountered any 
serious political opposition yet, unlike the remaining period within the scope of this research. 
 
 
104 “…My dear brothers, realizing the goal of enhancing the republic to the level of contemporary civilizations is 
achieved my Ak Party today. Because unlike others’ mere talk, we do what needs to be done for that.” 
105. Discourse ID: D07. Link is available in the appendix. 
106. “…When you look at sales of automobiles in 2012, even though it’s slightly behind the year 2011, happened 
as 556 thousand. This amount was only 91 thousand in 2002; from 91 thousand to 552 thousand…” 
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Figure 4.3 Overall appeals: Crisis emphasizing vs crisis denying of case 1 
 
Figure 4.4 Overall appeals: Populist vs non-populist of case 1 
 
 
 
4.1.2. Case 2: 10.2013 – 01.2014 
 
During this case period, all economic indicators have deteriorated. Deterioration level in 
exchange rate is 11.5 %, in unemployment rate 13 %, and average value of inflation rate is 
1.06 %. Monthly values of each indicator are given below. 
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Table 4.4 Changes in economic indicators within case 2 
Date Exchange Rate Unemployment Rate Inflation Rate 
10.2013 1.99 9.10 1.799 
11.2013 2.02 9.30 0.008 
12.2013 2.06 9.60 0.460 
01.2014 2.22 10.30 1.978 
 
With regards to political atmosphere, this case corresponds to a time that oppositional politics 
has recently become active in Turkey, and maybe reached its peak during AKP rule. This 
period refers to the post-Gezi period and it embodies the initial conflict with Gülenist 
Movement that took place in December 2013, which Erdoğan claimed as a coup attempt 
against AKP government and national will in his purely political appeals. Although post-
Gezi period opposition is not powerful as it was during Summer 2013, Erdoğan makes some 
implies without explicitly pronouncing demonstrators until his speech on December the 25th. 
Especially just after the conflict, his speech on December the 25th, 2013, he associates not 
only members of Gülenist Movement but also Gezi demonstrators with international 
conspiracies and plots against Turkish economy. In short, political failures are presented as 
a package of failures during the case while the temporal scope of a political failure, Gezi 
Events, is extended and added into that package. 
 
Table 4.5 Frequencies & proportions of each rhetoric within case 2 
Type of Rhetoric Within Case 
Frequencies 
Within Case 
Proportion 
Crisis emphasizing populist 27 0.252 
Crisis emphasizing non-populist 1 0.009 
Crisis denying populist 26 0.243 
Crisis denying non-populist 1 0.009 
Failure ignoring populist 22 0.206 
Failure ignoring non-populist 30 0.28 
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Table 4.6 Frequencies & proportions of overall appeals within case 2 
Type of Rhetoric Within Case 
Frequencies 
Within Case 
Proportion 
Crisis emphasizing overall 28 0.262 
Crisis denying overall 27 0.252 
Failure recognizing overall 55 0.514 
Failure Ignoring overall 52 0.486 
Overall populist 75 0.701 
Overall non-populist 32 0.299 
Overall coded excerpts 107 1.000 
 
Until his speech on December the 25th, Erdoğan’s failure ignoring tone overwhelms his 
failure acknowledging appeals. From October to November, the tendency to ignore failures 
is on a rise while recognizing failures is decreasing. Once the initial conflict with Gülenist 
Movement has occurred, Erdoğan does not apply any failure ignoring rhetoric in his speech 
that took place on December the 25th. All ignoring appeals of December 2013 are exercised 
on December the 3th. Hence, when comparing failure recognizing and failure ignoring 
appeals, one cannot think independently from the political atmosphere of the case. Within 
case 2, the overall number of failure recognizing excerpts is greater than failure ignoring ones 
(55 vs 52). This picture is totally different during the first two months (12 vs 31). Although 
rare, economic failures are mentioned explicitly within the case. In Erdoğan’s speech that 
took place on December the 25th, during his political attacks against internal and external 
enemies of Turkey, he mentions the value depreciation of Turkish Lira vis-à-vis foreign 
currencies and the rise in interest rate, while he channels the latter with activities of the 
interest rate lobby. 
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Figure 4.5 Overall appeals: Failure recognizing vs failure ignoring of case 2 
 
When it comes to failure ignoring populist and non-populist excerpts, non-populist ones are 
mostly about AKP’s contribution to Turkish economy. Within the case, overall frequency of 
failure ignoring non-populist excerpts are greater than the ignoring ones (30 vs 22). The 
number of ignoring populist excerpts falls sharply after November 2013 since Erdoğan 
mostly applies either crisis emphasizing or crisis denying rhetoric in the following months, 
especially after December the 25th. Throughout this case period, due to the launch of 
Marmaray, Erdoğan mostly emphasizes the importance of such work and its potential 
contribution to the national economy during his ignoring non-populist appeals. Excerpts of 
failure ignoring populist rhetoric are mostly about AKP’s contribution to Turkish economy 
while blaming the opposition. On November the 5th, ignoring populist appeals are exercised 
for the youth, students, and conservative female population with headscarves while 
antagonism is built against oppositional actors due to their past time economic failures. But 
Erdoğan mostly criticizes the opposition by standing against Turkey’s huge projects and 
growth targets, particularly their jealousy against Marmaray project. Besides during his 
allusions on implementations of previous governments while blaming MHP for its pseudo 
nationalist claim, due to its failures during DSP-MHP-ANAP coalition government. Similar 
accusations are made against MHP and CHP via failure ignoring populist rhetoric on 
November the 19th. On December the 3rd, Erdoğan talks about his party’s assistance and 
services to disabled population of Turkey and how it has changed since AKP come to power 
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via populist and non-populist appeals. In January 2014, ignoring populist appeals are used as 
a response to corruption claims while Erdoğan accentuates AKP’s contribution to Turkey 
with regards to education and health investments. 
 
Figure 4.6 Categories: Populist vs non-populist of case 2 
 
When it comes to crisis emphasizing appeals, Erdoğan’s tone gets intensive once December 
17th-25th incidents have emerged. Before that, excerpts that refer to instances of crisis 
emphasizing or denying rhetoric do not have that much confrontational and accusing tone. 
During his speech on October the 8th, his mentions involve some implicit warnings to his 
colleagues without clearly putting threats and insidious plans against Turkey. His wishes and 
cautions for the future to members of the AKP do not point out to any failure and his tone is 
mostly political. On October the 22nd, he briefly makes some allusions against environmental 
activists and members of the main opposition party. However, his tone is firm but not so 
offensive. On 5th of November, Erdoğan blames the opposition in a crisis emphasizing tone 
due to attempts to confuse people and efforts to damage the Turkey’s stability. However, 
until December the 25th, Erdoğan’s failure acknowledging appeals are few. From the 
beginning to the end of this case period, crisis emphasizing rhetoric, which is against the 
opposition in post-Gezi period and members of Gülenist Movement that led the initial 
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conflict between themselves and the government, are presented as a package of failures and 
appeals that are about these two groups are framed as plots against Turkey. These groups, 
despite their disparity between themselves with regards to their political stances, are 
mentioned as members of a big conspiracy. Frequency of crisis emphasizing rhetoric equals 
to 1 for both October and November 2013. In the former, antagonism of crisis emphasizing 
rhetoric is expressed as power circles and groups that do not want Turkey to grow and 
become more powerful in the region that Turkey belongs to whereas in the former domestic 
oppositional actors, although not pronounced explicitly, are framed as the ones who try to 
confuse people due to their envy to the government. 
On December 25th, Erdoğan makes a very intense speech on the meeting of extended 
provincial chairmen of AKP and crisis emphasizing rhetoric reached its peak within this case. 
Erdoğan associates the move of Gülenist Movement on December the 17th with an 
international conspiracy against Turkey that has begun to be run by evil forces and interest 
lobbies since the end of May 2013, when Gezi demonstrations occurred. To Erdoğan, such 
circles target Turkey because Turkey achieved some serious economic accomplishments 
especially in May 2013. Besides, Erdoğan also mentions that Turkey has paid all her debt to 
IMF and has become debtless to this institution since May the 14th, 2013. He emphasizes the 
attack that took place on December the 17th cannot be considered independently from such 
achievements, which also led Gezi Events that started in May 2013. During his speech, 
because Erdoğan associates economic failures and attacks against the economy with a 
package of such political failures, and since he points out the same threat (without explicitly 
identification of it), emphasis on Gezi events are assessed since both December 17th incident 
and Gezi demonstrations are combined as if they are conducted by the same threat during the 
speech107: 
 
“…Bakın 2013 yılında biz çok farklı bir mayıs ayı yaşadık. Küresel finans 
krizinin etkileri tüm dünyada çok ağır şekilde devam ederken mayıs ayında biz 
Türkiye olarak, tarihte örneği görülmeyen başarılara, rekorlara imzamızı attık. 
Nedir bunlar? Bunları çok iyi değerlendirmemiz lazım çünkü şu olay, yine altını 
çizerek söylüyorum, ulusal bir operasyon değildir. Bu olayın değerli 
arkadaşlarım uluslararası boyutu vardır ve uluslararası boyutta bunun en tepe 
 
107. Discourse ID: D14. Link is available in the appendix. 
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noktası vardır ve onun altında da bunun çeşitli yerlerdeki taşeronları vardır. Ve 
olay basit olarak ele alınmasın, bu Ak Parti iktidarının Türkiye’nin büyümesine 
olan öncülüğü sebebiyle yapılan bir operasyondur…”108 
 
This excerpt is an instance of crisis emphasizing populist rhetoric since it puts the people into 
an alarming position while introducing the active threat while not expressing any denial with 
regards to its actual or potential impact over Turkey. Although Erdoğan mentions on May 
2013 accomplishments of AKP, what Erdoğan points out as “this incident” is December the 
17th incident109. He emphasizes that Turkey as on the path to sustainable growth and 
development is tried to be pulled down. In this excerpt, antagonism is built against members 
of Gülenist Movement that triggered December 17th incident – although not explicitly given 
but implied via “this incident” while totality claim is again implicitly exists due to Erdoğan’s 
emphasis on AKP’s leadership in Turkey’s growth.110  
Just after this excerpt, Erdoğan associates December the 17th operations with AKP’s huge 
projects. He points out the same the same threat attempting to undermine Turkish economy 
and investments that have been made in order to boost Turkey development and growth. 
Once Erdoğan has spoken as given in the excerpt mentioned above, in the following part, he 
mentions 9 points that economic troubles that Turkey has been facing since Gezi Events. 8 
out of 9 are coded as crisis emphasizing populist rhetoric since the threat is presented by an 
implicit antagonism while its attempts are against Turkish economy, thereby implicitly 
targets the people of Turkey.  So, most of these appeals are presented as a package of failures 
pointing out the same external threat working with in collaboration with domestic threats. 
 
108. “…Look we experienced a very different month in May 2013. While the impact of global crisis continued all 
over the world very heavily, we as Turkey, broke records of our history unprecedentedly. What are these? We must assess 
these very well since this incident, again I am saying by highlighting, is not a national operation. This incident, my friends, 
have an international dimension and there is top point in that international dimension, and under that there are proxies of 
that top in some certain places. And this incident should not be approached as if it is simple, this is an operation that is being 
run due to the leadership of Ak Party with regards to Turkey’s growth…” 
109. One can realize that’s the case if he/she checks the video material of this discourse. Discourse ID: D14. Link 
is available in the appendix. 
110. Here “Turkey” may seem to be used in a mere institutional extent however, once I’ve read too many discourses 
of Erdoğan, I’ve realized that distinguishing what is institutional and what is not easy, thereby I’ve thought it shouldn’t be 
vulnerable against subjectivity of the coder. Therefore, throughout this work, I’ve assessed Erdoğan’s expressions like 
“Turkey, Turkish economy, our economy, etc.” as they embody an implicit totality claim since such expressions interest all 
the people of Turkey. I’ve viewed the excerpts including such expressions with implicit totality claims as populist on the 
condition that they embody at least an implicit antagonism. So, my point of view here is whenever Erdoğan says “attacks 
against Turkey,” he implicitly claims the totality of Turkish people. All excerpts are taken into consideration according to 
this logic due to concerns of consistency. 
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“…Peki nedir bunlar? Bir, İstanbul’da 46 milyar Dolarlık 3.havalimanı ihalesini 
gerçekleştirdik ve dünyanın en büyük havalimanını yapmak için kolları sıvadık. 
Bakın bu, çeşitli mahfilleri ciddi manada rahatsız etmiştir. Bunu bilmenizi 
istiyorum. Ve bu havalimanına yönelik her türlü olumsuzluğu her an yapabilirler, 
bunu da bilmenizi istiyorum. Çünkü bu dünyada ilk 3 içerisine girecek bir proje 
ve böyle bir şey yapılıyor.”111 
 
Here112, Erdoğan puts the people into an alarming position since he emphasizes that the threat 
is active and has a potential to harm investments of Turkey and thereby, impede Turkey’s 
growth, downgrade it if possible. He presents the construction of the 3. Airport as a success 
story but he does not deny the potential impact the active threat. Therefore, it is another 
instance of crisis emphasizing populist rhetoric. 
Apart from excerpts that point out package of failures, Erdoğan also gives explicit references 
merely about the economy and deteriorations of economic indicators as well: 
 
“…Halka açık şirketlerimizin değerli arkadaşlarım bu 9 gün içinde yaklaşık 20 
milyar Dolar değer kaybetti. Faizlerde artış var. Türk Lirası’nın değerinde bir 
miktar düşüş var. Birilerine kaybettirdiler ama tabi birileri de bu arada bu işten 
çok karlı çıktı…”113 
 
Here114, antagonism is built against the ones who have turned out to be better off due to the 
incident while totality is implicitly claimed for the nation. Crisis emphasis is strong since 
threat is framed as active and still affecting the economy. Again, no remark of denial exists 
at this point while the people are being put into an alarming position. 
 
111. “…So, what are these? One, In Istanbul, we have done the bidding of the 3. airport and we have rolled our 
sleeves up in order to make the world’s biggest airport. Look, this has substantially bothered some circles. I want you to 
know this. And they can do any negativity to this airport in any minute, I also want you to know this. Because this is a 
project that can be among top three in the world, and something like this is being made.” 
112 Discourse ID: D14. Link is available in the appendix. 
113. “…Our publicly held companies in these 9 days, my dear friends, have lost roughly 20 billion Dollars. There 
is an increase in interest rates. There is a depreciation in the value of Turkish Lira. They have made some people to lose but 
some others have turned out to be better off…”  
114 Discourse ID: D14. Link is available in the appendix. 
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During the same whole discourse, Erdoğan continuously warns the people of Turkey that 
Gülenist Movement will not stop in its malicious attempts, especially due to approaching 
local election of March 30th, 2014. In such way, he not only attempts to perpetuate economic 
crisis perception but also deepens a sense of political crisis for the people of Turkey. In the 
following excerpt, he speaks with members of his party as if that Turkey is in the middle of 
a turning point due to an active threat. Such emphasis is given with a conditionality. 
Antagonism is built against the interest rate lobby and the ones who the ones who are against 
Turkey while totality is claimed for the nation115: 
 
“…En küçük bir ihmale artık yer yok, en küçük bir rehavete boş vermişliğe, hele 
hele umutsuzluğa moralsizliğe yer yok. Açık söylüyorum, siz çalışırsanız 
Türkiye kazanacak. Eğer siz ihmal ederseniz, bütün Türkiye kaybedecek, milli 
irade kaybedecek, bütün Türkiye kaybedecek. Bu süreç, unutmayın, yeni 
Türkiye’nin istiklal mücadelesi sürecidir, bu kadar önemli. Bu süreç, Türkiye 
üzerine hesapları olanların hesaplarının bozulacağı süreçtir. Bu süreç faiz 
lobisinin Türkiye’den son darbeyi yiyeceği süreçtir. Yeise kapılmadan 
karamsarlığa asla prim vermeden moralleri yüksek tutarak kararlı bir mücadele 
vereceğiz. Tekrar ediyorum, millet bizimle. Milletin hayır duası bizimle. Bırakın 
onlar manşetleriyle ihanet içinde olsunlar. Bırakın onlar milletin emeğini faiz 
lobilerine pazarlamanın gayreti içinde olsunlar. Bırakın sosyal medyada, iğrenç 
internet sitelerinde kasetlerinin içinde onlar boğulsunlar. Bırakın o kaset 
montajcıları, o itibar suikastçıları Müslümanlara beddua etsinler. Biz bedduaya 
lanet, duaya evet diyeceğiz…”116 
 
In the same speech, Erdoğan also asks for help from the people in a crisis emphasizing 
populist tone. In the excerpt given above, Erdoğan attributes a responsibility to the people of 
Turkey by pointing out the ballot box of March 30th local elections. Antagonism is built 
against the ones who participated the assault – which is used as an equivalence of the failure 
– and totality of the nation is claimed117: 
 
115 Discourse ID: D14. Link is given in the appendix. 
116. “...There is no room for any piece of neglect, any piece of slackness, nonchalance, and most particularly, there 
is no room for hopelessness, no room for downheartedness. I am putting this clearly, if you work, Turkey will win. If you 
neglect, the whole Turkey will lose, the national will will lose, the whole Turkey will lose. This process, do not forget, the 
struggle for the independence of New Turkey, it is that much important. This process is the process that calculations of the 
ones that have calculations on Turkey will be ruined. This process is the process that the interest rate lobby will take the 
death blow from Turkey. Without getting into desolation, not promoting pessimism, and keeping our morale high, we will 
decidedly struggle. I repeat, the nation is with us. Prayers of the nation is with us. Let them strive for marketing the labor of 
the people to interest lobbies. Let them choke on social media, and in their tapes on their disgusting websites. Let those tape 
editors, those assassins of reputation imprecate Muslims. We will say curse to imprecation, yes to prayer.…” 
117 Discourse ID: D14. Link is available in the appendix. 
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“…Değerli kardeşlerim, yolsuzluk kılıfına gizlenmiş Türkiye’ye millete, 
Türkiye’nin geleceğine kasteden bir saldırıyla biliyorsunuz karşı karşıyayız. 
Şunu herkes görüyor: Bu bir yolsuzluk soruşturması değildir. Bu siyasete ve 
millete karşı açık bir komplodur, açık bir tezgahtır. Allah’ın izniyle bu tezgâh, 
bu oyun milletimiz tarafından 30 Mart’ta sandıkta bozulacaktır. Yeni Türkiye 
yürüyüşümüzü hiç kimse durdurmayacak.”118 
 
In January 2014, Erdoğan’s crisis denying rhetoric becomes to be greater than his crisis 
emphasizing one, he points out that December 17th-25th operations were failed, but the threat 
is still active. Therefore, some of his appeals are still in a crisis emphasizing manner. For 
instance, while attacking Gülenist Movement and mentions to decipher this organization 
which settled in all state institutions, Erdoğan warns his comrades and says: “If you show 
pity, then you become pitiful.”  
 
Nonetheless, the frequency of crisis denying appeals are only lower than crisis emphasizing 
ones during December 2013 and once the tension of December 17th-25th incidents has 
declined, Erdoğan’s denial rhetoric again becomes dominant than his crisis perpetuation 
appeals. In the following excerpt119, Erdoğan claims totality of the nation while he positions 
76 million vis-à-vis both the ones who try to scare and startle foreign capital and TÜSİAD 
and similar organizations of elites. This excerpt has a denial tone since Erdoğan here claims 
that despite the ones who try to scare and startle foreign capital, Turkey is successful in terms 
of investment appeal. It may look to have a turning point, however here it is not expressed 
against a threat that is framed as having a potential to bring an impact over Turkish economy 
and the people of Turkey in an economic sense: 
 
“…Birileri yabancı sermayeyi korkutmaya, ürkütmeye çalışırken Türkiye bu 
alanda büyük başarılara imza atmaya devam ediyor. İstikrar sayesinde, güven 
ortamı sayesinde, özellikle de yargıda yaptığımız reformlar sayesinde Türkiye 
uluslararası yatırımlar için cazip bir ülke haline geldi. Yabancı sermaye bundan 
sonra da Türkiye’ye gelmeye devam edecek, ama öyle görünüyor ki TÜSİAD 
gibi kuruluşlar kendi ülkelerine yabancı kalmaya devam edecekler. Bugüne kadar 
 
118. “…My Dear brothers, as you know we are against an assault that is hides under the cover of corruption and 
attempts against Turkey, the nation, the future of Turkey. Everybody sees this: This is not a corruption investigation. This 
is a clear plot against politics and the nation, it is an apparent conspiracy. With God’s permission, this conspiracy, this stage 
will be spoiled by our nation on March 30th in the ballot box. No one will be able to stop our New Turkey march…” 
119. Discourse ID: D16. Link is available in the appendix. 
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kendi ülkelerine yabancı kaldılar, belli ki bundan sonra da yabancı kalacaklar. 
Eski Türkiye’nin aktörleri artık şunu bir defa kabul etsinler: Türkiye’de artık 
kazanan elitler, seçkinler, belli sermaye çevreleri değil, Türkiye’de bundan sonra 
kazanan her zaman 76 milyon olacak…”120 
 
During this case period, with regards to the variety of crisis emphasizing rhetoric, Erdoğan 
applies conditional statements while emphasizing turning point in his crisis emphasizing 
attempts. He also attributes duties to the people when he attempts to canalizes them to the 
ballot box for the upcoming local elections, thereby ask the people’s help implicitly. 
Although he mostly frames failures as a package, he also makes explicit references to the 
depreciation of Turkish Lira and rising interest rate. While presenting failures as a package, 
he makes references to Gezi events, so he attempts to extend the temporal scope of this failure 
which happened before this case period under AKP rule. Erdoğan does not offer pure political 
or religious solutions against failures nor he attempts to extend the temporal scope of an 
offensive confrontation vis-à-vis global threats, although Gülenist movement is frequently 
associated by external enemies during Erdoğan’s appeals. During his speech on December 
the 25th, with regards to crisis emphasizing rhetoric, Erdoğan mostly applies the first option 
of crisis emphasizing rhetoric, what I’ve called as putting the people into an alarming position 
while not using any crisis denying rhetoric. 
 
When it comes to comparison of populist and non-populist rhetoric, Erdoğan’s populism has 
always been greater than his non-populist appeals. And 96 % of non-populist appeals are in 
the scope of failure ignoring rhetoric. Within this case, the total number of such appeals is 
30 whereas the number of crisis emphasizing and denying non-populist appeals is 2, 1 for 
each. So, if to compare failure acknowledging appeals within themselves, 2 out of 55 are 
only non-populist ones. Of course, this is due to my approach to appeals in general during 
this work. As I’ve mentioned above in a footnote, because any message that is related with 
Turkish economy pertain to all people living in Turkey, I’ve viewed such appeals as referring 
 
120 “…While some try to scare, startle foreign capital, Turkey continues to succeed in this area. With the help of 
stability, environment of trust, especially due to reforms that we have made in judiciary Turkey has become an attractive 
country for international investments. Henceforward, foreign capital will also come to Turkey, but it seems organizations 
like TÜSİAD will remain to be stranger to their own country. So far, they have been stranger to their country, they will 
apparently do so henceforth. Actors of the Old Turkey should accept this: Winners in Turkey will no longer be elites, 
notables, or certain capital circles, from now on the winner in Turkey will be 76 million…” 
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an implicit hegemonic totality claim. Besides, with regards to not only explicit and but also 
implicit mentions that embody antagonism and claims of hegemonic totality, the 
overwhelming superiority of populist appeals makes sense. However, one key point here 
should be because Turkish economy interests everyone, appeals pertain to it inevitably 
involve a totality claim. As long as such appeals also include antagonism, they inevitably 
refer to populist appeals due to my definition, given at the end of chapter II. Because 
Erdoğan’s appeals of Turkish economy are mostly accompanied by antagonistic references, 
they mostly refer to populist appeals according to that definition. 
 
Figure 4.7 Overall appeals: Populist vs non-populist of case 2 
 
 
During, 4 months, except December 2013, the frequency of crisis denying excerpts are 
greater than crisis emphasizing ones. However, crisis emphasizing rhetoric is so great in 
December, thereby total number of crisis emphasizing excerpts become greater than crisis 
denying ones (28 vs 27). The view is not different if we compare crisis emphasizing populist 
rhetoric vs crisis denying populist rhetoric (27 vs 26). Within this case Erdoğan’s inclination 
to perpetuate of failures as crisis is mostly due to the conflict with Gülenist Movement on 
that took place December the 17th, 2013.  
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Figure 4.8 Overall appeals: Crisis emphasizing vs crisis denying of case 2 
 
 
 
4.1.3. Case 3: 01.2015 – 04.2015 
 
During this case period, deteriorated indicators are exchange rate and inflation rate while 
there is a fall in unemployment rate. Deterioration level in exchange rate is 13.7 % and the 
average value of inflation rate is 1.157. Monthly values of each indicator are given below: 
 
 
Table 4.7 Changes in economic indicators within case 3 
Date Exchange Rate Unemployment Rate Inflation Rate 
01.2015 2.33 11.30 1.102 
02.2015 2.46 11.20 0.714 
03.2015 2.58 10.60 1.185 
04.2015 2.65 9.60 1.629 
 
The political atmosphere of this case is stable, and the most crucial event is approaching 
general elections that took place in June the 7th, 2015. Despite the absence of a concrete 
political failure of this term, in his speeches, Erdoğan is likely to associate economic failures 
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with a package of political ones, especially by extending their temporal dimension. Mostly 
expressed particular incidents are Gezi Events and the initial conflict with Gülenist 
Movement on December the 17th-25th while the former is mostly associated with activities of 
an interest rate lobby working against economic interests of Turkey. Erdoğan also frames 
terrorism (PKK as the separatist organization) as an attempt to block Turkey’s growth and 
development. Within this case, Erdoğan also explicitly mentions economic indicators such 
as, interest rate, inflation, and the fall in employment. But he mostly emphasizes the interest 
rate. He associates the rise in interest rate not only with interest rate lobbies but also 
indifference and impotency of Turkish Central Bank. 
 
Table 4.8 Frequencies & proportions of each rhetoric within case 3 
Type of Rhetoric Within Case 
Frequencies 
Within Case 
Proportion 
Crisis emphasizing populist 9 0.1 
Crisis emphasizing non-populist 0 0 
Crisis denying populist 18 0.2 
Crisis denying non-populist 2 0.022 
Failure ignoring populist 21 0.233 
Failure ignoring non-populist 40 0.444 
 
 
Table 4.9 Frequencies & proportions of overall appeals within case 3 
Type of Rhetoric Within Case 
Frequencies 
Within Case 
Proportion 
Crisis emphasizing overall 9 0.1 
Crisis denying overall 20 0.222 
Failure recognizing overall 29 0.322 
Failure Ignoring overall 61 0.678 
Overall populist 48 0.533 
Overall non-populist 42 0.467 
Overall coded excerpts 90 1.000 
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Figure 4.9 Overall appeals: Failure recognizing vs failure ignoring of case 3 
 
When we check the overall appeals of failure ignoring and failure recognizing in order to 
make a comparison, the former overwhelms the latter (61 vs 29) while 40 out of 61 failure 
ignoring excerpts are coded as non-populist appeals. Failure ignoring non populist appeals 
are more frequent in January and April, while the frequency of failure ignoring populist 
appeals reached its peak in April, especially during the speech that Erdoğan speaks on 
MÜSİAD General Assembly meeting on April the 25th, 2015121. In such appeals, Erdoğan 
rhetorically attacks the main opposition due to their election promises while mentioning 
AKP’s contribution to the people of Turkey with regards to improvements that have been 
made to enhance their economic conditions. Although failure recognizing references are 
more frequent during January and April, even in these two months they are less than failure 
ignoring ones, and failure ignoring appeals dominate failure ignoring ones during the whole 
case.  
Among failure recognizing appeals, crisis denying rhetoric is more frequently exercised than 
crisis emphasizing one during the whole period, in every month. Failure recognizing appeals 
continuously falls from January to March while Erdoğan mostly applies pure political appeals 
 
121. Discourse ID: D24. Link is available in the appendix. 
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during February and March 2015. In his crisis denying appeals, he not only exercises populist 
appeals but also uses non-populist references, as given below122: 
 
“…Ben şunu biliyorum; kim ne derse desin bir defa yüksek faiz bu ülkede 
yatırımın önündeki en büyük engeldir. Eğer yüksek faiz devam edecek olursa bu 
ülkede yatırımlar bizim istediğimiz seviyede asla yürümeyecektir. Ve bu ülke 
girişimci doğuramayacaktır. Girişimcinin doğabilmesi için bir defa yüksek faiz 
değil, en azından şöyle uluslararası camiadaki faizlere yakın bir faiz politikasını 
bizim de uygulamamız lazım.”123 
 
Although Erdoğan recognizes high interest rate as an economic failure, he does not use any 
antagonistic language in the excerpt given above. Because the message manifests his 
intentions for a lower interest rate, it underlines why it is a requirement for Turkey. I’ve 
viewed it as an instance of crisis denying non-populist rhetoric. In case 3, among 20 excerpts 
of crisis denying rhetoric, he uses 2 non-populist ones. 
 
122. Discourse ID: D17. Link is available in the appendix. 
123. “…I know this; whoever says whatever, high interest rate is the biggest obstacle to investment in this country. 
If high interest rate continues to exist, then investments in this country will never be on the levels that we want. And there 
will be no entrepreneur in this country. In order to pave the way for the entrepreneur, firstly not a high interest rate, but we 
need to implement an interest rate policy which is at least close to the ones of the international community.” 
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Figure 4.10 Categories: Populist vs non-populist of case 3 
 
 
In his crisis denying rhetoric exercised during his meetings with muhtars124 Erdoğan 
associates a package of political failures in which he exercises antagonism against Gülenist 
Movement and actors of Gezi Events. He blames actors who were involved in Gezi Events 
and December the 17th-25th incidents, as the ones who attempted to stage sabotages against 
Turkey due to Turkey’s becoming grand, developed, and powerful: 
 
“…Bakın değerli kardeşlerim; terör meselesi Türkiye’nin kalkınmasının, büyük, 
güçlü bir ülke olmasının, huzurlu, emniyetli, refah içinde bir ülke olmasının 
önünde en büyük engeldir. Şimdi biz bu büyük maniyi ortadan kaldırmaya 
çalıştıkça birileri de bizi engellemek için çalışıyor. 2013 yılında hatırlayın, Gezi 
olayları adı altında sahnelenen oyun Büyük Türkiye’yi sabote etme girişiminden 
başka hiçbir şey değildi. Arkasından altından kimlerin çıktığını gördünüz. Aynı 
şekilde 2013 sonunda 17 ve 25 Aralık tarihlerinde yolsuzluk maskesi altında 
sahneye konulan darbe girişimi, işte bu çözüm sürecini, bu kardeşlik sürecini, 
büyük Türkiye hedefini sabote etme girişiminden başka bir şey değildi. Biz bu 
 
124. Discourse ID: D18. Link is available in the appendix. 
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girişimler karşısında o zaman Hükümet olarak sağlam durduk, dik durduk. Aynı 
şekilde milletimiz oynanan oyunu gördü ve sapasağlam dimdik bir duruş 
sergiledi. Ve yerel seçimlerde görüldüğü gibi yine büyük bir arayla o zaman 
Genel Başkanı olduğum Partimiz geldi, seçimlerden başarılı bir şekilde çıktı. 
Çünkü milletin ferasetinin önünde durulmaz. Millet ferasetiyle bakar ve kararını 
ona göre verir. Orada da öyle verdi.”125 
 
The excerpt given above is an apparent instance that Erdoğan frames failures as a package. 
He denies the actual impact of such incidents and remarks that the people made their decision 
in local elections already. Hegemonic totality claim is explicit while actors who were behind 
such incidents were pointed out in an antagonistic way. So, it is a clear example of crisis 
denying populist rhetoric. 
Figure 4.11 Overall appeals: Crisis emphasizing vs crisis denying of case 3 
 
 
125 “…Look my dear brothers; the issue of the terror is the greatest obstacle to Turkey’s development, and to her 
becoming grand, powerful, peaceful, secure, prosperous. Now as we try to eliminate this great obstacle, some also try to 
prevent us. Remember, in 2013, the stage that was played under the name of Gezi Events was nothing more than an effort 
to sabotage Grand Turkey. You saw who showed up just behind that. Likewise, at the end of 2013, the coup attempt on 
December the 17th and 25th, under the guise of corruption claims, was nothing more than an effort to sabotage this process 
of the resolution, process of fraternity, the goal of grand Turkey. As the government, we stood upright and firmly against 
these attempts. Similarly, our nation saw this stage and manifested an iron and upright stance against it. And in local 
elections, by far and away, our party that I was the chairman of at that time came the first, became victorious in elections. 
Because no one can stand against the people. The people look with insight and make a decision according to that. At that 
time, they also did so.” 
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When it comes to crisis emphasizing appeals, On January the 19th, he speaks in The Young 
Businessmen Confederation of Turkey126. Among the parts of that speech, the following 
excerpt is an apparent example of crisis emphasizing rhetoric since it simply puts the people 
into an alarming position while not denying the actual or potential impact of the threat which 
is framed as involved economic attacks against Turkey. Here, Erdoğan associates economic 
attacks with December the 17th-25th incident. He claims the totality for the whole nation while 
attempts to build antagonism against Gülenist Movement: 
 
“…Ülkemize yönelik saldırılara baktığımızda, bir yandan demokrasimizin 
onunla birlikte ekonomimizin hedef alındığını görüyoruz. Bu açık gerçeğe 
rağmen, içerideki bazı kesimlerin kendi siyasi veya ekonomik çıkarları uğruna 
ülkemiz ve milletimiz aleyhindeki kampanyalara destek verdiklerini üzüntüyle 
müşahede ediyoruz. Bilhassa değerli başkanın da az önce ifade ettiği 17-25 
Aralık demokrasiye ve sivil siyasete darbe girişiminden beri paralel yapının ülke 
içinde ve dışında bu konuda başı çektiğini biliyoruz…”127 
 
In the following excerpt of April, the 24th128, he simply puts the people into an alarming 
position while again combining Gezi Events and interest rate lobbies, while emphasizing 
interest rate lobbies exist in some certain Turkish institutions, and that is no good for the 
people of Turkey. Because there is no denial about the actual or potential impact of failures 
nor an intention or determination of the government to overcome them, it is an instance of 
crisis emphasizing populist rhetoric. Totality claim exists for the country explicitly while 
interest lobbies and their domestic collaborators are the target of Erdoğan’s antagonism: 
 
“…O Gezi olaylarında faiz lobilerine nasıl çalışıldığını hep anlattık. Faiz lobileri 
şu anda o malum kurumların içerisinde var mı? Var. Ve oradan çok ciddi bir gücü 
devşiriyorlar mı? Devşiriyorlar. Maalesef buna hizmet edenler kim olursa olsun 
ben onlara iyi nazarla bakmıyorum, onu da söyleyeyim, kim olursa olsun. Çünkü 
ben şuna inanıyorum: Faiz hiçbir zaman benim ülkemin yararına olmamıştır, 
olmayacaktır…”129 
 
126. Discourse ID: D17. Link is available in the appendix. 
127. “…When we look at attacks against our country, we see on one hand our democracy and on the other hand, 
our economy is being targeted. Despite this apparent fact, sadly, we observe that some domestic groups support campaigns 
against our country and nation for their own political and economic benefits. Especially, since the coup attempt against 
democracy and civil politics of December the 17th – 25th as dear president has just stated, we know that the parallel structure 
(Gülenist Movement) leads the way in this regard, inside and outside of the country…” 
128. Discourse ID: D24. Link is available in the appendix. 
129  “…In those Gezi Events, we talked about how interest lobbies were being served. Are there interest 
lobbies in those certain institutions right now? Yes, there are. And do they pick up a serious power from there? 
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As I’ve mentioned at the beginning, during case 3, Erdoğan mostly applies a package of 
political failures and associates them with Turkey’s economic landscape in his crisis 
emphasizing appeals. While doing that, he extends the temporal scope of a past failure of 
AKP and present it as if it happened due to Turkey’s enemies. Among options of crisis 
emphasizing, he uses the strategy of putting the people into an alarming position, asking the 
people’s contribution for the solution. He neither applies expressing pure political or 
religious references as solutions, nor he attempts to extend the political confrontation with a 
global threat via an offensive tongue. He also does not use conditional statements or a turning 
point emphasis for an uncertain future that might cause trouble for the people of Turkey. 
 
Figure 4.12 Overall appeals: Populist vs non-populist of case 3 
 
When it comes to populist vs non-populist appeals, populist ones are more frequently used. 
During the case, except March 2015, Erdoğan’s populist rhetoric dominates the non-populist 
one. The high increase in the frequency of populist excerpts may be explained due to electoral 
concerns during April, when there is less than 2 months for June the 7th 2015 elections. 
 
 
Yes, they do. Unfortunately, whoever serves this, I do not see them good, I should say that too, regardless of who they are. 
Because I believe in this: Interest rate has never been advantageous for my country, and never will be…” 
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4.1.4. Case 4: 09.2016 – 01.2017 
 
During this case period, as one can notice by checking values, all economic indicators 
deteriorated. Deterioration level in exchange rate is 26 %, deterioration in unemployment 
rate is 15 % and average value of inflation rate is 1.25 %. Monthly values of each indicator 
are given below: 
 
Table 4.10 Changes in economic indicators within case 4 
Date Exchange Rate Unemployment Rate Inflation Rate 
09.2016 2.96 11.30 0.181 
10.2016 3.07 11.80 1.438 
11.2016 3.27 12.10 0.516 
12.2016 3.49 12.70 1.643 
01.2017 3.73 13.00 2.461 
 
With regards to political atmosphere within this period, Turkey has declared the state of 
emergency period just after the failed coup attempt of Gülenist Movement on July the 15th, 
2016. This period was marked with a shrinking political opposition since the pressure over 
all oppositional actors remained heavy, especially initial months following the coup attempt. 
In his pure political appeals of September and October, Erdoğan responds to the criticisms 
against the government which is made due to state of emergency declaration. Beside state of 
emergency and its impact over the Turkish society, during this case, relations with the U.S. 
remains problematic due to the involvement of Reza Zarrab and general manager of 
Halkbank to a sanction violation case, seen in the U.S. The issue was framed as a national 
cause and an attack to Turkey’s sovereignty in pro-government media channels once Zarrab 
was arrested in Miami. 
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Table 4.11 Frequencies & proportions of each rhetoric within case 4 
Type of Rhetoric Within Case 
Frequencies 
Within Case 
Proportion 
Crisis emphasizing populist 23 0.397 
Crisis emphasizing non-populist 10 0.172 
Crisis denying populist 19 0.328 
Crisis denying non-populist 0 0 
Failure ignoring populist 0 0 
Failure ignoring non-populist 6 0.103 
 
Table 4.12 Frequencies & proportions of overall appeals within case 4 
Type of Rhetoric Within Case 
Frequencies 
Within Case 
Proportion 
Crisis emphasizing overall 33 0.569 
Crisis denying overall 19 0.328 
Failure recognizing overall 52 0.897 
Failure Ignoring overall 6 0.103 
Overall populist 42 0.724 
Overall non-populist 16 0.276 
Overall coded excerpts 58 1.000 
 
In the first two months, Erdoğan mostly focuses on the failed coup attempt of July the 15th. 
He frequently points out terrorism and its detrimental effects over the society in his rhetorical 
attacks against Gülenist Movement (FETÖ), PKK, YPG, PYD, ISIS, etc. He also does not 
hesitate to confront with the E.U over state of emergency issue and 5 permanent members of 
U.N. Security Council over ongoing Syrian conflict. Due to this turbulent political 
atmosphere, Erdoğan mostly exercises pure political appeals except the speech on September 
the 29th during the first two months. He only applies failure ignoring references during his 
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speeches that took place in November. However, Erdoğan’s failure recognizing appeals 
overwhelms his failure ignoring rhetoric during the whole case period. Only in November 
the frequencies of these two are equal (6 vs 6).  
 
Figure 4.13 Overall appeals: Failure recognizing vs failure ignoring of case 4 
 
 
Moreover, Erdoğan’s failure ignoring rhetoric is completely non-populist. Whenever he 
applies using an antagonism in his appeals, they all refer have a failure recognizing tone, 
despite the fact that some of them refer to instances of crisis emphasizing appeals while he 
does not apply to use any crisis denying non-populist rhetoric during whole case. 
0
5
10
15
20
25
09-2016 10-2016 11-2016 12-2016 01-2017
fr
eq
u
en
cy
date
overall appeals: failure recognizing vs failure ignoring
failure recognizing failure Ignoring
162 
 
Figure 4.14 Categories: Populist vs non-populist of case 4 
 
 
During October Erdoğan does not use any economic references. His rhetoric is completely 
political. For the first three months of case 4, his crisis denying tone either equals to or greater 
than his crisis emphasizing rhetoric. However, for the last two months of this case, his crisis 
emphasizing populism becomes greater than the number of crisis denying populist 
references, and this remains the same in January 2017. He also applies non-populist crisis 
emphasizing appeals. In overall crisis emphasizing and denying appeals, the former 
overwhelms the latter in December 2016 (16 vs 6) and January 2017 (10 vs 4). In short, 
during the case, Erdoğan more frequently applies to failure recognizing rhetoric than failure 
ignoring one. His inclination to perpetuate failures as crisis only becomes greater than 
denying framing them as crisis in the last two months.  
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Figure 4.15 Overall appeals: Crisis emphasizing vs crisis denying of case 4 
 
 
On September the 29th, Erdoğan attacks credit rating agencies via an aggressive crisis 
emphasizing tone. In the following excerpt, although his denials are more frequent, he 
offensively perpetuates the political confrontation with these agencies, which are framed as 
collaborators of global threats during the whole speech. Without a doubt, here “Lower how 
much you want to lower” makes the whole excerpt an example of crisis emphasizing populist 
rhetoric130. The reason is credit rating agencies have the power to promote capital inflows to 
Turkey. Moreover, Erdoğan also implies that these credit ranking agencies are not 
independent, but they are working for some other actors or circles. As I’ve explained under 
“crisis emphasizing rhetoric” title, extending the temporal scope of political confrontation 
with a global power via an offensive tone requires coding that excerpt as an example crisis 
emphasizing rhetoric. Whenever Erdoğan uses such a discourse, such appeals are viewed 
with priority. No matter how much Erdoğan denies economic landscape and claims “that’s 
not a reality of Turkey,” once an offensive confrontation with a powerful global actor has 
been involved, the people of Turkey is expected to be more concerned about their future. 
And when their concerns get intensified, sense of crisis among them is expected to rise.  
 
 
130. Discourse ID: D26. Link is available in the appendix. 
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“…Şimdi bizim notumuzu düşürdüler de ne oldu? Hazine biliyorsunuz hemen 
bir piyasa yaptı ve Hazine’nin kağıtlarına dışarıdan-içeriden bunların 
beklediğinin çok daha üstünde bir ilgi, bir alaka oldu. Niye? Türkiye’nin gerçeği 
bu değil ki. Batmış, bitmiş bir ülkeye, bir anda bakıyorsun 4 kat büyümede bir 
derece vermeye kalkıyorlar. Avrupa’dan 400 milyar avro destek gören bir ülkeye 
bu desteği veriyorlar, Türkiye gibi kendi ayakları üzerinde duran bir ülkeye de 
bakıyorsunuz ‘durağan’ diyor. Bu sefer durağan da demediler, ne yaptılar? Puanı, 
notu düşürdüler. İstediğiniz kadar düşürün, Türkiye’nin gerçeği bu değil. Türkiye 
yatırımlarına devam ediyor, kalkınmaya devam ediyor, yükselmeye, güçlenmeye 
devam ediyor evvel Allah. Siz Türkiye’nin gerçeklerinden uzaksınız. Bunların 
cebine 3-5 kuruş ekstra para koy, istediğin notu al; bunlar böyle, böyle 
çalışıyorlar. Talimatları zaten nereden aldıklarını da biliyoruz. Biz gerçekleri her 
zaman konuşacağız…”131 
 
During the whole case, instances of crisis emphasizing populist rhetoric mostly point out an 
economic war that is being conducted against Turkey. Erdoğan claims that external threats 
with their domestic collaborators could not achieve to stop Turkey via coup attempts or 
terrorism, then they began to use economy as a gun against Turkey. The following excerpt is 
from the same speech132: 
 
“…Değerli kardeşlerim; Biraz önce de ifade ettim, ülkemize yönelik saldırılar 
çok farklı mecralar üzerinden yürütülüyor. Bunlardan biri de ekonomidir. 
Türkiye’nin önünü terörle, terör örgütleriyle, darbe girişimleriyle, uluslararası 
sergilenen alanda ayak oyunlarıyla kesemeyeceklerini görenler ekonomi kartını 
şimdi masaya sürdüler…”133 
 
This is an instance crisis emphasizing populist since the threat makes its new move over 
economy, and no denial of actual or potential impact of the threat is given. Totality claim 
 
131. “…Now they have lowered our note (credit rating note), and what has happened? As you know, the treasury 
has made a market and a serious interest which is above what has been expected was shown towards treasury securities. 
Why? Turkey’s reality is not that. You look and realize that they raise one note of a sunk country after a 4 times growth. 
They give support to a country which is supported 400 billion euro by the Europe. They say ‘stationary’ to Turkey which is 
a viable country. This time they even didn’t say stationary, what did they do? They lowered our credit rating. Lower how 
much you want to lower; this is not a reality of Turkey. Turkey continues her investments, she continues to rise and get 
strong, with the help of Allah. You are far away from Turkey’s realities. You put 3-5 Kurus to the pockets of these, then 
take whatever note you want, they are like this, they work like this. We also know where they take the orders. We will 
always talk about realities…” 
132. Discourse ID: D26. Link is available in the appendix. 
133. “…My dear brothers; I’ve just mentioned, attacks against our country are conducted over very different 
channels. One of them is economy. The ones who have seen that they cannot make Turkey to stop via terrorism, terrorist 
organizations, coup attempts, international intrigues now they pull out their economy card…” 
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exists with “Turkey”, antagonism is built against the ones who pull out their economy card. 
Erdoğan simply puts the people into an alarming position via such words.  
He gives a very similar message on December the 7th, 2016134. However, this time while he 
accepts the failure, he points out the determination of the government by taking governmental 
action to overcome inconveniences of the economic attack without simply putting the people 
into an alarming position. Therefore, Erdoğan denies framing the failure as crisis in a populist 
way. Besides, he makes an explicit reference to the deteriorating exchange rate, as given 
below: 
 
“…Son hamle ekonomimizle yapıldı. İhracat ve turizm üzerinden yapılan 
saldırıya ilave olarak döviz spekülasyonuyla ekonomimiz çökertilmeye 
çalışılıyor. Ekonomimizin bazı sorunları, sıkıntıları yok mu? Elbette var. 
Hükümetimiz bunların çözümü için gayret sarf ediyor. Yeni tedbirlerle gereken 
önlemleri alıyor, almayı da sürdürecek…”135  
 
Of course, Erdoğan’s crisis emphasizing rhetoric is not limited to his populist tongue. He 
also applies crisis emphasizing non-populist rhetoric during the case especially when he asks 
from the people to revive the economy. During December, his crisis emphasizing non-
populist appeals are almost equal to his crisis denying populist rhetoric (5 vs 6) whereas they 
are equal during his speeches made in January 2017 (4 excerpts for each). On December the 
7th136, the speech that Erdoğan most frequently applies to crisis emphasizing rhetoric, he also 
asks the people to contribute the economy to mitigate the inconveniences of economic 
downturn via a non-populist tone: 
 
“…Değerli kardeşlerim, ben buradan tüm iş adamlarımıza, yatırımcılarımıza, 
esnafımıza, sanatkarımıza da seslenmek istiyorum: Yaşadığımız zorlukları, 
tereddütleri, sıkıntıları biliyorum. Ama gelin ülkenize güvenin, ülkenize sahip 
çıkın. Böyle bir dönemde üretime yüklenmeyeceksiniz, istihdamı 
artırmayacaksınız, ticaretin çarklarının dönmesini sağlamayacaksınız da bunu ne 
zaman yapacaksınız? Türkiye, üretimdeki düşüşü, istihdamdaki düşüşü, 
ticaretteki daralmayı hak eden bir ülke değildir. Potansiyelimiz de hedeflerimiz 
 
134. Discourse ID: D31. Link is available in the appendix. 
135. “…The last move was made against our economy. In addition to the attack on exportation and tourism, our 
country is tried to be subverted via exchange rate speculations. Aren’t there are some problems, some issues in our economy? 
Of course, there are. Our government tries hard for the solution of these. It takes required precautions via new measures, 
and it will also continue to take...” 
136. Discourse ID: D31. Link is available in the appendix. 
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de tam tersine daha çok büyümeyi, daha çok istihdamı, daha çok ticareti işaret 
ediyor…137” 
 
Because antagonism is missing, the excerpt given above138, is an instance of crisis 
emphasizing non-populist rhetoric. Similarly, during the same speech, he also applies pure 
political solutions vis-à-vis failures, as given in the excerpt below: 
 
“…Unutmayın kardeşlerim; gücümüzün asıl kaynağı paramızın çokluğu değil 
birliğimizin, beraberliğimizin, kardeşliğimizin kuvvetidir. Öyleyse tek millet 
diyeceğiz, tek bayrak diyeceğiz, tek vatan diyeceğiz, tek devlet diyeceğiz; bizim 
hedefimiz bu. Ve bir olacağız, iri olacağız, diri olacağız, kardeş olacağız, hep 
birlikte Türkiye olacağız; bizim hedefimiz bu olmalı. Onun için daha çok 
çalışacağız, daha çok ter dökeceğiz…”139 
 
The excerpt given above is also an instance of crisis emphasizing non-populist rhetoric since 
it lacks antagonism again, while totality claim exists for the nation. Erdoğan points out pure 
political references as solutions, rather than manifesting a determination for concrete steps to 
be taken in order to overcome inconveniences of failures have caused. 
 
Erdoğan’s crisis emphasizing tone is high during this speech. He applies perpetuation of the 
temporal scope of past failures that emerged during AKP governments. For instance, Erdoğan 
again mentions Gezi events as the breaking point of economic attacks via interest rate lobbies. 
In the same excerpt, he makes an explicit reference to interest rate. He attempts to associate 
economic attacks with heroic defense of the nation that was manifested on July the 15th, 2016, 
during the failed coup attempt. Erdoğan also uses conditional statements during his crisis 
emphasizing appeals. Like in the first excerpt I’ve given above, he attempts to perpetuate the 
political confrontation with a global threat via an offensive tongue. He mostly applies 
packages including multiple sources of threats like terrorist organizations such Gülenist 
 
137. “…My dear brothers, I want to appeal all our businessmen, investors, craftsmen, artisans from here: I know 
the difficulties, hesitations, distress that we experience. But come and trust your country, claim your country. If you did not 
produce, increase employment, and make the wheels of trade to turn in a period like this and then when would you do that? 
Turkey is not a country that deserves the fall in employment, recession in trade. On the contrary, both our potential and our 
targets points out greater growth, greater employment, greater trade…” 
138. Discourse ID: D31. Link is available in the appendix. 
139. “…Do not forget my brothers; the source of our strength is not the abundance of our money, it is the strength 
of our unity, solidarity, and fraternity. If so, we will say one nation, one flag, one homeland, one state; this is our target. 
And we will be one, will be great, we will be strong, and all together we will be Turkey; that must be our target. Therefore, 
we will work harder, we will sweat more…” 
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Movement (FETÖ), PKK, ISIS, YPG; credit rating agencies that lower Turkey’s credit not 
to depreciate overall investment; implicitly U.S. over Syrian politics, etc. Erdoğan’s most 
explicit remarks of economic indicators is about the exchange rate. He frames economic 
attacks as exchange rate speculations. He also asks the people to continue to convert their 
U.S. Dollars into Turkish Liras. 
Although Erdoğan does not apply ignoring populist rhetoric, the high frequency of populist 
crisis emphasizing and crisis denying rhetoric drives up the number of overall populist 
appeals and makes it higher than the overall non-populist ones. Because October is an outlier 
for the case since there are no economic references in Erdoğan’s speeches, except November 
when the total number of populist and non-populist appeals are equal (6 excerpts for each), 
populist appeals overwhelm non-populist ones from September 2016 to January 2017. 
 
Figure 4.16 Overall appeals: Populist vs non-populist of case 4 
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During this case period, deteriorated indicators are exchange rate and inflation rate while 
there is a fall in unemployment rate. Deterioration level in exchange rate is 11.2 % and the 
average value of inflation rate is 1.406. Monthly values of each indicator are given below: 
 
Table 4.13 Changes in economic indicators within case 5 
Date Exchange Rate Unemployment Rate Inflation Rate 
09.2017 3.47 10.60 0.650 
10.2017 3.66 10.30 2.077 
11.2017 3.88 10.30 1.491 
In case 5, state of emergency continued within geographical confines of Turkey while the 
political confrontation with E.U. over Holland and Germany that rose in March 2017 remains 
intense. Frequencies and proportions of each rhetoric and overall appeals of case 5 are given 
below. 
 
Table 4.14 Frequencies & proportions of each rhetoric within case 5 
Type of Rhetoric Within Case 
Frequencies 
Within Case 
Proportion 
Crisis emphasizing populist 2 0.077 
Crisis emphasizing non-populist 0 0 
Crisis denying populist 8 0.308 
Crisis denying non-populist 1 0.038 
Failure ignoring populist 1 0.038 
Failure ignoring non-populist 14 0.538 
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Table 4.15 Frequencies & proportions of overall appeals within case 5 
Type of Rhetoric Within Case 
Frequencies 
Within Case 
Proportion 
Crisis emphasizing overall 2 0.077 
Crisis denying overall 9 0.346 
Failure recognizing overall 11 0.423 
Failure Ignoring overall 15 0.577 
Overall populist 11 0.423 
Overall non-populist 15 0.577 
Overall coded excerpts 26 1.000 
 
For September 2017, as I’ve mentioned under “On Discourses” title, due to lack of 
textualized data, I’ve had to select Erdoğan speeches which are exercised at the gala dinner 
in TURKEN Foundation and inauguration ceremony of 2016-2017 academic year. In the 
former, Erdoğan does not mention any economic appeals. In this speech, all references are 
pure political, and mostly against Gülenist Movement due to their involvement in July the 
15th coup attempt. While mentioning the importance of education, Erdoğan emphasizes the 
importance of patriotism and loyalty to national values. In the latter140, while mentioning on 
education mostly, he exercises one example of crisis denying populist rhetoric, which is at 
the same time the mere failure recognizing example for this month: 
 
“Değerli arkadaşlar; küresel ve bölgesel ölçekte eşine yüzyılda bir 
rastlanabilecek bir dönüşüm sürecinden geçiyoruz. Türkiye olarak çevremizde 
yaşanan tüm insani krizlere, çatışmalara, istikrarsızlıklara rağmen kendi 
hedeflerimiz doğrultusunda yolumuza devam ediyoruz. Bugüne kadar bize 
yöneltilen her saldırı, devlet ve millet olarak sergilediğimiz güçlü duruş 
sayesinde amacına ulaşamadan etkisiz hale geldi. Toplumsal kaos çıkarma 
planlarından bölücü eylemlere, ekonomik kriz senaryolarından siyasi 
istikrarsızlık gayretlerine kadar sayısız saldırıyı milletimizle birlikte 
göğüsledik.”141 
 
140. Discourse ID: D36. Link is available in the appendix. 
141. “Dear friends, we have been through in an uncommon process of change on global and regional level. As 
Turkey, despite all humanitarian crises, conflicts, instabilities happening around us, we continue our path in accord with our 
objectives. Every attack that have turned against us until today got neutralized before achieving their goals. From societal 
chaos generation plans to separatist actions, from economic crisis scenarios to political instability endeavors, we have 
resisted to numerous attacks with our nation.” 
170 
 
 
The nation is explicitly pronounced and thereby hegemonic totality claim remains strong. 
Failures are presented as a package. Although subjects of antagonism are not explicitly 
mentioned, “attacks” embody an implicit antagonism against the ones who have taken such 
actions against Turkey in order to turn her from her path. Therefore, it is viewed as an 
instance of crisis denying populism. 
 
Figure 4.17 Overall appeals: Failure recognizing vs failure ignoring of case 5 
 
During the case, economic appeals are not so frequent especially when compared with other 
cases. In October 2017, failure recognizing appeals are greater than failure ignoring ones (6 
vs 2), in November the view is reverse (4 vs 11). Overall, Erdoğan applies failure ignoring 
appeals more than failure recognizing ones (15 vs 11) and overwhelming majority of failure 
ignoring appeals consist of non-populist excerpts (14 vs 1).  
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Figure 4.18 Categories: Populist vs non-populist of case 5 
 
Underlying reason of the huge increase in the number of failure ignoring non-populist 
excerpts in November 2017 is that Erdoğan talks on an entrepreneurship group’s event which 
intend to build Turkey’s automobile in the following years. In this meeting, Erdoğan’s 
appeals are mostly positive remarks on the government’s determination on producing the 
automobile of Turkey while he also exercises three examples of crisis denying rhetoric. In 
one of those appeals, while denying the actual impact of crisis, he satirizes global hegemonic 
powers by using economy as a weapon against Turkey, as in the following excerpt142: 
 
“…Çünkü bu ülkenin arkasında 100 milyonlarca insanın duası, 80 milyon 
vatandaşımızın ümidi, bize güvenen milletimizin gereken her durumda en güçlü 
şekilde ortaya koyduğu iradesi vardır. Ve ülkemize yönelik saldırıların cüreti 
giderek artmasına rağmen devlet ve millet olarak dimdik ayaktayız. Türkiye’yi 
darbelerle yıkamadılar, Türkiye’yi vesayet güçleri hep birlikte gayret ettiler 
durduramadılar. Türkiye’yi terör örgütlerini kullanarak hizaya sokamadılar. 
Türkiye’yi, ekonomiyi silah gibi kullanarak sendeletemediler. Bölgemizdeki 
krizlerin yıkıcı etkilerini bize ciro edemediler. Küresel düzenin çarpıkları 
konusundaki itirazlarımızın haklılığının üzerini örtemediler. Kendilerini küresel 
 
142. Discourse ID: D39. Link is available in the appendix. 
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düzenin sahipleri olarak gören ülkelerin son dönemde ülkemizin üzerine bu kadar 
çok gelmelerinin sebebi işte bunlardır.”143 
 
This is an instance of crisis denying populist rhetoric since it embodies an antagonism against 
the countries who view themselves as the owners of the global order while totality is claimed 
for the nation. Erdoğan apparently denies the actual impact of such actors over Turkey and 
links the recent tension with unsuccessful attempts of mentioned global actors. 
With regards to failure recognizing appeals, Erdoğan’s attitude is more likely to have a crisis 
denying oriented approach during the whole case. There are only 2 examples of crisis 
emphasizing rhetoric which both have populist characteristic and are expressed during the 
speech that Erdoğan has made on October the 5th 2017. While acknowledging failures, he 
strives for underrating the actual impact of them. In such failure recognizing appeals, 
Erdoğan applies a package of failure in which terrorism, Gezi Events, the initial conflict with 
Gülenist Movement on December 17th-25th 2013 and  failed coup attempt that members of 
Gülenist Movement involved on July the 15th 2016 are framed as events which were 
organized by global powers in order to block Turkey’s growth and development. Most of 
these appeals are linked with regional reign of terror in recent years. Especially Erdoğan 
makes frequent references to what has been going on in the Middle Eastern geography, and 
particularly in Syria. One instance of crisis denying rhetoric is given below144: 
 
“…Değerli kardeşlerim… Türkiye, bölgesinde ve dünyada yaşanan tüm 
sıkıntılara, krizlere, çalkantılara rağmen, hedefleri doğrultusundaki kararlı 
yürüyüşünü sürdürmektedir. Bir yandan ülkemizin etrafındaki bu ateş çemberini 
kırmanın gayreti içindeyken, diğer yandan da ekonomide, yatırımlarda, 
güvenlikte, adalette, diplomaside çok önemli başarılara imza atıyoruz. Büyüme 
rakamlarımızdan ihracata kadar ekonomide aldığımız sevindirici haberler, bize 
geleceğimiz için güven veriyor…”145 
 
143. “…Because behind this country, there are prayers of hundreds of millions of people, the hope of 80 million 
citizens of ours, the will that is potently exercised whenever necessary by our nation that trusts us. And despite the increasing 
daring against our country, as the nation and the state, we stand upright. They couldn’t subvert Turkey by coups. Tutelary 
powers endeavored all together but couldn’t stop Turkey. They couldn’t align Turkey by using terrorist organizations. They 
couldn’t trip Turkey by using economy as a weapon. They couldn’t impute devastating effects of the crisis in our region to 
us. They couldn’t cover the rightfulness of our objections against the deviancy of the global order. That’s why the countries, 
which view themselves as the owners of the global order, offensively acted against our country recently…” 
144. Discourse ID: D37. Link is available in the appendix. 
145 “…My dear brothers… Despite all issues, crises, and unrest in the World and in her region, Turkey 
continues to walk her determined walk through her targets. On the one hand, we strive for breaking this ring of 
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This is an example of crisis denying non-populist rhetoric and it is the only failure 
recognizing non populist excerpt within this case. By the “ring of fire,” Erdoğan points out 
the actual armed conflict in Northern Syria. Although global powers are mentioned for their 
evil purposes over the Middle East, here in this excerpt Erdoğan is more about identifying 
the political landscape in the region. He does not mention any attack against Turkey, thereby 
antagonism does not exist, even implicitly. 
 
Figure 4.19 Overall appeals: Crisis emphasizing vs crisis denying of case 5 
 
In his crisis two emphasizing appeals, Erdoğan points out plots against Turkey due to her 
capabilities and strength, unlike other states in the region. He uses a populist rhetoric by 
presenting a package of failures that include Gezi Events, the initial conflict with Gülenist 
Movement on December the 17th-25th 2013, the recent trench war that took place in South 
Eastern Turkey against PKK, and July the 15th failed coup attempt that members of Gülenist 
Movement were involved. He frames all these different incidents as a complete bundle that 
is caused by various actors to prune Turkey’s power, not only with regards to political power 
but also in terms of her economic potency. The following excerpt is an instance of crisis 
emphasizing rhetoric since Erdoğan emphasizes that “we are being targeted” and does not 
 
fire around our country, on the other hand, we have very significant achievements with regards to the economy, investments, 
security, justice, and diplomacy. From our growth rates to exportation, good news that we have for the economy gives us 
confidence for our future…” 
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even mention what needs to be done and what is considered against the threat. The outcome 
of incidents which are added into the package are clear however, the actual or potential 
outcome of Turkey’s being targeted is not given within the excerpt. Here, antagonism is built 
against various political actors which are organized by the same master mind, while totality 
is claimed for the nation146: 
 
“Değerli kardeşlerim… Bölgemize yönelik bu kanlı senaryonun önündeki en 
büyük engel hiç şüphesiz Türkiye’dir. Bu oyunun başarılı olabilmesi, ancak 
Türkiye’nin zayıflamasına, tökezlemesine ve düşmesine bağlıdır. Çünkü güçlü 
Türkiye, bölgesel huzur ve istikrarın güvencesi demektir. Dış politikada etkin 
Türkiye, kurulan tezgâhı sahiplerinin başına geçiren ülke demektir. Ekonomik 
bakımından kendi ayakları üzerinde duran Türkiye, aynı zamanda tüm kardeş ve 
dostlarının da aydınlık geleceğinin müjdecisi demektir. Bunun için, ülkemiz 
içeriden ve dışarıdan kuşatılmaya çalışılıyor. Biz, ülkemize çizilen sınırlara 
eyvallah demediğimiz, gücümüzü sadece milletimizden aldığımız, bu güvenle 
üzerimize giydirilmeye çalışılan deli gömleğini yırtıp attığımız için hedef 
alınıyoruz. Gezi olayları, 17- 25 Aralık yargı-emniyet darbesi, bölücü örgütün 
çukur eylemleri ve son olarak 15 Temmuz hain kalkışması, Türkiye’nin önünü 
kesme planının farklı kesimler eliyle yürütülen safhalarından ibarettir.”147 
 
Erdoğan simply puts the people into an alarming position. In the same speech, he also applies 
a conditional statement for the uncertain future by accentuating the only way to overcome 
failures is keeping our unity strong. These are the only two options Erdoğan uses to 
perpetuate failures as crisis within this case. During this period, his crisis denying rhetoric 
overwhelms the crisis emphasizing one and the number of crisis denying excerpts increase 
from October to November while instances of crisis emphasizing are only seen in October. 
When it comes to overall populist vs non-populist appeals, as I’ve mentioned before, there is 
only one failure recognizing non-populist excerpt and it has a crisis denying characteristic. 
Remaining non-populist excerpts are all failure ignoring ones. Due to the increase of such 
 
146. Discourse ID: D37. Link is available in the appendix. 
147. “…My dear brothers… Without a doubt, the greatest obstacle to this bloody scenario is Turkey. Its success 
depends on Turkey’s weakening, stumbling, and fall. Because strong Turkey means an assurance of regional peace and 
stability. An active Turkey in foreign policy means spoiler of such plots. A viable Turkey in terms of economics means the 
harbinger of bright future of all her fellows and friends. That’s why our country is trying to be surrounded from inside and 
outside. We are being targeted since we don’t accept boundaries that are drawn for us, since our power comes from the 
nation, since we tear and throw the straitjacket that is tried to be put on us. Gezi Events, the coup of judiciary-security that 
took place on December the 17th-25th, trench war on separatist organization, and lastly the treacherous attempt of July the 
15th are phases of the plan of blocking Turkey, conducted by different actors…” 
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appeals in November, frequency of non-populist appeals is greater than populist ones during 
this period (15 vs 11). 
 
Figure 4.20 Overall appeals: Populist vs non-populist of case 5 
 
 
 
4.1.6. Case 6: 01.2018 – 05.2018 
 
During this case period, exchange rate and inflation rate increases while unemployment falls 
continuously until April 2018. As one can see by checking the table given below, there is no 
deterioration in unemployment rate while two other variables deteriorate. Deterioration level 
in exchange rate is 17 % and average value of inflation rate is 1.56 %. Monthly values of 
each indicator are given below: 
  
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
09-2017 10-2017 11-2017
fr
eq
u
en
cy
date
overall appeals: populist vs non-populist
overall populist overall non-populist
176 
 
Table 4.16 Changes in economic indicators within case 6 
Date Exchange Rate Unemployment Rate Inflation Rate 
01.2018 3.77 10.80 1.020 
02.2018 3.78 10.64 0.731 
03.2018 3.88 10.12 0.993 
04.2018 4.05 9.60 1.872 
05.2018 4.41 9.70 1.622 
 
Table 4.17 Frequencies & proportions of each rhetoric within case 6 
Type of Rhetoric Within Case 
Frequencies 
Within Case 
Proportion 
Crisis emphasizing populist 4 0.059 
Crisis emphasizing non-populist 0 0 
Crisis denying populist 8 0.118 
Crisis denying non-populist 1 0.015 
Failure ignoring populist 21 0.309 
Failure ignoring non-populist 34 0.5 
 
Table 4.18 Frequencies & proportions of overall appeals within case 6 
Type of Rhetoric Within Case 
Frequencies 
Within Case 
Proportion 
Crisis emphasizing overall 4 0.059 
Crisis denying overall 9 0.132 
Failure recognizing overall 13 0.191 
Failure Ignoring overall 55 0.809 
Overall populist 33 0.485 
Overall non-populist 35 0.515 
Overall coded excerpts 68 1.000 
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When we look at the political atmosphere of this period, Turkey is still in state of emergency 
period which is declared after the failed coup attempt of Gülenist Movement, and relations 
with the E.U. remains problematic due to the previous year’s confrontation, especially with 
Germany and Holland. When we check Erdoğan’s political appeals, Turkish national army 
organized an operation called “Operation Olive Branch” to north western Syria, to the city 
of Afrin in January 2018. Erdoğan earlier discourses of this case have many pure political 
references about this operation. From January 2018 to February 2018 both failure ignoring 
and failure recognizing appeals are in decline due to Erdoğan’s frequent pure political appeals 
especially the ones about Syrian conflict and operation Olive Branch. Moreover, in January, 
his failure ignoring non-populist appeals includes investments in defense industry. Erdoğan 
focuses much more on pure political issues during the first two months of this case period 
although failure recognizing excerpts are far lower than ignoring ones (3 vs 17). Likewise, 
within the case, overall failure ignoring appeals overwhelms failure recognizing ones (55 vs 
13). Except March 2018, failure ignoring rhetoric always overrides failure recognizing 
rhetoric. 
In his failure ignoring appeals, On April the 10th, Erdoğan mentions rising level of economic 
relations with Russia with regards to some huge projects like the construction of Turkey’s 
first Nuclear Plant in Akkuyu. He accentuates the potential impact of this project to Turkish 
economy and how it will contribute to Turkey in terms of supplying 10 percent of the overall 
electricity to the country, when activated. He also gives some explicit statistical information 
on Turkey’s general economic overview in the same speech. In the second discourse of this 
month he also mentions on how AKP has contributed to Turkish economy so far. This 
month’s failure ignoring excerpts are mostly have a non-populist tone (13 vs 2).  
Through the end of this case period, Erdoğan’s appeals turn into a more election-oriented 
quality. The reason is the gap between failure ignoring and failure recognizing appeals gets 
wider from March to April, and from April to May. This becomes visible when we check 
frequencies of failure ignoring appeals of these two months in the following graph. Moreover, 
from April to May, failure ignoring populist excerpts rises tremendously - from 2 to 17 while 
total number of such excerpts for the whole case is 21. During May 2018, Erdoğan’s failure 
ignoring appeals are mostly towards approaching June 24th, 2018 presidential election. 
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Erdoğan’s failure ignoring rhetoric sharply gains a populist quality during his frequent 
attacks against main opposition party, especially on the speech he makes on May the 8th, 
2018148. Only this discourse has 16 failure ignoring populist excerpts. During this AKP group 
speech, Erdoğan mostly exercises failure ignoring populist excerpts in his rhetoric attacks 
against the opposition while emphasizing AKP’s economic contribution to turkey and the 
people of Turkey, due to approaching elections.  
Figure 4.21 Overall appeals: Failure recognizing vs failure ignoring of case 6 
 
Likewise, I’ve assessed the following excerpt149 and the ones that follow it as instances of 
failure ignoring non-populist rhetoric since they focus on AKP’s accomplishments with 
regards to concrete services to the people and to the economy while Erdoğan’s framing 
depends on purely rhetorical and hypothetical questions based on election talk. Due to 
antagonistic nature of such references, they are all coded as populist excerpts: 
 
“…Muhalefetin projesi yok dedik, ama haksızlık ettik galiba, bir tane projeleri 
var, onu da şimdiden açıkladılar. Bu proje Türkiye’yi eski sisteme geri 
döndürmekmiş. Her şeyden önce bu tavır, milletin 16 Nisan’da ortaya koyduğu 
iradeye saygısızlıktır. Madem bunlar Ak Parti’nin her yaptığının tersini 
vadediyorlar, öyleyse buradan milletimize çağrı yapıyorum, size bu vaatle 
gelenlere şunları da sorun: AK Parti Türkiye’de 284 bin yeni derslik yaptı, siz 
 
148. Discourse ID: D49. Link is available in the appendix. 
149. Discourse ID: D49. Link is given in the appendix. 
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onları da mı yıkacaksınız? AK Parti Türkiye’de 585 bin yeni öğretmen göreve 
başlattı, siz onları da işten atacak mısınız? AK Parti Türkiye’de 111 yeni 
üniversite açtı, siz onları da kapatacak mısınız?”150 
 
Another example from the same speech is given below: 
 
“…AK Parti 38 milyar lira sosyal yardım yaptı, siz bunları gidip garip-gurebadan 
geri mi isteyeceksiniz? AK Parti yaklaşık 4,5 milyon kişiye 15 milyar lira 
Tasarruf Teşvik Fonu ödemesi, 8 milyonun üzerinde kişiye 3,5 milyar lira Konut 
Edindirme Yardımı ödemesi yaptı, siz bunları geri mi alacaksınız?”151 
 
Figure 4.22 Categories: Populist vs non-populist of case 6 
 
 
Because Erdoğan mostly uses a populist tone during May, his failure ignoring populist tone 
also has affected the frequency of overall populist rhetoric. In May Erdoğan uses only 2 
 
150. “…We said that the opposition does not have any project, but I guess we were not fair, there is one, and they 
have announced it already. This project is turning Turkey into the old system. First of all, this attitude is an indignity to the 
will of the nation that took place on April the 16th. Seeing that these promise the opposite of anything that Ak Party has 
done, then I am making a call to our nation, you ask these to the ones who show up with this promise: Ak Party has built 
284 thousand classrooms, are you going to destroy them also? Ak Party appointed 585 new teachers, are you going to sack 
them also? Ak Party has opened 111 new universities, are you going to close them also?” 
151. “…Ak Party has made 38 billion Lira social aid; will you want this back from the poor? Ak party has made 
15 billion Lira saving incentive fund payment to 4.5 million people, 3.5 billion Lira housing acquisition aid payment to over 
8 million people, will you take this back?” 
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failure recognizing populist rhetoric, one for each. 17 out of 19 populist appeals have a failure 
ignoring characteristic. When we make an overall comparison of populist vs non-populist 
appeals within this case, until May 2018, the number of populist appeals in failure 
recognizing categories (crisis emphasizing and crisis denying) are close and fluctuating as 
like the frequency of failure ignoring populist excerpts (3, 0, 4, 4 vs 1, 1, 0, 2). Up until May, 
the number of crisis denying populist excerpts are slightly higher than both crisis 
emphasizing and failure ignoring ones (6, 3, 4 respectively) while in May the picture is totally 
different (1, 1, 17 respectively). If we merely focus to the first four months of the case, the 
number of populist appeals are greater than non-populist ones only in March 2018 (4 vs 2).  
 
Figure 4.23 Overall appeals: Populist vs non-populist of case 6 
 
 
From the beginning to the end of this case, there are only 4 instances of crisis emphasizing 
rhetoric and they all have a populist tone. In March, Erdoğan mentions on Turkey’s purchase 
of Russian missile defense system S-400 from Russia while baldly criticizing the U.S. 
authorities due to their threats over sanctions against Turkey. In the excerpt given below152, 
Erdoğan also does not care to engage in a confrontation with the U.S. Although he has a 
defensive tone, Erdoğan simply puts the people into an alarming position while not denying 
 
152. Discourse ID: D45. Link is available in the appendix. 
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the potential impact of any possible U.S. sanctions against Turkey153. Hegemonic totality is 
claimed for the nation implicitly, and antagonism is built against the authorities of the U.S. 
who oppose Turkey’s purchase of S400 missile defense system. So, it is an instance of crisis 
emphasizing populist rhetoric: 
 
“…Türkiye’yi, terör örgütleriyle mücadelesi, S400 hava savunma sistemlerini 
alması dolayısıyla eleştirenler, dönüp kendi yaptıklarına bir baksalar eminim 
haklılığımızı kabul edecekler. Sen kalkacaksın Yunanistan’ın S300’leri gündeme 
geldiğinde, şu anda S300’ler var, Yunanistan’a ses çıkarmayacaksın. Ee? Türkiye 
S400’leri alacağı zaman, sizlerden istediğinde vermeyeceksin, ama Rusya’dan 
S400’leri alma yoluna gidince, anlaşınca, ‘NATO ülkeleri için bu yanlıştır’ 
diyeceksin. NATO’nun Genel Sekreteri ne diyecek? ‘Hayır, Türkiye bu konuda 
özgürdür, istediği gibi hareket eder’ diyecek. Öbürü de ‘bak yaptırım 
uygulayabiliriz’ diyeceksin. Böyle ittifak, böyle bir dayanışma söz konusu 
olabilir mi? Bunların hepsi bugüne kadar yanlış alışkanlıklardır; ama bu yanlış 
alışkanlıklar kusura bakmasınlar bize geçmez. Biz yolumuza devam edeceğiz ve 
bu yönde sorgulamalara da gelemeyiz. Biz bu süreçte sağlam duracak, taviz 
vermeden kendi hedeflerimize doğru yürümeyi sürdüreceğiz...”154 
 
During the case, the frequency of Erdoğan’s crisis denying rhetoric is either equals to or 
slightly greater than the frequency of his crisis emphasizing rhetoric. On January the 9th, 
Erdoğan uses a reference to Reza Zarrab case that was being seen in the U.S. He exercises a 
crisis denying rhetoric while denying the potential impact of the failure. Zarrab’s case is 
framed as a pressure over the economy, as given in the following excerpt155. This excerpt has 
a populist quality since antagonism is built against the U.S. authorities while totality claim 
implicitly exists for Turkish nation: 
 
“…Değerli kardeşlerim; bakın burada bir konunun üzerinde hassasiyetle durmam 
gerekiyor; 15 Temmuz darbe girişimini ülkemizde başaramayanlar şimdi farklı 
darbe girişimlerinin arayışı içerisindeler. Değerli kardeşlerim, bunu da özellikle 
 
153 Sanctions are explicitly mentioned in the excerpt while Erdoğan does not retreat. 
154. “…I am pretty sure about that the ones who criticizes Turkey due to her struggle against terrorist organizations, 
the purchase of s400 air defense system, will accept our rightfulness if they turn and look to what they, themselves have 
done. You will not make a sound against Greece when her S300s were brought to the agenda, they have S300s now, and 
then? When Turkey buys, when Turkey wants from you, you do not give them, but whenever she decides to buy from Russia 
and comes to an agreement, then you say, “This is wrong for NATO countries.” What will the general secretary of NATO 
say? He will say ‘No, Turkey is free in this respect, and she can act freely.’ And with the other, you will say “look we can 
implement sanctions.” Is such an alliance, a solidarity possible? So far, these all have been wrong habits; pardon us but 
these wrong habits do not work on us. We will continue our path and we cannot tolerate questionings in this path. We will 
stand strong in this process and we will move to our own targets without any concessions…” 
155. Discourse ID: D41. Link is available in the appendix. 
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buradan ifade etmem gerekir; şu anda Amerika’daki malum dava işte bir siyasi 
içerikli darbe girişiminin adresidir. Ve bu öyle sureta atılmış bir adım veya 
yapılmakta olan bir dava değildir. Türkiye’yi güya kendilerine göre ekonomik 
noktada sıkıştırmak, güya kendilerine göre FETÖ terör örgütüyle, CIA ile öbür 
tarafta FBI ile sıkıştırmak suretiyle Türkiye’ye kendilerine göre bir sıkıştırma 
operasyonudur. Fakat bu da tutmayacak, bunu da başaramayacaklar…”156 
 
In his crisis emphasizing populist attempts, on April the 24th, Erdoğan explicitly mentions on 
plots on exchange rate, applies conditional statements. And in remaining two instances of 
this category, he simply puts the people into an alarming position by perpetuating failures as 
crisis. Reza Zarrab case is presented as a package, and the temporal dimension of this 
conflict, has been extended since a final decision has still not been made. 
During the case, all instances of crisis emphasizing rhetoric refer to populist excerpts 
however the frequency of such excerpts are so few. From January to May, the number of 
crisis emphasizing excerpts reach its top level in March, and the number of crisis denying 
excerpts are either equal or great than crisis emphasizing ones. The number of crisis denying 
populist excerpts are greater than crisis denying non-populist ones during the case. The only 
one instance of crisis denying non populist rhetoric157 of April 2018 is given below: 
 
 “…Bütçe disiplinimizden ve reform gündemimizden taviz ermeden, faiz 
ve enflasyon başta olmak üzere ekonomimizi tehdit eden tüm sorunların 
üstesinden yeni dönemde daha kolay geleceğimizi düşünüyorum. Erken 
seçim kararına piyasaların ve iş dünyasının verdiği olumlu tepki, bu 
sürecin ekonomide risklerin değil, fırsatların tetikleyicisi olacağına işaret 
etmektedir…”158 
I’ve assessed this excerpt as an example of crisis denying non-populist rhetoric the problems 
that threaten Turkish economy does not point out any antagonism since problems are 
mentioned as with economic variables. When we look at the overall distribution of populist 
 
156. “…My dear brothers, look here I need to dwell on a subject sensitively; the ones who couldn’t be able to 
achieve the coup attempt of July the 15th are now in a search for another coup attempts. My dear brothers, I also need to 
state this particularly; the present case in the U.S., as you know, is the address of a thematic political coup attempt. And this 
is not a fake step that has been taken or a fake case that is being conducted. It is an operation of, supposedly, pressuring 
Turkey at the economical point, supposedly, by pressuring Turkey via the terrorist organization of FETÖ, CIA and FBI on 
the other side. But this also will not hit target, they will also not be able to achieve this …” 
157. Discourse ID: D48. Link is available in the appendix. 
158. “…While not making concessions from our budgetary discipline and reform agenda, in the new 
period, I think we will overcome the problems that threaten our economy, particularly interest rate and inflation 
rate. The positive reaction of markets and business world to the decision of early election points out that this 
process will be a trigger of opportunities, not risks in the economy…” 
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vs non-populist excerpts within failure recognizing excerpts, excerpts only 1 out of 14 have 
non-populist characteristic, and it is in the scope of crisis denying category.  
 
Figure 4.24 Overall appeals: Crisis emphasizing vs crisis denying of case 6 
 
 
 
4.1.7. Case 7: 06.2018 – 09.2018 
 
During this case period, all economic indicators have deteriorated. Deterioration level in 
exchange rate is 37.6 %, in unemployment rate 12.2 %, and average value of inflation rate is 
2.94 %. Monthly values of each indicator are given below. 
 
  
0
1
2
3
4
5
01-2018 02-2018 03-2018 04-2018 05-2018
fr
eq
u
en
cy
date
overall appeals: crisis emphasizing vs crisis denying
crisis emphasizing crisis denying
184 
 
Table 4.19 Economic deterioration within case 7 
Date Exchange Rate Unemployment Rate Inflation Rate 
06.2018 4.63 10.16 2.612 
07.2018 4.75 10.76 0.551 
08.2018 5.73 11.12 2.295 
09.2018 6.37 11.40 6.304 
 
Political atmosphere is highly dynamic during this case. Turkey has experienced a system 
change just at the beginning of this period. Presidential elections that took place on June the 
24th resulted with the victory of Erdoğan. In July, Turkey was threatened by the U.S. 
authorities to release pastor Andrew Brunson immediately. The trial of pastor turned into a 
huge political crisis while its economic impact was felt immediately by the whole nation. 
When compared with other cases, this case has the greatest increase in exchange rate. 
Besides, not among the discourses I’ve analyzed but Erdoğan uses some offensive appeals 
against the U.S. over Brunson’s continuing trial whenever he shows up in front of cameras, 
especially throughout August. Brunson remained imprisoned during this case period, he was 
released and went back to the U.S. in October 2018. 
 
Table 4.20 Frequencies & proportions of each rhetoric within case 7 
Type of Rhetoric Within Case 
Frequencies 
Within Case 
Proportion 
Crisis emphasizing populist 7 0.175 
Crisis emphasizing non-populist 0 0 
Crisis denying populist 10 0.25 
Crisis denying non-populist 1 0.025 
Failure ignoring populist 2 0.05 
Failure ignoring non-populist 20 0.5 
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Table 4.21 Frequencies & proportions of overall appeals within case 7 
Type of Rhetoric Within Case 
Frequencies 
Within Case 
Proportion 
Crisis emphasizing overall 7 0.175 
Crisis denying overall 11 0.275 
Failure recognizing overall 18 0.45 
Failure Ignoring overall 22 0.55 
Overall populist 19 0.475 
Overall non-populist 21 0.525 
Overall coded excerpts 40 1.000 
 
The first two discourses I’ve analyzed are mostly about the presidential election. In the first 
one, Erdoğan talks in meeting in Adıyaman. In this meeting with the people of Adıyaman, 
he only uses failure ignoring appeals, by mentioning the contribution of his party to Turkish 
economy via enhanced level of investments, projects, and services due to approaching 
elections. During this meeting, Erdoğan uses only failure ignoring appeals while in his 
accusatory appeals, he rhetorically attacks the head of the main opposition and the candidate 
of the main opposition for upcoming presidential elections. However, Erdoğan’s attacks 
against the opposition and alliance that the opposition forms are mostly in a pure political 
format. In the second one in which Erdoğan gives a balcony speech after his triumph in 
elections. During this speech, Erdoğan mostly uses a soft and inclusive rhetoric. In short, due 
to references are mostly shaped by the electoral campaign, Erdoğan only uses failure ignoring 
appeals in June 2018.  
This is also true for July 2018. In July, Erdoğan also uses a soft rhetoric when he takes over 
the presidential office. The second discourse of July is exercised on July 15 Martyrs’ Bridge 
where the people resisted in front of armed soldiers during the failed coup attempt. This 
speech has pure political appeals and mostly about cursing Gülenist Movement. In short, he 
doesn’t even apply failure recognizing appeals until his discourses that take place in August.  
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One example of failure ignoring non-populist rhetoric which Erdoğan exercises during his 
inauguration ceremony as the president159 is given below. Here, Erdoğan mentions on what 
his party has achieved so far for the people of Turkey via projects and investments. Such 
appeals are assessed within the scope of failure ignoring appeals. Because there is no 
antagonism, it has a non-populist quality: 
 
“…Ülkemizi dünyanın en büyük 10 ekonomisinden biri haline getirmek için, 
makroekonomik dengelerden yatırımlara kadar her alanda çok büyük hamleler 
yapacağız. Bugüne kadar tamamladığımız projelerimiz en büyük referansımızdır. 
Halen devam eden yatırımlarımızı ve milletimize taahhüt ettiğimiz projeleri 
hayata geçirmekle kalmayacak, çok daha büyük işlere imza atacağız.”160 
 
Figure 4.25 Overall appeals: Failure recognizing vs failure ignoring of case 7 
 
The confrontation with the U.S. got intensified towards late July when Turkey was explicitly 
threatened by vice president of the U.S. Mike Pence. After this incident and with the 
unstoppable value depreciation in Turkish Lira, Erdoğan’s discourses mostly focus on 
failures in August. That’s why, in August 2018, failure recognizing appeals substantially rise 
 
159. Discourse ID: D53. Link is available in the appendix. 
160. “…We will make huge moves in all areas, from macroeconomic balances to investments, in order to make 
our county as one of the top ten economies of the world. Our projects that we have completed up until today are our biggest 
references. We will not only actualize our investments which still continue and our projects that we have promised to our 
nation, we will make greater works.” 
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due to the intensified confrontation with the U.S. and exchange rate hike. On August 13th, 
Erdoğan talks in 10th Conference of Ambassadors, and he mostly mentions about economic 
attacks against Turkey, while applying instances of both crisis emphasizing and crisis 
denying rhetoric. 
All instances of crisis emphasizing rhetoric are exercised in August, when the impact of the 
exchange rate over the society was tremendous. Overall, during such appeals, Erdoğan does 
not avoid extending the temporal dimension of the political confrontation with the global 
powers via offensive rhetoric and exacerbates the confrontation without hesitation. Among 
other crisis perpetuation options, he asks the contribution of the ambassadors he speaks to, 
in order to boost the economy. He also applies pure political appeals as solution for the 
failure. The following excerpt161 is an example of simply putting the people into an alarming 
position while not denying framing failures as crisis: 
 
“…Kıymetli dostlar; görünen köy kılavuz istemez, böyle bir misalimiz var ya… 
Son birkaç haftadır yaşadığımız hadiseler hepimize şu gerçeği bir kez daha 
gösterdi: Türkiye diğer alanlarda olduğu gibi, ekonomide de bir kuşatmayla karşı 
karşıyadır. Gezi olaylarıyla başlayan, 17-25 Aralık girişimiyle devam eden, 15 
Temmuz hain darbe teşebbüsüyle bir üst aşamaya taşınan saldırıların bir müddet 
daha devam edeceği açıktır. Türkiye’nin bağımsızlığı, ekonomik çıkarlarını, 
milli onurunu, haysiyet ve şahsiyetini hedef alan bu atakların farklı biçimlerine 
karşı da hazırlıklı olmalıyız…”162 
 
In excerpt given above, while economic blockade is framed as associated with a package of 
political failures, Erdoğan claims the totality of the nation while he exercises an antagonism 
against global powers over economic blockade. Moreover, participants of articulated past 
incidents are also in the target of his antagonism. It is an example of crisis emphasizing 
populist rhetoric.  
 
 
161. Discourse ID: D55. Link is available in the appendix. 
162. “…Dear friends; it is clear that… Incidents that we experienced in some recent weeks showed us this fact: 
Turkey, like in other areas, vis-à-vis a blockade in economy too. It is apparent that attacks that began with Gezi Events, 
continued with attempt of December the 17th – 25th, leveled up with treacherous July the 15th coup attempt will continue. 
We also need to be prepared different forms of these attacks that target Turkey’s independence, economic interests, national 
pride, dignity and personality…” 
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Erdoğan also applies mere political references as the solution vis-à-vis the economic 
blockade he mentions and accentuates the importance of national unity, solidarity, and 
support of the people to overcome failures. He explicitly mentions exchange rate during this 
discourse. In the second speech of this month, Erdoğan mentions on Andrew Brunson case 
without calling the pastor’s name explicitly, while not denying framing the issue as crisis. 
 
Figure 4.26 Categories: Populist vs non-populist of case 7 
 
 
However, within this case, Erdoğan’s overall tone denies framing failures as crisis (11 vs 7), 
while denying crisis populist rhetoric is more frequently used than his crisis emphasizing 
appeals (10 vs 7). The following excerpt is an instance of framing failures with a package 
while, this time, denying the actual impact of failures and accentuating the determination of 
the government163. Totality claim is powerful while antagonism is primarily built against 
global powers and finance lobbies: 
 
“…Son yıllarda terörden ekonomik manipülasyonlara, bir dizi operasyona maruz 
kalmamızın en önemli sebebi, milli menfaatlerimiz noktasında tavizsiz bir tutum 
 
163. Discourse ID: D55. Link is available in the appendix. 
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takınmış olmamızdır. Göreve geldiğimiz andan beri milletin emanetini 
namusumuz bilip üzerine gölge düşürmedik, siyasetin yeniden vesayetin emrine 
girmesine izin vermedik. Toplumsal çatışma senaryolarını milletimizle sırt sırta 
vererek engelledik. Terör örgütleri üzerinden kurulan oyunları kısa sürede deşifre 
edip önüne geçtik. Suriye’de DEAŞ164’la mücadele bahanesiyle etrafımızda 
oluşturulmaya çalışılan terör koridoruna rıza göstermedik. Ekonomide fakir-
fukaranın rızkının finans lobilerine peşkeş çekilmesine göz yummadık…”165 
 
Figure 4.27 Overall appeals: Crisis emphasizing vs crisis denying of case 7 
 
 
Within this case, populist and non-populist appeals of Erdoğan’s speeches fluctuate due to 
political atmosphere. Non-populist appeals are only lower than populist ones during August 
2018. There is only one failure recognizing non-populist excerpt, and it is an instance of crisis 
denying non-populist rhetoric. It belongs to Erdoğan’s inauguration ceremony speech, while 
he accuses the old system due to its great burden over the people of Turkey, in terms of both 
political and economic. Remaining non-populist appeals are all failure ignoring ones. Their 
frequency rises greatly in September 2018. However, this rise is about Erdoğan’s remarks 
 
164. Erdoğan uses DEAŞ for DAESH a.k.a. ISIS or ISIL, given under the “List of Abbreviations” on page xvi. 
165. “…The most important reason that we have been exposed to a series of operation from terrorism to economic 
manipulations in recent years is that we have assumed an uncompromising attitude with regards to our national interests. 
Since we took the office, we have assumed the trust of the nation as our honor and haven’t compromised, we haven’t let the 
politics to be subjected to the yoke of tutelage again. We prevented societal conflict scenarios with our nation by standing 
back to back. We prevented plots that were set over terrorist organizations by deciphering them in a short time. We didn’t 
consent the terror corridor that was tried to build around us by excuses of struggle against ISIS in Syria. In the economy, 
we didn’t overlook the making the livelihood of the poor available to finance lobbies…” 
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about how much contribution AKP has done so far in order to enhance economic well-being 
of martyrs and veterans, in Erdoğan’s speech that is exercised on September the 19th, on the 
veterans’ day. Populist excerpts overwhelm non-populist ones in August (14 vs 1) when the 
political confrontation with the U.S. gets intensified over Pastor Andrew Brunson incident 
and exchange rate manipulation gets intensified accordingly. The story changes in September 
(3 vs 9), just before October 2018 when the Brunson crisis was overcome, and he was 
released.  
 
Figure 4.28 Overall appeals: Populist vs non-populist case 7 
 
 
 
4.2. Analysis 
 
 
In accord with cases I’ve scrutinized and Moffitt’s (2015) core argument, in this analysis 
part, I have three major concerns. First, I want to check whether Erdoğan applies populist 
appeals more or less than non-populist ones. This is also important since Moffitt (2015) 
claims that “populists” who attempt to perpetuate failures as crisis remain longer in power 
than politicians who do not tend to do so. Because I do not define politicians in a binary sense 
like populist vs non-populist, and I argue that populism inherently has degrees, Erdoğan’s 
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more frequently usage of populist rhetoric might provide me a clue whether I have been 
running a reasonable research with regards to the associational pattern I’ve been seeking for 
throughout this work. To Moffitt (2015) that was the case for Hugo Chávez. Moreover, any 
possible finding on Erdoğan’s inclination to apply populism more than non-populist appeals 
also confirms Hawkins’ research on populism166 including different leaders all around the 
world. In this study, in terms of the intensity of populist appeals, Erdoğan is ranked 4th among 
leaders of 40 different countries. Second, I aim to find out whether Erdoğan more frequently 
emphasizes or denies perpetuation of crisis via populist rhetoric. My intention is to focus on 
what a possible and plausible explanation for this variation might be. Third, I intend to check, 
for cases in which Erdoğan more frequently applies crisis emphasizing populist rhetoric than 
crisis denying populist one, how sense of crisis among the people changes and how electoral 
support to AKP fluctuates in those periods. This is indeed my primary concern throughout 
analysis part since it is the essence of Moffitt’s (2015) argument which has become an 
inspiration for me to conduct this study.  
 
Table 4.22 Cross case proportions of each rhetoric 
Type of Rhetoric Case 
1 
Case 
2 
Case 
3 
Case 
4 
Case 
5 
Case 
6 
Case 
7 
Crisis emphasizing populist 0 0.056 0.019 0.05 0.004 0.008 0.015 
Crisis emphasizing non-populist 0 0.002 0 0.021 0 0 0 
Crisis emphasizing overall 0 0.058 0.019 0.071 0.004 0.008 0.015 
Crisis denying populist 0.006 0.054 0.038 0.038 0.017 0.017 0.021 
Crisis denying non-populist 0.004 0.002 0.004 0 0.002 0.002 0.002 
Crisis denying overall 0.01 0.056 0.042 0.038 0.019 0.019 0.023 
Failure recognizing populist 0.006 0.11 0.056 0.088 0.021 0.025 0.035 
Failure recognizing non-
populist 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.021 0.002 0.002 0.002 
Failure recognizing overall 0.01 0.115 0.06 0.108 0.023 0.027 0.038 
Failure ignoring populist 0.077 0.046 0.044 0 0.002 0.044 0.004 
Failure ignoring non-populist 0.102 0.063 0.083 0.013 0.029 0.071 0.042 
Failure Ignoring overall 0.179 0.108 0.127 0.013 0.031 0.115 0.046 
Overall populist 0.083 0.156 0.1 0.088 0.023 0.069 0.04 
Overall non-populist 0.106 0.067 0.088 0.033 0.031 0.073 0.044 
Coded excerpts 0.19 0.223 0.188 0.121 0.054 0.142 0.083 
 
166. https://www.theguardian.com/world/ng-interactive/2019/mar/06/revealed-the-rise-and-rise-of-populist-
rhetoric 
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In accord with these intentions, in the table given above, I’ve shared cross case proportions 
of each rhetoric that Erdoğan exercises during his speeches which I’ve focused throughout 
this work. According to proportions of populist coded excerpts with respect to overall 
frequency of all coded excerpts, Erdoğan’s populism is greater in case 2, case 3, and case 4 
while cross case proportions of populist and non-populist excerpts of case 6 and case 7 is 
also close. When overall frequencies and proportions are checked, the overall view seems to 
have a better accord with Hawkins’s findings. Total frequencies of each type of rhetoric and 
their overall proportions are given below: 
 
Table 4.23 Overall frequencies and proportions of all types of rhetoric 
Type of Rhetoric Overall Frequency Proportion (of all 
excerpts) 
Crisis emphasizing populist 72 0.15 
Crisis emphasizing non-populist 11 0.023 
Crisis emphasizing overall 83 0.173 
Crisis denying populist 92 0.192 
Crisis denying non-populist 8 0.017 
Crisis denying overall 100 0.208 
Failure recognizing populist 164 0.342 
Failure recognizing non-populist 19 0.04 
Failure recognizing overall 183 0.381 
Failure ignoring populist 104 0.217 
Failure ignoring non-populist 193 0.402 
Failure Ignoring overall 297 0.619 
Overall populist 268 0.558 
Overall non-populist 212 0.442 
Coded excerpts 480 1.000 
 
To this table, Erdoğan exercises populist appeals more frequently than non-populist ones. 
However, the difference between overall frequencies & proportions, and cross case 
proportions relies on the variation of the intensity of applying populist rhetoric in different 
cases.  Erdoğan’s populist appeals overwhelms non-populist ones in case 2 (75 vs 32) and 
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case 4 (42 vs 16) while in remaining cases numbers are close to each other167. case 1, when 
economic failures were not complemented with political ones, frequency of populist appeals 
vis-à-vis non-populist ones is 40 vs 51, while this is 48 vs 42 for case 3, 11 vs 15 for case 5, 
33 vs 35 for case 6, and 19 vs 21 for case 7. These numbers are also shared under each case. 
Overall, due to overwhelming dominance of populist appeals in case 2 and case 4, Erdoğan 
more frequently applies populist rhetoric. But when we check the intensity of populist 
appeals vis-à-vis non-populist ones, in 3 failure periods that’s the case, while in the last two 
cases numbers are very close. When one checks within case frequencies, then one can easily 
figure out that the overwhelming dominance of populist vs non-populist appeals in case 2 
and case 4. This is indeed crucial since, whenever Erdoğan overwhelmingly applies populism 
within a case, he also does it by perpetuating failures as crisis more frequently than denying 
framing them as crisis. Within case proportions of each rhetoric is given below. Frequencies 
are divided total number of coded excerpts per each case.  
 
Table 4.24 Within case proportions of each rhetoric 
Type of Rhetoric Case 
1 
Case 
2 
Case 
3 
Case 
4 
Case 
5 
Case 
6 
Case 
7 
Crisis emphasizing populist 0 0.252 0.1 0.397 0.077 0.059 0.175 
Crisis emphasizing non-populist 0 0.009 0 0.172 0 0 0 
Crisis emphasizing overall 0 0.262 0.1 0.569 0.077 0.059 0.175 
Crisis denying populist 0.033 0.243 0.2 0.328 0.308 0.118 0.25 
Crisis denying non-populist 0.022 0.009 0.02 0 0.038 0.015 0.025 
Crisis denying overall 0.055 0.252 0.22 0.328 0.346 0.132 0.275 
Failure recognizing populist 0.033 0.495 0.3 0.724 0.385 0.176 0.425 
Failure recognizing non-populist 0.022 0.019 0.02 0.172 0.038 0.015 0.025 
Failure recognizing overall 0.055 0.514 0.32 0.897 0.423 0.191 0.45 
Failure ignoring populist 0.407 0.206 0.23 0 0.038 0.309 0.5 
Failure ignoring non-populist 0.538 0.28 0.44 0.103 0.538 0.5 0.5 
Failure Ignoring overall 0.945 0.486 0.68 0.103 0.577 0.809 0.55 
Overall populist 0.44 0.701 0.53 0.724 0.423 0.485 0.475 
Overall non-populist 0.56 0.299 0.47 0.276 0.577 0.515 0.525 
Coded excerpts 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
 
 
167 Because cross case proportion of total number of coded excerpts of case 2 is the greatest, it pulls up overall 
populist appeals to a higher level vis-a-vis non-populist ones.  
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In 5 out of 7 cases, Erdoğan uses crisis denying populist rhetoric more frequently than crisis 
emphasizing one. Moreover, when we compare his overall crisis emphasizing and denying 
appeals, the proportion of overall crisis denying populist appeals are also greater than crisis 
emphasizing ones except case 2 and case 4. One possible explanation about populist and non-
populist appeals is the fact that I’ve viewed populism via claims of hegemonic totality and 
antagonism while the former inherently exists in all appeals that attempt to build an 
equivalential relation between Erdoğan and the people in an economic sense. So, non-
populist appeals for failure recognizing categories (crisis emphasizing and crisis denying 
categories) are overwhelmed by populist ones. However, when we look at within case 
proportions of failure ignoring and failure recognizing appeals, except case 7, populist 
rhetoric is less frequently used in remaining all 6 cases. In case 7, proportions are equal. This 
can be explained due to Erdoğan’s positive remarks about the economy and AKP’s 
contribution to it mostly lack antagonism. Erdoğan only applies antagonism during his 
rhetorical attacks on the opposition. In such appeals, while accentuating AKP’s contribution 
to Turkey and the people of Turkey in an economic sense, he either mentions failures of past 
governments or speaks hypothetically about potential future economic changes in Turkey 
due to a possible government change. 
When we compare proportions of crisis emphasizing and crisis denying appeals, Erdoğan 
mostly applies crisis emphasizing populist rhetoric during case 4 and case 2. The proportion 
of crisis emphasizing populist excerpts is greatest during case 4. The view is more intense 
when we check overall crisis emphasizing appeals because over 11 crisis emphasizing non-
populist appeals, 10 of them are exercised during case 4, during Erdoğan’s speeches 
exercised in the last two months of this case. In both case 2 and case 4, Erdoğan’s populist 
appeals with regards to perpetuating failures as crisis is greater than denying framing them 
as crisis. In both cases, all economic indicators that I’ve used while determining my cases 
have deteriorated. However, that’s not the case for case 7. Moreover, although deteriorated 
economic indicators are explicitly pronounced by Erdoğan in his discourses of case 2 and 
case 4, crisis emphasizing appeals are more about Erdoğan’s introduction of a bundle of 
political and economic failures together, what I’ve called as “package of failures” during this 
research. What I mean is Erdoğan overwhelmingly associates economic downturns with 
external threats and their domestic collaborators, both working against Turkey and welfare 
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and sovereignty of the people of Turkey. Such associations might be important since what 
makes case 2 and case 4 different than others is that AKP government underwent serious 
political conflicts on structural level with members of Gülenist Movement, and thus Turkey 
indeed experienced intense political failures in these two cases. In case 2, Turkey experienced 
December 17th-25th incidents and case 4 comes just after the failed coup attempt that members 
of Gülenist Movement are involved while implementations of state of emergency period 
continues. While December the 17th-25th incidents primarily target Erdoğan, some ministers 
and businesspeople which are close the government, the latter was conducted not only against 
Erdoğan but also against the people of Turkey. So, Erdoğan might attempt crisis emphasizing 
populist appeals more than crisis denying ones when he faces serious political failures that 
attempts to change political settings of the country. 
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Figure 4.29 All variables, cases, within case proportions of crisis emphasizing populist rhetoric and crisis denying populist rhetoric of 
each case
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In the graph given above, all variables and cases are provided while within case proportions 
of crisis emphasizing populist rhetoric (cepr) and crisis denying populist rhetoric (cdpr) are 
given for each case. For case 2 and case 4, Erdoğan more frequently applies crisis 
emphasizing populist rhetoric than crisis denying populist rhetoric (0.252 vs 0.243 in terms 
of within case proportions). For case 2, these seems to have an association with the rise in 
sense of crisis from 38.9 % to 49.7 % between October 2013 and January 2014. So, during 
case 2, sense of crisis rises while Erdoğan also uses a populist tone in perpetuation of failures 
as crisis than denying framing them as crisis. But does this work for Erdoğan’s and AKP’s 
favor? When we check electoral support to AKP, it falls from 40.2 % to 38.1 %. Of course, 
that might also be about corruption charges during December the 17th-25th incidents. 
However, although an association between crisis perpetuation via populist rhetoric and a rise 
in sense of crisis exists, it does not support the argument that that might help Erdoğan to 
remain in power. The story is not different for case 4. While Erdoğan more frequently applies 
crisis emphasizing populist rhetoric than crisis denying one (0.397 vs 0.328 in terms of within 
case proportions) crisis perception rises substantially, and almost continuously from 36.2 % 
to 63.9 % between September 2016 and January 2017, for the same period, the electoral 
support to AKP falls sharply from 49.8 % to 41 %. Furthermore, in both cases Erdoğan’s 
crisis emphasizing populist appeals do not overwhelm crisis denying ones while they are just 
more frequently applied. Cases in which sense of crisis rises regardless of Erdoğan’s rhetoric 
do not pertain to my research interest due to the scope of this study. 
Lastly, if to make an overall summary of cases, for case 1 when political failures are not 
common and serious confrontations do not even exist, Erdoğan does not even apply any crisis 
perpetuation attempts while crisis denying ones exist, but they are so few. Instead he 
overwhelmingly applies failure ignoring appeals vis-à-vis failure recognizing ones (overall 
values are 0.945 vs 0.055). And like in all cases, his failure ignoring non-populist appeals are 
greater than populist ones. For case 2, Erdoğan recognizes failures more frequently than just 
ignoring them due to serious political confrontation with Gülenist Movement occurs during 
December the 17th-25th incidents. In accord with this political atmosphere, he uses crisis 
emphasizing populist appeals more frequently than crisis denying ones. Although this seems 
to be related with a rise in sense of crisis among the people of Turkey, it does not seem to 
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work for the advantage of AKP in terms of electoral support. For case 3, failure ignoring 
rhetoric begins to overwhelm failure recognizing one due to approaching June the 7th 
elections (0.68 vs 0.32 in terms of within case proportions) while Erdoğan less frequently 
applies crisis emphasizing populist appeals than crisis denying ones. For case 4, Erdoğan 
again recognizes failures more frequently than just ignoring them due to recent bloody 
confrontation with members of the Gülenist Movement during July the 15th coup attempt. 
Like in case 2, he again uses crisis emphasizing populist appeals more frequently than crisis 
denying ones while a tremendous rise in sense of crisis among the people of Turkey occurs. 
However, it again does not seem to work for the advantage of AKP in terms of electoral 
support. One important detail of this case is Erdoğan’s overall failure recognizing appeals 
overwhelms his failure ignoring rhetoric (0.897 vs 0.103 in terms of within case proportions). 
For case 5, Erdoğan’s crisis denying appeals are greater than crisis emphasizing ones while 
number of coded excerpts of any type of rhetoric is the lowest when compared with all 
remaining cases. Only 26 excerpts have been detected while Erdoğan’s tendency is more 
about ignoring failures. For case 6, the gap between failure ignoring and recognizing appeals 
gets wider due to upcoming June the 24th elections and the former again overwhelms the 
latter as the election day approaches (0.809 vs 0.191 in terms of within case frequencies). 
Erdoğan again more frequently applies crisis denying populist appeals than crisis 
emphasizing ones. And lastly, for case 7 Turkey has underwent serious economic downturn 
due to exchange rate hike in Summer 2018 while political and diplomatic confrontation with 
the U.S. got severe. However, this confrontation was framed by domestic and international 
media to be more about Pastor Andrew Bronson’s imprisonment in Turkey. So different than 
what was experienced in case 2 and case 4, political crisis of case 7 did not seem to be about 
changing political settings of Turkey. For case 7, crisis denying populist appeals turn out to 
be greater than Erdoğan’s crisis emphasizing populist appeals. This might be related with 
due to the limited availability of data on official presidential webpage since some of 
Erdoğan’s appeals which were framed by the media were indeed more in accord with the aim 
of this research. However, I haven’t encountered such severe crisis perpetuation references 
of Erdoğan in discourses of this period on the official presidential webpage168. I think that 
 
168. An example that I’ve used to explain my categories: “If they have Dollar, we have our people, we have our 
Allah.” That was said by Erdoğan during exchange rate crisis of Summer 2018. 
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for the ones who aim to run future research, especially for this case, less limitations on 
availability of Erdoğan’s discourses may be more helpful. 
 
 
4.3. Concluding Remarks 
 
 
In this work, I’ve intended to run an exploratory research based on Moffitt’s argument that 
(2015) populism perpetuates failures and turns them into crisis, thereby achieve their 
sustainable populist politics, and remain in power. Moffitt (2015) argues that populists who 
skillfully perpetuate a performance of crisis and achieved to extend it to a longer period of 
time have longer political lifetime than the ones who couldn't achieved to do so (208). He 
points out Hugo Chávez’s success of achieving such perpetuation, and thereby had been able 
to rule for a long period of time (207). Depending on this claim, I’ve attempted to run an 
explorative empirical case studies and a mixed method research in order to find out whether 
Recep Tayyip Erdoğan might have also been able to remain in power due to same strategy 
or not, for between October 2012 and September 2018. In the most of this period, Turkey has 
undergone serious economic and political failures. In accord with my objective, I’ve created 
and defined my categorical variables while selecting my cases according to failure periods 
of three key economic indicators: exchange rate, unemployment rate, and inflation rate. I was 
hoping to find out more crisis emphasizing or denying attempts of Erdoğan when Turkey 
experiences serious economic downturns. Once I have adopted both a qualitative and 
quantitative approach in terms of focusing on my cases and then running analysis, despite 
the narrow scope of this exploratory research due to limited data, I’ve found out that Erdoğan 
does not seem to fit the “populist” profile that Moffitt (2015) mentions during his remarks 
on Hugo Chávez. Erdoğan’s crisis emphasizing populist rhetoric is more frequently exercised 
than his crisis denying populist rhetoric only in two of my cases, case 2 and case 4. Although 
there seems to be association with Erdoğan’s crisis perpetuation attempts of failures as crisis 
via a populist tone and sense of crisis levels, contrary to my expectation, the electoral support 
to AKP does not rise and does not seem to work for the advantage of the government and 
Erdoğan for related cases. In both of these cases Turkey underwent serious political failures 
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and Turkey’s political settings were under the risk of change. During case 2, Turkey 
experienced December 17th-25th incidents and case 4 refers to the period that the failed coup 
attempt that members of Gülenist Movement are involved on July the 15th, 2016. Hence, the 
variation of Erdoğan’s crisis emphasizing attempts might only be explained by Turkey’s 
facing with such huge political turmoil and framed by Erdoğan as political crisis in his pure 
political appeals. My point about this possible variation of Erdoğan’s perpetuation of crisis 
via populist rhetoric may indeed be in accord with Chávez’s position in Venezuela vis-à-vis 
the U.S. For many years, Venezuela under Chávez rule, had mostly been framed by 
international media as it has been under offensive political siege of the U.S. while this 
situation may have provided a fertile soil for Chávez crisis emphasizing attempts. Moffitt 
(2015) also gives examples of Chávez’s perpetuation of political failures as crisis in his work. 
Hence, due to constraints of data and time, and because of limited findings of this study, one 
can also focus on a greater temporal scope while maximizing cases by including non-failure 
periods, and might seek to find out whether Erdoğan’s crisis emphasizing attempts have an 
association with all serious political downturns that Turkey has recently faced with under 
AKP rule169. Moreover, any future research does not have to be limited to Turkey and 
Erdoğan while many contemporary democracies of today are either being ruled or may be 
ruled in close future by “populist” leaders. 
 
 
  
 
169 Moreover, if available data can be found, one can instead merely focus on political failures and Erdoğan’s 
perpetuation of such failures as crisis while checking political crisis perception of the people of Turkey. Due to data 
limitations in this work, I’ve been able to acquire only economic crisis perception of the people of Turkey.  
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APPENDIX 
 
 
 
Table: Web links of all selections 
Cases / Discourse IDs Links 
Case 1 / D01 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CwBs92-HiP0 
Case 1 / D02 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RhLQpW1WTrE 
Case 1 / D03 
 
http://www.harunkaraca.com/haber/genel-baskandan/286-
snbasbakanimizin-14-kasim-tarihli-genisletilmis-il-baskanlari-
toplantisi-konusmasinin-tam-metni; 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ccjb5kB8UEg 
Case 1 / D04 http://www.harunkaraca.com/haber/genel-baskandan/291-
basbakanimiz-sayin-recep-tayyip-erdogan-beyin-20-kasim-2012-
tarihindeki-grup-konusmasinin-tam-metni; 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dhudG1Bg_Gg 
Case 1 / D05 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ftBBStRT5DI 
Case 1 / D06 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0-7fdOPssrU 
Case 1 / D07 http://www.harunkaraca.com/haber/genel-baskandan/325-snbasbakan-
imizin-15-ocak-tarihli-tbmm-grup-toplantisi-konusmasinin-tam-metni; 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ajP42KLe1Hg 
Case 1 / D08 http://www.harunkaraca.com/haber/genel-baskandan/329-
snbasbakanimizin-22-ocak-2013-tarihli-grup-konusmasi; 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Sp4eUzn81Q0 
Case 1 / D09 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=77GHGfFSb3M 
Case 2 / D10 http://www.harunkaraca.com/haber/genel-baskandan/11407-
basbakanimiz-sayin-recep-tayyip-erdoganin-22-ekim-2013-tarihli-
grup-konusmasinin-videosu-ve-tam-metni; 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MR-8nU7AYrw 
Case 2 / D11 http://www.harunkaraca.com/haber/genel-baskandan/11416-
basbakanimiz-sayin-recep-tayyip-erdoganin-05-kasim-2013-tarihli-
grup-konusmasinin-videosu-ve-tam-metni ; 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PaaqcWP7qFs 
Case 2 / D12 http://www.harunkaraca.com/haber/genel-baskandan/11426-
basbakanimiz-sayin-recep-tayyip-erdoganin-19-kasim-2013-tarihli-
grup-konusmasinin-videosu-ve-tam-metni ; 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9kZTDX64HnU 
Case 2 / D13 http://www.harunkaraca.com/m/haber/genel-baskandan/11437-
basbakanimiz-sayin-recep-tayyip-erdoganin-03-aralik-2013-tarihli-
grup-konusmasinin-videosu-ve-tam-metni ; 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fTDPcdjxHDQ 
Case 2 / D14 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1hD5Oaul9Vs 
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Case 2 / D15 http://www.harunkaraca.com/haber/genel-baskandan/11470-
basbakanimiz-sayin-recep-tayyip-erdoganin-14-ocak-2014-tarihli-
grup-konusmasinin-videosu-ve-tam-metni ; 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UEgRtK2C_EU 
Case 2 / D16 http://www.harunkaraca.com/haber/genel-baskandan/12475-
basbakanimiz-sn-recep-tayyip-erdoganin-28-ocak-2014-tarihli-grup-
konusmasinin-videosu-ve-tam-metni; 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=htWnJKAa9cg 
Case 3 / D17 https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/2973/turkiye-genc-is-
adamlari-konfederasyonu-tugik-genel-baskani-erkan-gural-ve-
konfederasyon-uyelerini-kabulunde-yaptiklari-konusma 
Case 3 / D18 https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/2978/muhtarlar-
toplantisinda-yaptiklari-konusma 
Case 3 / D19 https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/2991/ikinci-muhtarlar-
toplantisinda-yaptiklari-konusma 
Case 3 / D20 https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/2997/ucuncu-muhtarlar-
toplantisinda-yaptiklari-konusma 
Case 3 / D21 https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/29791/dorduncu-muhtarlar-
toplantisinda-yaptiklari-konusma 
Case 3 / D22 https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/29895/besinci-muhtarlar-
toplantisinda-yaptiklari-konusma 
Case 3 / D23 https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/30100/altinci-muhtarlar-
toplantisinda-yaptiklari-konusma 
Case 3 / D24 https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/32122/musiad-23-genel-
kurulunda-yaptiklari-konusma 
Case 4 / D25 https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/51281/81-ilin-valisini-
kabulunde-yaptiklari-konusma 
Case 4 / D26 https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/52447/27-muhtarlar-
toplantisinda-yaptiklari-konusma 
Case 4 / D27 https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/55704/28-muhtarlar-
toplantisinda-yaptiklari-konusma 
Case 4 / D28 https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/55757/29-muhtarlar-
toplantisinda-yaptiklari-konusma 
Case 4 / D29 https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/58925/musiad-16-expo-fuari-
ve-20-uluslararasi-is-forumu-kongresinde-yaptiklari-konusma 
Case 4 / D30 https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/61114/turkiyenin-yeni-
guvenlik-konsepti-konferansinda-yaptiklari-konusma 
Case 4 / D31 https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/65283/31-muhtarlar-
toplantisinda-yaptiklari-konusma 
Case 4 / D32 https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/66361/32-muhtarlar-
toplantisinda-yaptiklari-konusma 
Case 4 / D33 https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/69654/33-muhtarlar-
toplantisinda-yaptiklari-konusma 
Case 4 / D34 https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/71110/35-muhtarlar-
toplantisinda-yaptiklari-konusma 
210 
 
Case 5 / D35 https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/87253/turken-vakfi-
geleneksel-gala-yemeginde-yaptiklari-konusma 
Case 5 / D36 https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/87254/2017-2018-akademik-
yili-acilis-toreninde-yaptiklari-konusma 
Case 5 / D37 https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/84824/kanaat-onderleri-ve-
stk-temsilcileri-ile-bulusma-programinda-yaptiklari-konusma 
Case 5 / D38 https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/85035/40-muhtarlar-
toplantisinda-yaptiklari-konusma 
Case 5 / D39 https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/87228/turkiyenin-otomobili-
ortak-girisim-grubunun-tanitim-toplantisinda-yaptiklari-konusma 
Case 5 / D40 https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/87288/41-muhtarlar-
toplantisinda-yaptiklari-konusma 
Case 6 / D41 https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/90386/ak-parti-grup-
toplantisinda-yaptiklari-konusma 
Case 6 / D42 https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/89348/ak-parti-grup-
toplantisinda-yaptiklari-konusma 
Case 6 / D43 https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/89335/ak-parti-grup-
toplantisinda-yaptiklari-konusma 
Case 6 / D44 https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/90412/ak-parti-grup-
toplantisinda-yaptiklari-konusma 
Case 6 / D45 https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/91644/ak-parti-grup-
toplantisinda-yaptiklari-konusma 
Case 6 / D46 https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/92030/ak-parti-grup-
toplantisinda-yaptiklari-konusma 
Case 6 / D47 https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/92346/ak-parti-grup-
toplantisinda-yaptiklari-konusma 
Case 6 / D48 https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/92474/ak-parti-grup-
toplantisinda-yaptiklari-konusma 
Case 6 / D49 https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/92824/ak-parti-grup-
toplantisinda-yaptiklari-konusma 
Case 6 / D50 https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/94019/sehit-aileleriyle-iftar-
programinda-yaptiklari-konusma 
Case 7 / D51 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=o2amPum2-cU 
Case 7 / D52 https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/94716/ak-parti-genel-
merkezinde-yaptiklari-balkon-konusmasi 
Case 7 / D53 https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/94767/cumhurbaskanligi-
goreve-baslama-toreninde-yaptiklari-konusma 
Case 7 / D54 https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/96173/15-temmuz-sehitler-
koprusu-bulusmasinda-yaptiklari-konusma 
Case 7 / D55 https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/96166/10-buyukelciler-
konferansi-nda-yaptiklari-konusma 
Case 7 / D56 https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/96331/kara-astsubay-meslek-
yuksekokulu-mezuniyet-toreninde-yaptiklari-konusma 
Case 7 / D57 https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/98641/gaziler-gunu-
toreninde-yaptiklari-konusma- 
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Case 7 / D58 https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/98791/teknofest-istanbul-da-
yaptiklari-konusma 
 
 
Table: The list of discarded textualized discourses of party meetings that is held on the 
national level and of Erdoğan’s meetings with muhtars due to random selection 
Case / Date Meeting or Event / 
Audience 
Links 
Case 2 / 
12.11.2013 
AKP Group Meeting 
/ AKP Members 
http://www.harunkaraca.com/haber/genel-
baskandan/11419-basbakanimiz-sayin-recep-tayyip-
erdoganin-12-kasim-2013-tarihli-grup-konusmasinin-
tam-metni 
Case 2 / 
26.11.2013 
AKP Group Meeting 
/ AKP Members 
http://www.harunkaraca.com/haber/genel-
baskandan/11432-basbakanimiz-sayin-recep-tayyip-
erdoganin-26-kasim-2013-tarihli-grup-konusmasinin-
videosu-ve-tam-metni 
Case 4 / 
01.12.2016 
Erdoğan’s Meeting 
with Muhtars / 
Muhtars 
https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/65235/30-
muhtarlar-toplantisinda-yaptiklari-konusma 
Case 4 / 
12.01.2017 
Erdoğan’s Meeting 
with Muhtars / 
Muhtars 
https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/70910/34-
muhtarlar-toplantisinda-yaptiklari-konusma 
Case 6 / 
30.01.2018 
AKP Group Meeting 
/ AKP Members 
https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/89339/ak-
parti-grup-toplantisinda-yaptiklari-konusma 
Case 6 / 
17.04.2018 
AKP Group Meeting 
/ AKP Members 
https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/92351/ak-
parti-grup-toplantisinda-yaptiklari-konusma 
 
Table: The list of remaining discarded textualized discourses due to random selection 
Case / Date Meeting or Event / 
Audience 
Links 
Case 3 / 
06.01.2015 
The 7th Ambassadors 
Conference / 
Ambassadors of 
Turkey 
https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/2970/yedinc
i-buyukelciler-konferansinda-yaptiklari-konusma 
Case 3 / 
20.01.2015 
Energy Markets 
Summit / Members 
of Energy Market 
Regulatory 
Authority and 
Participants of the 
Summit 
https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/2974/enerji-
piyasalari-zirvesinde-yaptiklari-konusma 
Case 3 / 
18.04.2015 
Opening Ceremony 
in Kocaeli / The 
People of Kocaeli 
https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/31829/kocae
linde-toplu-acilis-toreninde-yaptiklari-konusma 
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Case 3 / 
19.04.2015 
Opening Ceremony 
of Levent-Hisarüstü 
Subway Line / the 
People of Istanbul 
https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/31831/leven
t-rumeli-hisarustu-metro-hatti-acilis-toreninde-
yaptiklari-konusma 
Case 3 / 
21.04.2015 
175th Anniversary of 
Establishment 
Ceremony of Turk 
Telekom / Members 
of Turk Telekom 
Company 
https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/31970/turk-
telekomun-175-kurulus-yil-donumu-dolayisiyla-
duzenlenen-torende-yaptiklari-konusma 
Case 3 / 
29.04.2015 
Publicity of Turkey 
Agriculture and 
Rural Development 
Attempt Project 
Practices / Farmers 
and Producers 
https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/32123/turki
ye-tarim-ve-kirsal-kalkinma-hamlesi-proje-
uygulamalari-tanitim-programinda-yaptiklari-
konusma 
Case 4 / 
01.09.2016 
Inauguration of 2017 
Court Year / 
Members of the 
Judiciary 
https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/51194/2016-
2017-adli-yil-acilis-toreninde-yaptiklari-konusma 
Case 4 / 
04.11.2016 
Capital Markets 
Congress / 
Businesspeople 
https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/58871/serm
aye-piyasalari-kongresinde-yaptiklari-konusma 
Case 4 / 
07.11.2016 
Opening Ceremony 
of Electric Power 
Plants / Actors of the 
Energy Market 
https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/61154/elektr
ik-santralleri-toplu-acilis-toreninde-yaptiklari-
konusma 
Case 4 / 
10.11.2016 
November the 10th 
the Commemoration 
of Atatürk / 
Participants of the 
Ceremony 
https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/61155/10-
kasim-gazi-mustafa-kemali-anma-toreninde-
yaptiklari-konusma 
Case 4 / 
13.11.2016 
Sendoff Ceremony 
of Energy Ships to 
Their Duty Station / 
Members of 
Karadeniz Holding 
and Sedef Shipyard  
https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/61175/enerji
-gemilerini-gorev-yerlerine-ugurlama-toreninde-
yaptiklari-konusma 
Case 4 / 
14.11.2016 
National Agriculture 
Project Meeting / 
Farmers 
https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/61156/milli-
tarim-projesi-toplantisinda-yaptiklari-konusma 
Case 4 / 
23.11.2016 
Gong Ceremony of 
Memorandum of 
Understanding for 
Strategic 
Cooperation Signed 
https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/61108/borsa
-istanbul-ile-islam-kalkinma-bankasi-arasinda-
imzalanan-stratejik-isbirligi-icin-mutabakat-zapti-
gong-toreninde-yaptiklari-konusma 
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Between Istanbul 
Stock Exchange and 
Islamic 
Development Bank 
Case 5 / 
01.10.2017 
Inauguration of 
Turkish Parliament 
for the 26th Term 3rd 
Legislative Year / 
Representators of 
the Nation 
https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/84720/turki
ye-buyuk-millet-meclisi-26-donem-3-yasama-yili-
acis-konusmasi 
Case 5 / 
29.10.2017 
October the 29th 
Republic Day 
Reception / 
Representators of 
the Nation 
https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/87240/29-
ekim-cumhuriyet-bayrami-resepsiyonunda-yaptiklari-
konusma 
Case 5 / 
01.11.2017 
Tourism Council / 
Individuals of 
Tourism Industry 
https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/87230/3-
turizm-srasinda-yaptiklari-konusma 
Case 7 / 
13.07.2018 
Opening Ceremony 
of the First Meeting 
of Presidency 
Cabinet / Ministers, 
Deputies, and 
Participants of the 
Ceremony 
https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/95917/cumh
urbaskanligi-kabinesi-birinci-toplantisi-acilis-toreni-
nde-yaptiklari-konusma 
Case 7 / 
13.07.2018 
The Ceremony of 
Granting Medal of 
Honor to Turkish 
Parliamentary 
Speaker Binali 
Yıldırım / 
Participants of the 
Ceremony 
https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/94865/tbmm
-baskani-binali-yildirim-a-devlet-seref-madalyasi-
tevcih-toreninde-yaptiklari-konusma 
Case 7 / 
15.07.2018 
Dinner with Kith 
and Kin of Martyrs 
and Veterans of July 
the 15th / Kith and 
Kin of Martyrs and 
Veterans of July the 
15th 
https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/96172/15-
temmuz-sehit-yakinlari-ve-gazileri-ile-yemek-
programinda-yaptiklari-konusma 
Case 7 / 
26.08.2018 
Conquest of 
Anatolia Malazgirt 
1071 Ceremony / 
Politicians and 
Participants of the 
Ceremony 
https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/96277/anad
olu-nun-fethi-malazgirt-1071-toreninde-yaptiklari-
konusma- 
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Case 7 / 
29.08.2018 
2017 Media Oscar 
Awards Ceremony 
of RTGD / Media 
Individuals 
https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/96329/radyo
-televizyon-gazetecileri-dernegi-2017-yili-medya-
oscarlari-odul-toreninde-yaptiklari-konusma 
Case 7 / 
30.08.2018 
The Ceremony of 
August 30 Victory 
Day / Participants of 
the Ceremony 
https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/96324/30-
agustos-zafer-bayrami-resepsiyonunda-yaptiklari-
konusma 
Case 7 / 
30.08.2018 
Graduation 
Ceremony of 
Students of Military 
Academy / 
Authorities of 
National Defense 
University and 
Military Academy, 
Graduated Students 
and Their Families 
https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/96330/milli-
savunma-universitesi-harp-okullari-mezuniyet-
toreninde-yaptiklari-konusma 
 
 
 
